Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/1–1449

Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, January 14, 1949, 3 p.m.

Washington, January 14, 1949, 3 p.m.

top secret

Mr. Lovett suggested a discussion of the three remaining important questions: Italy; the departments of Algeria; and the duration of the Treaty. Also, the question of informing Norway and Denmark, who would be meeting shortly with Sweden, should be considered.

The question of the inclusion of Italy in the Pact had been brought to the front by a formal request on the part of Italy. He regretted that the request had been made because it could prove to be a complicating element in Italian internal affairs. However, since the request had been made, it was necessary that it be considered. The US position was that Italy, in view of its geographical location, should in some way be associated with Western Europe. This might be through the Brussels Pact or the more general organization of the European Council.

Mr. Van Kleffens¹ thought that with regard to Italy, the proposition was now clear. Because of its situation outside the North Atlantic area it was not a natural partner of the North Atlantic Pact. On the other hand, the maximum should be done for Italy. The solution of the Italian problem would have repercussions on the countries in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean, perhaps even on the position of Spain.

Speaking in a purely personal capacity, he wondered whether a way out of this problem, which had become more complicated by the Note of the Italian Ambassador, could perhaps be found by the insertion in the Treaty of a provision for which he submitted informally, with every apology for hasty drafting, a suggestion reading as follows:

“The Parties recognize that the attainment of the purposes of this convention may be promoted by the association of countries situated outside the area defined in Article 5, which in matters of human rights, state, and society held views similar to theirs. Agreements made with such countries will be in the form of annexes to this convention and will be considered as forming an integral part thereof.”

Asked whether there was any geographic limitation to the suggested clause, Mr. Van Kleffens thought that in view of the global nature of the conflict with regard to which this Treaty was being negotiated, it might perhaps not be advisable a priori to exclude even remote countries which met the requirements of the clause.

Mr. Lovett thought that Mr. Van Kleffens’ approach was an interesting one and that it raised indirectly the definition of the areas in which the Treaty would be operative. At present, US thinking favored specifying countries or continents in the operating clause rather than making a map definition. This would make it simpler to deal with the question of Algeria since reference to the departments of Algeria could be made parenthetically with France.

Mr. Van Kleffens pointed out that his suggestion, which was of course open to any amendment, left the “hard core” intact, but created the possibility for other countries outside the North Atlantic area with the same civilization to participate on an equal footing.

Mr. Bonnet said it was well known that France favored the inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact. His position, therefore, with respect to the note presented by the Italian Ambassador was that an invitation should be issued to Italy.

He said that he would refer Mr. Van Kleffens’ proposal to his Government, but he personally thought that the approach, although interesting, raised certain doubts. Others had said that the inclusion of Italy would weaken the position of refusing admission to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. However, he thought that the crucial consideration was that there existed territorial continuity between Italy and the Brussels Treaty countries, while no such continuity existed between Greece and Turkey and Western Europe. Hence, the position of Italy was not at all the same as that of other countries such as Greece and Turkey. Therefore, if special arrangements were made with Italy and annexed to the Treaty, it would be more difficult not to grant the same considerations to other nations.

He thought that Mr. Van Kleffens’ approach would change the nature and the character of the Pact. It might assume the character of a coalition or become a frame for a coalition rather than conforming with the idea of regionalism as envisaged in Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Lovett thought Mr. Bonnet had made a good point in that the arrangement should be confined to a geographic area. This aspect was important because some of the proponents and supporters of the United Nations feared that the consultative provision of the Pact constituted a threat to the authority of the Security Council. It was important not to carry the provisions of the Treaty to the point where it might appear to be a competitor of the United Nations.

Sir Oliver Franks² said that his Government had on the whole been against the inclusion of Italy, and although this position had not been altered, the formal approach on the part of the Italian Government did change the picture and would necessitate reconsideration of the question by his Government. Referring to Mr. Van Kleffens’ suggestion, he said that the UK had been in favor of a geographical limitation and that the extension of the area into the Mediterranean would create new problems. He asked Mr. Van Kleffens two questions: What would be the content of the Italian agreement which would be annexed to the Pact? Would not some such formula appear very attractive to the Scandinavian countries?

Mr. Van Kleffens, in reply to the second question, pointed out that his suggestion solely concerned countries outside the North Atlantic area. It did not refer to Norway and Denmark or any other North Atlantic country.

As to Sir Oliver’s first question, he remarked that the agreements could take into account the particular circumstances of each country. In the case of Italy the limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty on its armaments would have to be considered. Some countries might be prepared to make bases available, others might make a military contribution. The scheme he had suggested was of a very flexible nature.

Mr. Wrong³ said that so far as Canada was concerned, it was politically very important that the full obligations assumed by the parties should operate within an area which could be called the North Atlantic area. His Government had been critical of treating Italy as a country in the North Atlantic area, but he thought it possible that it could agree to some form of Italian association if all the other countries so desired. He was not sure that his Government would accept Italy as a full partner, but he was sure it would not be prepared to accept the same obligations for Greece and Turkey as for Italy. He pointed out that a draft article which had been proposed by the Canadian representatives envisaged treating Italy in somewhat the same manner as that proposed by Mr. Van Kleffens, but that it had not commended itself to the working group. He observed that annexes to the Pact would constitute additional obligations which would necessitate separate legislative approval and ratification by the Governments. He said that he had an open mind concerning the approach proposed by Mr. Van Kleffens, but he thought it would require some sort of territorial limitation.

Mr. Le Gallais⁴ said that in view of recent developments he would like to consult his Government before making any comments.

Baron Silvercruys, referring to the question of Italy, said he had previously stated his Government’s position. It was considered that Italy raised the entire question of Mediterranean security which was very important but which could not be solved now within the framework of the North Atlantic Pact. It might be that in due time Article 9 as presently drafted could lead to a solution of some of the difficulties. For the present, his Government thought that something such as the proposed British declaration at the time of the signature of the Treaty would be adequate for coping with the Italian situation. In any case, his Government would not stand in the way if it were decided that Italy should be included in the Pact. He thought, however, that the Italian initiative requesting an invitation to be a member of the Pact constituted a new element. The formal request of the Italian Government had changed the situation and required that fresh consideration be given to the matter.

Mr. Lovett agreed that the formal request changed the situation and regretted that it had been made. He thought, however, that since the request had been received, it was necessary to give fresh consideration to the question and arrive at a decision as soon as possible.

Mr. Van Kleffens felt that the maximum should be done for Italy. In the note of the Italian Ambassador nothing, however, was stated with regard to Italy’s contribution; it only asked for help and a guarantee.

Mr. Lovett observed that it was known very accurately just what Italy could do in contributing to the arrangement.

Sir Oliver Franks thought that Article 5 was flexible and provided for obligations on the part of different countries according to their resources and powers. In what way would Mr. Van Kleffens’ idea introduce more flexibility than was allowed for by the present draft Treaty? He asked Mr. Van Kleffens for clarification of the content of a possible Italian agreement which might be annexed to the Treaty.

Mr. Van Kleffens, in reply, observed that Italy was not able to undertake the full commitments of the Pact and constituted as such a special case. Moreover, it was outside the area of the North Atlantic where the hard core of the future security system was to be situated. He had submitted his suggestion to give Italy, which according to the note of the Italian Ambassador wanted full partnership, the greatest possible satisfaction. He had given no thoughts to the question whether countries associated under the suggested provision should sit on the council. Perhaps that would, just as in the case of Norway and Denmark, depend on the commitments they were prepared to undertake.

Mr. Bonnet observed that Italy could accept the obligations of the Pact in every case except that relating to military commitments entailing rearmament in excess of that allowed by the Peace Treaty. In any case, Italy would enjoy the same protection under the Treaty as the other countries. The system of a special annex would not in any way diminish the obligations of the other countries toward Italy.

Mr. Van Kleffens doubted if the term “North Atlantic Community” was still applicable if Italy were included.

Mr. Lovett agreed and said that the opposition to the Pact would be magnified if the area were expanded. It would be difficult enough to obtain acceptance for the idea of a tightly knit regional pact, but to expand the area would make the title “North Atlantic Pact” meaningless.

Baron Silvercruys assumed that the Italian note had not induced Sir Oliver Franks to withdraw his suggestion regarding a declaration covering Italy, Greece, or Turkey.

Sir Oliver Franks said that the proposed declaration was not withdrawn. The Italian request had introduced a new factor which required that further consideration be given to the question of Italy. He was sure that everyone agreed to the importance of strengthening the political ties of Italy with the West. As long as the Italian Government had not sought admission, the UK had not been in favor of it, but now that the request had been made, further consideration was required.

Mr. Wrong said that was also the position of the Canadian Government.

Sir Oliver Franks, beginning the discussion on Algeria, said that earlier he had expressed sympathy with the French proposal, but later had felt obliged to say that if no solution could be found, the UK would not regard it as a vital issue. If any solution could be found, the UK would be glad to agree.

Mr. Lovett said that, without in any way indicating that it was a possibility, it might be that by abandoning the map idea and dealing with the question on the basis of enumerating countries, a solution could be achieved. The US military advisers doubted seriously the wisdom of including Algeria and it was necessary to find some way of meeting the views of all the various parties.

Mr. Wrong said that the matter had caused concern on the part of the Canadian Government which was reluctant to see the area extended to include part of North Africa. He reserved his position, but was glad to note that the proposal now was concerned only with Algeria.

Baron Silvercruys asked if Malta were to be included and received Sir Oliver’s personal opinion that Malta might not be included but that Gibraltar would if Algeria were.

Mr. Hoyer Millar⁵ considered that Malta would probably depend on Italy.

Baron Silvercruys expressed satisfaction that only Algeria was being considered with respect to North Africa. He hoped that some formula could be found for this point to which France attached great importance, and suggested that it be considered further when a definite proposal was made.

Mr. Van Kleffens had considerable understanding for the French point of view and hoped that the majority would be able to find a solution which would bring this part of metropolitan France into the Pact.

Mr. Bonnet emphasized the seriousness with which his Government regarded the question of Algeria. France did not see how a Pact could include part of the Arctic regions and the northern part of Canada without including the three departments of Algeria which were a part of France. The exclusion of Algeria from the Brussels Treaty was explicable by the fact that the Treaty was purely European in scope. The North Atlantic Pact, on the other hand, covered a much wider area.

Mr. Lovett, referring to the question of duration, said that soundings which he had so far taken indicated that the term would have to be moderate—10 or 12 or 20 years—but said that the US had no firm opinion. He explained the difficulty from the point of view of US policy of concluding such a Pact for a long period. If the Pact proved itself, he doubted whether there would be any opposition to its extension.

Mr. Van Kleffens pointed out that the Brussels Pact had a duration of 50 years; the thoughts of the Brussels Pact signatories as to the duration of the North Atlantic Pact went along the same lines. He thought, however, it was realized in Europe that the position of the US was rather special on this point. Perhaps the thought would appeal to Congress that if an era of peace and security were to be established, a short period would not be of much avail. The psychological influence of the Pact would be stronger if a period of 20 years could be adopted than if it were for 12 years.

Mr. Bonnet said that his Government favored a long duration. The Treaty provided for cooperation in cultural and economic fields in which cooperation would not cease in 10 or 20 years. Also, the psychological value of the Treaty, from the point of view of organization for peace and a better working of the United Nations, would be much greater if it were concluded for a longer period.

Sir Oliver Franks thought that the original term of 50 years had been proposed without too much deep thought. However, the UK would not like the term to be markedly shorter than a generation. It would fail in one of its most important aims if it were what people would call a short-term agreement. He would like to see it concluded for at least 25 or 30 years.

Mr. Wrong said that since Canada, like the US, was venturing into a new field in foreign policy by subscribing to the Pact, his Government did not favor a long duration. The period suggested by Mr. Lovett was about what the Canadian Government had in mind. Also, if a term of as long as 20 years were agreed, it might be advisable to include a provision permitting, but not requiring, review at the halfway mark to determine whether, in view of the progress of the United Nations, the Pact should be extended, amended, or terminated. The Canadian representative had introduced such a proposal into the working group.

Mr. Lovett thought that such a proposal certainly had merit in that it might to a certain extent meet the objections of those opposition groups who felt that a competitor to the United Nations was being set up.

Mr. Le Gallais agreed with the opinions expressed concerning a minimum of 20 years.

Baron Silvercruys said the Belgian Government favored a duration as long as possible.

Mr. Lovett, in answer to a question by Baron Silvercruys, said that in his mind the duration of the Pact would not be affected by the inclusion or non-inclusion of Italy.

Mr. Van Kleffens made it clear that his suggestion at the begining of the meeting was not a formal proposal but merely an indication of a way in which a very real difficulty might perhaps be solved. He would welcome any improvement that could be suggested. It had not as yet been mentioned in the conversations that the Charter of the United Nations authorized only the conclusion of regional pacts. A North Atlantic Pact including Italy as a full partner could hardly be called a regional pact, and on that score might run into criticism which it would be difficult to refute.

Mr. Lovett stated that as a result of conferences which would take place in Scandinavia in the near future, there had been requests from Norway and Denmark for a look at the working papers of the Treaty. He asked for the views of the other representatives on this question.

After some discussion about the security aspect of making the draft text available to other countries, particularly Norway and Denmark, it was decided that the Norwegian and Danish Ambassadors should be thoroughly briefed on the Treaty without actually being given the text. The importance of security would also be strongly emphasized.

Mr. Lovett said that in view of his resignation he would probably not be present at the next meeting; and expressed his appreciation for the cooperation of the other representatives.

Mr. Bonnet, on behalf of the other representatives, expressed gratitude for the great contribution which Mr. Lovett had made to the talks.

1. E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States.
2. Sir Oliver S. Franks, British Ambassador in the United States.
3. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador in the United States.
4. Hugues Le Gallais, Luxembourg Minister in the United States.
5. Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer Millar, British Minister at Washington.