840.20/8–349
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)
| Participants: | The Honorable Hume Wrong, Ambassador of Canada |
| Mr. Perkins, EUR | |
| Mr. Thompson, EUR | |
| Mr. Galloway, WE |
The Canadian Ambassador called this morning at his request and explained that he desired to discuss the Atlantic Pact organization in a preliminary fashion before leaving Washington this week end for a vacation of some two weeks.
The Ambassador said that he was generally familiar with the preliminary position taken by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on military organization under the Pact. He understood that suggestions had come from various quarters that within the military organization there should be constituted a Steering or Executive Group consisting of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and possibly Canada. The Canadian Government had taken the position that it would serve on such an executive group if an invitation were forthcoming, but that it would not of its own accord press for inclusion. He inquired if his understanding was correct that there had been no final decision on this point by the United Sttaes Government. In particular, he understood that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had not taken a final position.
[Page 316]The Ambassador was informed that it was true that the United States had not reached a position but that the Joint Chiefs were inclined toward an executive group consisting of only three nations. The Joint Chiefs’ view was based entirely on military considerations with particular reference to effective functioning of such an executive group.
It was explained to the Ambassador that there were certain questions in our minds as to the procedure to be followed in securing the acceptance of the idea of an executive group. We thought it probable that there would be opposition from the nations not to be represented. Hence, it might be advisable not to propose initially the formation of an executive group, but rather to let the executive group be proposed later as a result of demonstrated need for its existence.
The Ambassador said that he, too, entertained certain misgivings as to the desirability of proposing an executive group at the outset and he thought personally that the better solution might be to let it come about through the natural course of events. The Ambassador was informed that it would be helpful to us to know before the return of the Joint Chiefs to the United States1 if there were any further considerations on the part of the Canadian Government with respect to an executive group. He promised to keep this in mind during his conversations in Ottawa in the very near future, but doubted if there was anything more that his Government could say.
The Ambassador next spoke of the relationship between existing defense organizations and the Atlantic Pact organization. He thought that the work of the existing United States-Canadian Joint Defense Board should not be affected in any way by Atlantic Pact machinery. In other words, there should be no formal connection. There would, of course, be a necessity for certain informal liaison between the Atlantic Pact organization and the already existing organization. In short, his Government would be reluctant to see the existing arrangement for planning the defense of the North American Continent disturbed. He was informed that our thinking was exactly along those lines. We had envisaged the possibility of the creation of a United States-Canadian regional planning group within the Atlantic Pact, and although this group would probably be composed of the same personnel who constitute the existing military coordination committee, it would have a separate formal designation under the Atlantic Pact. Hence, there would be no official connection between the two, but the [Page 317] accomplishments of the existing organization would be utilized by the Pact organization.
The Ambassador then alluded to the question of location—in particular, as it concerned the main military organization under the Pact. He said that logically, United States and Canadian troops would form, for the most part, a reserve. It was the desire of the Canadian Government to maintain this concept and therefore they did not favor a location in Europe for the major military organization under the Pact. They were concerned lest such an arrangement would cause undue pressure on the United States and Canada for more extensive and exacting commitments as to the use of their troops on the continent of Europe. All things considered, the Canadian Government preferred Washington as the seat of the major military organization.
When the Ambassador asked about the timetable, we observed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would return to the United States about August 10. A few days would be required for consultation between the National Military Establishment and the Department of State after the Joint Chiefs’ return. We hoped that the working group could begin about August 15 and that its work could be completed in about three weeks’ time. It might, therefore, be possible to have a meeting of the Council about the middle of September.
The Ambassador thought that this was a reasonable estimate and expressed the opinion that from the point of view of convenience to his own Government and in view of the fact that Mr. Bevin would be in Washington during that period, Washington would be the logical place for the Council to meet.
We informed the Ambassador that this confirmed our own thinking and made the observation, with which he agreed, that if the working group achieved satisfactory results, the meeting of the Council should be very brief.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to return August 9 or 10 from Europe where they had been conferring informally with military representatives of the Brussels Pact nations on questions concerning military organization (840.20/6–2949).↩