865.014/10–849
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)1
It appears that general debate in Committee I on the disposal of the former Italian Colonies is very nearly complete.2 Statements by representatives of the inhabitants of the territories concerned will have been completed in a few days. Argentina has already submitted a resolution providing for a 15-member subcommittee to consider resolutions submitted to the Committee and to draft a resolution or resolutions which the Committee might consider.
Thus far four resolutions have been submitted, by India, Iraq, Liberia and the Soviet Union. Only the last named deals with all three of the former colonies. It appears likely that most delegations will favor consideration of each of the colonies in a separate resolution, although the Soviets may well try to insist on a single package.
From the general debate, from our talks with many of the delegations, and from the nature of the resolutions which have been submitted, it appears likely that agreement of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly on Libya will be possible in this session, although there is still work to be done in ironing out procedural details. Two-thirds agreement on Italian Somaliland will be more difficult, but is not impossible.
The situation is most fluid with regard to Eritrea, and there is some talk of postponement. This sentiment is accompanied by considerable feeling that a commission of some sort should be sent to Eritrea to determine the situation there, especially the wishes of the inhabitants.
Libya
The principle of independence for Libya without an intervening period of trusteeship appears to be almost unanimously accepted. The issues which remain to be settled involve varying assessments by the delegations of the procedures which will be required to effect an orderly transition from occupation to independence without jeopardizing the authenticity of independence itself. While some delegations not in the Soviet bloc have suggested virtually immediate independence, it seems likely that they do so through failure to appreciate the dangers to stability of too rapid a transition. On the other hand, the resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation, calling not only for immediate [Page 590] independence but for the complete withdrawal within three months of all foreign troops and bases, may well be calculated to promote confusion. This is especially so inasmuch as the Soviets can advertise their proposal as not only insuring “authentic independence”, but as in line with their peace propaganda. Any necessary argument against the Soviet proposal must be careful to emphasize the necessity for proceeding slowly and carefully to assure an orderly transition, and must not further open the way to Soviet propaganda about colonialism and strategic preparation for aggression.
The Indian resolution calls for completion of the transition to independence in two years, whereas the Iraqi resolution calls for an immediate declaration of independence and immediate steps to a handover within as short a period as practicable. The Iraqi resolution might well be susceptible of amendment to bring it into line with our view that a definite period of three or four years should be prescribed for the transition; we could probably accept specification that immediate steps be taken to put the machinery in motion.
There has been very little specific opposition to the concept of unity of Libya, which we support, but there is some support for the British view that the inhabitants of Libya should decide the point. Both the Indian and Iraqi resolutions refer specifically to a united Libyan state, although the Indian resolution is so worded as to permit that state to be federal rather than unitary.
The question of whether there should be an advisory commission in Libya is rather fluid, although there seems to be general agreement that the General Assembly should arrange to keep itself informed of the progress toward independence. Thus, the Indian resolution incorporates the idea that a commission of experts should be appointed to supervise convening of a Constituent Assembly and to approve a constitution for Libya drawn up by that Assembly. The Iraqi resolution calls only for reports by the present administrations to the United Nations on the progress made toward independence. Of course, neither of these resolutions comes near to our position; the latter does not yet, however, appear to require modification. The British strongly favor the Iraqi resolution, with slight modifications, as it eliminates direct U.N. supervision during the interim period.
Eritrea
Support for the cession of all of Eritrea except the Western Province to Ethiopia falls far short of a majority. Arguments of the merits of the case for cession and arguments of the economic and political unpreparedness of Eritrea for independence have not made much headway. It now appears that in order to head off independence, or even trusteeship, we and those who so far agree with us may have to [Page 591] move onto compromise ground. The Delegation is now exploring the possibilities of finding such ground.
Only the Soviet resolution mentions Eritrea, calling for independence in five years, during which time the area would be administered under trusteeship. The resolution provides that an administrator appointed by the Trusteeship Council would be assisted by an advisory committee comprising representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council and of Italy and Ethiopia, with one European and two native residents of Eritrea nominated by the other seven members. The Soviet resolution would also give Eritrea an outlet to the sea through Assab. This resolution is obviously unacceptable to us, as would be any resolution permitting direct Soviet participation in the Administration of an East Africa territory.
Italian Somaliland
Although there is no great enthusiasm for Italian trusteeship over Italian Somaliland, there appears to be no serious threat to this proposal. In fact, it is understood that the Latin American caucus has decided to condition their support of Libyan independence on Arab support of Italian trusteeship in Somaliland. Liberia has introduced a resolution calling for independence of Somaliland after ten years of trusteeship administration, without specifying the trustee power. The Soviet Union resolution embodies the same complicated formula for Somaliland as that proposed for Eritrea. While neither of these resolutions is acceptable to us, the Liberian or a similar resolution might be susceptible of amendment which would enable us to support it.