Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63D351, NSC 40 Series

¹

Report by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the Council

top secret

Washington, July 29, 1949.

NSC 40/1

The Position of the United States With Respect to United States and North Atlantic Security Interests in Iceland

the problem

1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to United States and North Atlantic security interests in Iceland, with particular reference to the threat of an internal communist coup d’état to obtain control of the Icelandic Government.

analysis

2. The National Security Council by NSC Action Number 10 confirmed the strategic importance of Iceland along with Greenland and the Azores.^*

3. During conversations in Washington in March 1949 between the Icelandic Foreign Ministers and representatives of the State Department and the National Military Establishment, it was agreed that the possibility of internal communist subversion presents the most immediate danger to Iceland. The extent of the danger is indicated by the communist riots during the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty in the Althing on March 31.

4. The Icelandic Government has made it clear that Iceland could not countenance the presence of foreign troops or military bases in Iceland during peace time. The United States Government has expressed its understanding and acceptance of this position.

5. According to recent information from Icelandic officials, the police force of Reykjavik, chiefly unarmed, amounts to only 150 men; the Government of Iceland desires to strengthen this force but is prevented by the cost; police protection is needed against communist riots; the Icelanders are averse to the use of force and most Icelanders do not believe that the communists would use force; it is difficult to educate the people and to change their habits of mind; and this is the greatest obstacle facing Icelandic Government leaders, who admit that the problem is one which Iceland must solve. Nevertheless, available evidence indicates that in the last six months there has been a considerable decline in relative communist strength.

6. An armed attack on Iceland by external forces would call for action under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as well as action in the United Nations.

7. A communist coup d’état or threat thereof would be legitimate grounds for consultations under the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

8. The North Atlantic Treaty is not yet in force. For some time after it comes into force and its organizations are set up, the group is unlikely to be prepared to take effective action on this problem.

9. In the event of an armed attack on or a Communist coup d’état in Iceland prior to the completion of the arrangements envisaged in the North Atlantic Treaty, it may become necessary for one or more of the signatories to act to protect the security of the North Atlantic area.

conclusions²

10. The security of the United States and of the North Atlantic area requires that facilities in Iceland be available for use in the event of emergency by the military forces of the United States and its allies, and that Iceland continue to be denied to unfriendly or potentially hostile forces.

11. The Department of State should draw up and begin to implement at once a program designed to decrease the vulnerability of the Icelandic Government to communist seizure of power.

12. The National Military Establishment should make plans, including plans for possible deployment of United States forces to Iceland, to protect United States and North Atlantic security interests in Iceland in the event of emergency. The National Military Establishment, in consultation with the Department of State, should devise appropriate arrangements to make possible rapid implementation of these plans.

13. A governmental decision to implement the plans called for in paragraph 12 above would be taken only in accordance with the requirements of the political and military situation prevailing at the time of the emergency.

1. Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
2. NSC 2/1. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 2/1.]
2. President Truman approved these conclusions on August 5, 1949, and directed their implementation by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.