501.BB/10–749: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
Delga 70. On basis most recent estimates staff fully convinced our preferred position on Eritrea has no chance of approval or of even [Page 587] simple majority support. Latin-American, together with Middle East and Asiatic groups are solidly opposed to this solution and such groups as Scandinavians are at best lukewarm. If we persist, therefore, in pressing our preferred position we would run most serious risk of severely damaging both our own and Ethiopian prestige by heavy adverse vote and ending up with solution voted by Assembly over our opposition which might freeze out Ethiopians altogether and seriously impair chances advancing our own objectives in Eritrea.
We have also received reports Latin-American caucus has decided to condition support of independence for a united Libya on Arab support of Italian trusteeship in Somaliland. While this development would not in itself necessarily prejudice chances of approval Libyan position it does isolate Eritrea and encourage tendency favoring postponement this session. In order forestall postponement or development undesirable compromise formula by other delegations, staff considers we should immediately shift our orientation and work towards compromise likely command necessary support while getting all we can for Ethiopia and protecting our interests.
Two compromise formulae appear to present possibilities. Clutton (UK) has as personal proposal suggested: (a) adoption this session resolution recommending incorporation in Ethiopia of those areas Eritrea occupied by Coptic Christians and others desirous of union with Ethiopia; (b) establishment commission to draw new boundary under terms of reference similar Trieste Boundary Commission, i.e. based on ethnic economic and geographic considerations. Clutton suggests commission could not avoid finding that practically all of Eritrea, exclusive of the Western Province, should be incorporated in Ethiopia since those areas occupied by Coptics could not be separated from rest of Eastern Provinces nor could cities of Asmara and Massawa be excluded on economic and geographic grounds. Thus, Clutton’s formula would accomplish our present objectives with the blessings of a commission and in accordance with a formula which presumably could not be objected to by Italy or their friends who are now insisting on independence as being in accordance with the wishes of the population. This formula might have further advantage of appealing to many delegations who think a commission should visit area.
Another possibility which staff considers feasible (and more likely than Clutton’s formula to command necessary support) is formula providing for confederation of all Eritrea, including Western Province, with Ethiopia through the person of the Emperor. Emperor would control such common problems of two territories as foreign affairs, defense, finance, etc. At the same time, provisions would be made for full local autonomy in Eritrea and guarantees for protection [Page 588] of political and economic rights of Eritreans. Such a formula might provide for Economic and Customs Union, full freedom of movement including completely free access to sea for Ethiopia. Full provisions could be made for guarantees of human rights for Eritreans. This kind of proposal might well attract further support by including provision for expert or international commission to assist in drawing up constitution giving effect to it.
The staff believes this formula should satisfy Emperor and at same time would overcome any legitimate Eritrean fears of domination by Addis Ababa. Formula would entirely safe-guard US interest and would also take care of problem of Western Province for which any other solution seems as difficult as ever.
Sforza expressed to Jessup his acceptance principle Economic and Customs Union Eritrea and Ethiopia and we have some reason to believe that additional concession of political union at the top level with adequate guarantees for local autonomy might also be accepted by Italy and therefore by Latin-Americans.
Request Department’s views urgently since developments are moving fast. In the meantime, we shall maintain Department’s approved position while at same time sounding out certain key delegations with respect possible compromise solutions. We will of course keep closest touch Ethiopian Delegation.
We have this noon discussed with Aklilou (Ethiopia) our doubts re success of our position on Eritrea, and suggested to him the two possible alternatives outlined above. Aklilou, while agreeing outlook not favorable and admitting damage which would be caused by defeat of our solution, was non-committal on best way to safeguard Ethiopian aspirations. We assured him that we would continue to make every effort to obtain approval of our present position pending Ethiopian consideration of above views and further consultations with him. Aklilou was insistent that he would oppose in every way a decision on Somaliland if it appeared certain that no decision possible for Eritrea at this session. Spencer observed that Ethiopian Government would go so far as to block Italian-Somaliland trusteeship agreement by refusing to agree to delineation of Ethiopian-Somaliland boundary. He added that, while Ethiopia would never give its positive support to Italian trusteeship for Somaliland, it would acquiesce in such a settlement provided simultaneous or prior satisfactory solution Eritrea.