840.20/4–149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret
Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Schuman
Mr. Henri Bonnet
Dr. Jessup1
Mr. Murphy2
Mr. Beam3

North Atlantic Treaty

Mr. Schuman expressed gratification with the North Atlantic Treaty.

[Page 266]

I said while we realized action could only be taken after ratification, I nevertheless thought we should consider here the various organizations to be set up under the Treaty. The Council might be composed of Foreign Ministers or Plenipotentiaries ready to meet at any time. In form the Military Committee could include representation of all members, but this should only be in form. In effect the Pact would add the US and Canada to the Brussels Treaty. The arrangement should be such as to limit the real work of the Military Committee to four powers. Other devices could be worked out to ensure the association of the other countries as needed.

Mr. Schuman agreed that there should be a small, concentrated Military Committee. Before leaving Washington he would like to obtain in outline answers to questions which the French Government considers most important, namely, regarding the political objectives of the Pact which he could use in debates in the French Chamber, and, secondly, regarding strategic considerations which he would like to discuss with the US military staffs here. France was most concerned about the possibility of Soviet invasion. The Soviets would be able to use all the resources of western Europe and would be in a sort of privileged position because it would be difficult to bomb them out of western Europe. Even if the other powers eventually conquered the Soviets, nevertheless France would cease to exist if it had to suffer a Russian invasion. Mr. Schuman recognized that these matters cannot be settled in a few months but thought the objectives should be considered now.

I said his representatives would doubtless wish to discuss these questions with the US military staff. The US would probably wish to retain considerable freedom of military action in the event of attack since our initial contribution would be air strength. The US found it difficult to think in terms of a fixed or static line of defense in Europe. We could not say that the Treaty in itself was a guarantee against invasion but it was our aim to have a strategic plan to stop invasion if it started.

Mr. Schuman agreed, and then referred to the US draft military assistance bill about which Mr. Harriman and Mr. Caffery had informed him. Such assistance was necessary as France did not possess the resources to arm western Europe.

I mentioned that we might have considerably more trouble in Congress with the military assistance law than with the Pact. We hoped to take this up following ratification. Mr. Schuman should nevertheless understand that because of our budget deficit it is becoming increasingly hard to get money appropriated.

[Here follows a record of discussion pertaining to Germany.]

  1. Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup.
  2. Robert D. Murphy, Acting Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs.
  3. Jacob D. Beam, Acting Special Assistant, Office of German and Austrian Affairs.