840.20/12–549
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)
| Participants: | Turkish Ambassador |
| Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary | |
| NEA: John D. Jernegan |
The Ambassador called, at his request, to ask whether I could tell him anything about the security relationships produced by the linking of Great Britain and the United States in the North Atlantic Pact while Britain was in turn linked to Turkey by the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Alliance of 1939. He recalled that he had raised this question with me some time ago.
I said that we had been giving considerable study to the whole problem of these interlocking relationships around the world. Right in our own back yard, for example, we had the question of the Rio Pact and the effect on its members of United States participation in the North Atlantic Treaty. However, there appeared to be many ramifications and it was proving extremely difficult and might even be impossible to arrive at a clear-cut juridical picture. Very possibly, we would never be able to give a positive statement as to what automatic obligations would arise out of the various commitments we and our associates had made. This was true even as between the members of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. So much would depend upon the way in which a concrete case might arise, that is, under the circumstances in which we and our associates might be called upon to consider what we should do in the light of our security obligations.
We were continuing our studies and, I said, I would be glad to talk to the Ambassador again from time to time as our thinking developed. For the moment, it seemed to me that the adherence of Great Britain to the North Atlantic Treaty, taken in conjunction with the existing UK-Turkish Treaty, had had a positive effect on Turkey’s security position, but I could not say more than that. I could not define precisely what this effect had been in terms of a direct relationship between Turkey and members of the North Atlantic Treaty other than Britain.
I asked the Ambassador how he viewed Turkey’s present situation and the attitude of the Turkish people toward security questions. Mr. Erkin said that while there had been no new developments in Turkey’s relationship with the USSR and her international position was therefore relatively calm, he could not say that the Turkish people were satisfied with the existing security arrangements. They were conscious of the lack of any commitment on the part of the United [Page 360] States to assist Turkey if she were attacked. Until Turkish-American relations were “clarified” by means of a formal mutual defense arrangement the Turkish people would never feel fully satisfied with their international situation.
I remarked that Turkey’s Treaty with Great Britain did not obligate Turkey to do anything which might involve her in a war with the Soviet Union. In any new arrangements which she might make with the Western Powers, would Turkey be willing to omit that reservation? The Ambassador hastened to say that conditions had changed since the Treaty of 1939 was drawn up. It was obvious that any aggression at the present time could only come from the USSR. Consequently, Turkey would be quite willing to omit any reservation with regard to the Soviet Union. He added that he understood the British Government did not want at this time to revise the 1939 Treaty, since to do so would be provocative to the Russians.
In commenting on a remark of mine, which he appeared to misunderstand, Ambassador Erkin remarked that if the attitudes of the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty should be a stumbling-block in the way of a defense arrangement between Turkey, Great Britain, France and the United States, he was sure the Turkish Government would be willing to make special provision to the effect that the obligations undertaken by the three Western Powers with respect to Turkey would not in any way involve the other NAP members despite their common association with the US–UK and France in the North Atlantic group. I made it clear that I was not suggesting any new arrangements but was merely trying to explore the interlocking effects of the present arrangements.