840.20/4–149
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary of State |
| Mr. Spaak | |
| The Belgian Ambassador | |
| Dr. Jessup | |
| Mr. Achilles | |
| Mr. Beam |
Military Assistance for Europe
Mr. Spaak having raised the question of military assistance under the Atlantic Pact, I explained that the US Congress would not authorize the delivery of arms to the Dutch which might go to Indonesia or replace armaments sent to Indonesia. Apart from the issues involved in Indonesia, this was simply a fact, since Congress was reluctant to appropriate money to nations not abiding by United Nations decisions. This is not a case of discrimination against the Netherlands. It would be best if the Indonesian matter were settled before the appropriation bill came up.
Mr. Spaak thought an improvement could be made in the coordination with the US of the arms requests of the Brussels powers. While it was natural for the European countries to get together and lay their results before the US, he feared this might lead to misunderstandings, since the US might feel that the Europeans were ganging up on us. As regards the Netherlands position, he mentioned there was also complete solidarity under the Five Power Treaty.
I said that Ambassador Douglas felt the five nations should meet together and before formally presenting the request to the US should inform him. It was not intended that Mr. Harriman or Mr. Douglas be present at every meeting but that representatives of the five European nations might consult Mr. Harriman regarding the ERP aspects and Mr. Douglas regarding armament requests before crystalizing their position.
Mr. Spaak did not entirely agree and thought there should be no objection to the US participating in the discussions at the outset, since difficulties arose from the fact that a certain amount of crystallization took place before US participation. He believed the US should take part on a basis of equality and not simply as observers, otherwise the impression would be given that the US was checking on the work rather than participating.
[Page 268]I agreed as regards ERP, but pointed out the British felt US participation in armaments matters was an embarrassment. The matter must be handled tactfully.
Mr. Spaak thought the present procedure cumbersome since the Brussels countries did not know whether or not they should show Ambassador Douglas completed texts. We should all be in it together from the very beginning.
I made no comment but said I believed the US had received necessary information from the London Committee, although further conversations were contemplated here.
The Belgian Ambassador expressed the need for coordination between the consultative committee of the Brussels powers and the committees under the the North Atlantic Pact. He suggested that an informal exchange of views take place between the US and the Brussels representatives.
I questioned whether this could be done before ratification of the Pact.
In reply to Mr. Spaak’s question regarding steps to be taken under Article 9 of the Atlantic Pact, I explained we opposed any development which might weaken the Brussels arrangements. We envisaged the Council under the Pact as including Foreign Ministers or Plenipotentiaries. A military committee representing all signatories could not operate effectively. For successful strategic planning, there should be two representatives from the Brussels powers plus Canada and the US, since the other signatories would not be immediately concerned.
I said we could discuss these procedures at tomorrow’s meeting with the Ministers.
Indonesia
Mr. Spaak said he was worried about the impact on the Benelux and western European countries if, because of the Indonesian question, the Netherlands were omitted in the effective implementation of the Pact. There would also be serious internal complications in the Netherlands. The Dutch had made a great mistake by resorting to military action in Indonesia, but it was in the general interest to do what we could to help them out of their predicament. We should tell the Dutch clearly the conditions under which the US would exert influence on the Republicans. Should the latter become aware of US refusal of military assistance to the Dutch under the Pact, they would never go to a conference.
I said that Cochran had sensible ideas about a solution but the Dutch were always laying down new conditions. We felt the government should be restored in Indonesia and that other matters, such as police, could be discussed later. I had urged that Van Royen be sent [Page 269] out to Indonesia as soon as possible. Cochran was willing to exert pressure on the Republicans but not to the point of rendering them completely impotent.
While he had a high regard for Mr. Cochran’s ability, Mr. Spaak did not think he had the authority to influence the Dutch and said that I was the only person who could do this successfully. He felt we should tell the Dutch what conditions the Republicans would accept and bring pressure on both parties now before bringing pressure on the Dutch through ECA and denial of military assistance. He thought there might be a real crisis in Holland if we so threatened the Dutch. He realized that the Netherlands position was untenable, that it was unwise for them to maintain the Indonesian question was entirely an internal issue. The Dutch always gave in too late and this encouraged the Republicans to hold out and to refuse to go to a conference. Stikker was moderate in comparison with some of the other Dutch politicans.
Dr. Jessup pointed out we had not threatened the Dutch, but they simply must take account of the US political situation. I said I had told Stikker that the US administration had opposed the Brewster amendment to ERP and that I had shown a strong interest in helping him. As regards military aid, we won’t get to this until late in June. We have informed the Dutch of our ideas concerning the essentials of a settlement and have told Cochran to press the Republicans to agree to a reasonable settlement. I had urged the dispatch of Van Royen as soon as possible and Cochran will work on the Republicans. I therefore thought our attitude was fairly close to Mr. Spaak’s suggestion. I was of the opinion that if we laid down hard and fast conditions on the Dutch they would react in the opposite way from which we wanted. I said I would be glad to review the latest file on the Indonesian case.
OEEC
Mr. Spaak said that as President of the OEEC he would like to take occasion to express gratitude for US assistance on the first anniversary of the setting up of the European Recovery organization which would occur on April 3.
I told him this would be a very gracious thing to do and it would be much appreciated here.