Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/12–349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (MacArthur)

top secret

[Washington,] December 3, 1949.

Participants:	Assistant Secretary Perkins
	Mr. N. E. Halaby, Department of Defense
	Mr. Thompson, EUR
	Mr. Achilles, WE
	Mr. Martin, RA
	Mr. Sheppard, S
	Mr. MacArthur, RA

Mr. Halaby called this morning to go over briefly the highlights of the Defense Ministers’ meeting in Paris on December 1. He said that the general atmosphere at the meeting was one of harmony with a general impression of greater solidarity among the Defense Ministers than in their first meeting on October 5.

Upon arrival in Paris, Secretary Johnson¹ was confronted with the following three problems on which there were divergent views:

1. Section 7–a of the Strategic Concept, which contains the sentence “Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb.”²

When the Military Committee met on November 29,³ the Danish representative made it clear that Denmark was strongly opposed to the above sentence and therefore proposed that the phrase “including prompt delivery of the atomic bomb” should be eliminated. The Danes apparently advanced a number of reasons including the fact that if the Concept paper should leak, the USSR might, upon the outbreak of war, use this phrase as a pretext for dropping an A-bomb on Copenhagen. General Bradley, Chairman of the Military Committee, overcame the objection of the Danish Chief of Staff in the meeting and the sentence was therefore not changed prior to consideration by the Defense Committee. Shortly after Secretary Johnson’s arrival in Paris the Norwegian Defense Minister informed him that if the reference to the A-bomb was not omitted a serious contretemps might arise in the Defense Ministers’ meeting since the Danish Minister was under categoric Cabinet instructions from his Government not to agree to the reference to the atomic bomb.

In view of this, Secretary Johnson devised a formula whereby he proposed to agree to the elimination of the phrase but to the inclusion in the minutes of a definite statement that strategic bombing included the use of the atom bomb. This formula was finally accepted by the Danish representative, but when Secretary Johnson proposed it in the Defense Ministers’ meeting the Belgians, followed by the Italians and Dutch, objected to the dropping of the phrase about the atom bomb on the basis that fear of the A-bomb was one of the greatest contributing factors to preventing a Russian attack, and in the event of hostilities its use would be necessary to allied strategy. After about forty minutes of discussion, the Defense Committee finally agreed to accept Secretary Johnson’s formula with the reference to the atomic bomb being replaced by some new and general language. Mr. Halaby did not have the language but felt that it might conceivably meet with objections on the score that it might imply bacteriological and other forms of warfare. While Mr. Halaby had no definite ideas as to whether or not we might wish to take up this subject with the North Atlantic Council when it meets to approve the Concept, he felt that we should give full consideration to the matter.

2. Section 7–d of the Strategic Concept, relating to control of sea communications.

The French desired to include in this section a specific statement that France should assume predominant responsibility for the lines of communications linking their African and metropolitan territories. In the United States view this raised a series of problems including the question of sea command in the Mediterranean, the possibility that France might endeavor to increase her Navy at the expense of her ground forces, and other considerations. When this subject came up in the meeting of the Military Committee, General Bradley was able to overcome the opposition of the French Chief of Staff. Mr. Pleven,⁴ however, was under Cabinet instructions to raise this matter in the Defense Ministers’ meeting. When Secretary Johnson learned of this fact he spoke to British Defense Minister Alexander, and it was agreed that they would both approach Pleven along the lines that this question was a planning matter which needed the most careful study by the military planners before it could be considered. Therefore, it was proposed to defer consideration of this question by the Defense Ministers until their next meeting, it being understood that in the interim period it would be thoroughly gone into by the planners.

3. Norwegian desire to have the strategic guidance for regional planning communicated to all representatives of the liaison group attached to the Standing Group prior to finalization of the paper.

The Norwegian Defense Minister, seconded by the Canadian, made known to Secretary Johnson the very strong view of his Government that the paper which is now being worked on by the Standing Group (which contains “strategic guidance for regional planning”)⁵ should be communicated to liaison representatives attached to the Standing Group for comment by their respective governments prior to its final consideration by the Military Committee. Despite the unhappiness of some of the United States military people, this proposal was agreed to by Secretary Johnson since it was obviously impossible to refuse. This, however, may make final approval of the paper more difficult since in addition to the Standing Group, the nine other governments will probably come up with thoughts or suggestions which will take time to discuss.

In addition to the three questions listed above, Mr. Halaby made the following additional observations:

[Here follow a list of United States delegates to the Paris meeting of the Defense Committee and observations by Halaby on the Committee’s discussion of ocean shipping, budgetary expenses, possible conflict of instructions between NATO and the Brussels Pact, and tentative plans for the next meeting.]

1. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense.
2. This version of Section 7–a is in an early draft, not printed. For the revised wording, see p. 355.
3. The North Atlantic Military Committee met in Paris under the chairmanship of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conjunction with the meeting of the Defense Committee. It was the Military Committee and its standing group that developed the “Strategic Concept” under reference here. For information concerning the Military Committee and its membership, see the communiqué released to the press in Paris on December 1 by the Defense Committee, Department of State Bulletin, December 19, 1949, p. 948.
4. René Pleven, French Minister of Defense.
5. Not identified in Department of State files.