Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/1–1749: Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Bay) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

Oslo, January 17, 1949—5 p. m.

23. Following comments offered on Copenhagen’s 27 January 12 to Department.

1. While Norwegians, no less than Danes, are determined explore all possibilities in effort preserve Scandinavian unity, I cannot believe Norwegian Government has any serious expectation Karlstad formula will be approved by US. Foreign Minister Lange has always indicated that for sake Norway’s relations with other Nordic countries as well as domestic public opinion, every line of approach must first be exhausted but that Norway would never agree to anything which would close door to association with West. Unless he has completely misunderstood purport Vandenberg resolution, which I do not believe, Lange is in my opinion under no illusions that a Scandinavian pact based Karlstad terms would fulfill requirements of mutual aid and of advancing US security. Norway’s willingness discuss Karlstad formula simply confirms that Lange prepared pursue attempts at compromise, but I believe he is fully aware of formula’s fallacies.

2. Danish argument that neutral Scandinavian bloc would be deterrent to Russian aggression seems completely unrealistic. Sweden could possibly resist Soviets better alone than encumbered by weak Norway let alone Denmark lacking all essential equipment. Combined front three Scandinavian countries cannot be compared to effect produced if joined with other members North Atlantic pact. Seems to me an insulated Scandinavian defense group constitutes chiefly an imposing consolidation of liabilities stimulating only to a potential aggressor. Moreover Danish reasoning that since US arms are being made available to members of Atlantic pact such arms should be offered to outsiders like Danes, seems to ignore both intent of Vandenberg resolution and limitations of supply under legislation not yet enacted.

3. With respect to Copenhagen’s observation that US North Atlantic members will be “relieved of obligation to defend indefensible Denmark” I assume they do not desire to be so relieved.

4. I believe that any support of such fallacious and weak-kneed Danish policy at this critical point would be disastrous in its consequences to Norway and Norwegian morale. By espousing or offering slightest encouragement to such course we might not only lose Denmark as prospective member Atlantic pact, but would undermine whole Norwegian position. Superimposed on present background one might say “as Norway goes so goes the election”. Loss of Norway would threaten entire concept North Atlantic community of nations standing in opposition to Soviet encroachments. Lange’s present position cries for firm US attitude.

5. It is my belief, shared by others in Oslo diplomatic corps, that Karlstad approach to Nordic security problem may well have its origin in Moscow. Such a plan designed to torpedo or at least materially retard Atlantic pact could be subtly inspired by Soviets and innocently swallowed by Swedes. Any Scandinavian pact that prohibited association with West would give Russia nothing to fear. Furthermore form of Russian aggression may not necessarily be direct military attacks but with Scandinavian neutrality could take form of slow aggression as in Finland.

6. Even Swedish Ambassador¹ appears to have tongue in cheek in discussing Karlstad formula with me and members my staff. Beck Friis acknowledged war unlikely within two years. Later he conceded to me US rearmament at contemplated rate could provide substantial help within that period. He found it difficult explain therefore why Sweden raised doubts of US aid as reason for not joining Atlantic pact. He declared to me his faith in West, and indicated his well learned speech does not always represent his personal views.

7. Over weekend British Ambassador Collier communicated following to me at request of British Foreign Office: Signs appearing of possible attempt prolong Scandinavian defense discussions February 15 or longer and this should be firmly discouraged. British Ambassador Copenhagen Randall has suggested line similar Copenhagen’s telegram 27 January 12 to Department. Collier deplores danger of developing unanimity between Danish Foreign Office and US–UK thinking. Collier also concurs Oslo Embassy views. He also stated British Ambassador Stockholm concurs fully with Matthews, Collier says Randall suggests Russian opposition to Scandinavian pact is no less than to Atlantic pact. This is neither Collier’s belief nor mine, but possibly is Russia’s contribution to Scandinavian confusion. Lange stated to Collier as to me US will probably get request supply missing link, namely arms, to complete Karlstad formula. Based on Lange’s conversations Collier firmly convinced, as am I, that Norway will join Atlantic pact if invited regardless outcome Karlstad discussions. Lange told Collier Rasmussen wavered in confidential understanding through giving press information which Lange interpreted as possible desire to condition Danish people for Danish Government’s hesitation on Atlantic pact. Collier believes Copenhagen is the danger spot. We agreed if US softened stated arms policy and met Karlstad formula, world would interpret this as premium on neutrality for European states. Any qualifying suggestion from Sweden that in consideration of US assistance under Karlstad formula Sweden might ultimately consent to principle Scandinavian group as whole join Atlantic pact is naive since help program once inaugurated would dissolve any reason for abandonment of status quo.

Sent Department 23, repeated Stockholm 2, Copenhagen 3, London 1, Moscow 1.

Bay

1. Johan H. Bech-Friis, Swedish Ambassador in Norway.