840.20/3–2749: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
1220. ECC discussed principle of “equality of treatment” in WU request for MAP and has following comments to make:
We fully appreciate pressures—Congressional, press and public—on Department regarding Indonesian question. It is not intent this message to concern itself with substance of Indonesian problem or Dutch actions. However we believe you would wish us to keep you informed of reaction to be expected in Europe to assertion by US of right to interpret unilaterally our UN obligations by suspending arms shipments under MAP to Dutch. Our comments are:
- 1.
- In asserting that right, we would be acting on assumption that French, British, Luxembourg, and Belgians will be less zealous than ourselves in carrying out our common and identical UN obligations and that common approach to Indonesian problem would be impossible. As matter of fact, closer relations made possible by MAP should [Page 252] facilitate such approach and the reaching of a common position in which Dutch could cooperate.
- 2.
- In joining with us in MAP, WU governments are assuming grave responsibilities. They are agreeing to make common contribution to common defense, in which security of all, including US, is indivisibly involved. From point of view of immediate danger of war on own territory, European powers consider risks assumed by them greater than ours. Is it reasonable to expect them to accept a situation in which defense potential of one partner (Netherlands) might be suddenly diminished by American decision involving unilateral interpretation of international engagements to which all partners have subscribed? Can a common strategic concept be built upon such a possible development arising out of unilateral action by US?
- 3.
- We have been urging integration—both economic and political—on European nations. Some progress is being made. It seems therefore most unfortunate that in case of military integration, where governments concerned are dealing with lives or deaths of their countries, we should foreshadow a refusal to deal with WU as a unit on this problem, a problem in which we state that our conduct will be governed by our UN obligations which somehow or other, we imply, are not identical with obligations of Britain, France, Belgium and Luxembourg or which we will observe and they will not. Will not this policy be interpreted by European countries as being on [one of?] keeping a close string on each WU member separately rather than one of strengthening common organization and promoting common decisions? Is that policy therefore not thoroughly inconsistent with the broad objectices of ERP, MAP and the Atlantic Pact?
- 4.
- It seems to us that if we insist upon our position, the other members—Britain, France, Belgium and Luxembourg—will be unable to comply with their commitments to each other under WU, and WU will therefore disintegrate to [omission] alternatively, will be unable to enter upon the mutually and collective [apparent garble] undertaking with us on MAP (or possibly the Atlantic Pact). Thus, we are confronted it seems to us, with a dilemma; either we are prepared to admit that all WU countries and the US are bound equally by their obligations under the charter of UN and should, as a unit, honor them iii accordance with a common interpretation of their meaning, or, alternatively, take a course which may mean either, (a) The disruption of WU, or (b) the isolation of US from WU, and therefore from the hard military core of the European portion of the Atlantic Pact membership. Either alternative is unpleasant.
- 5.
- From strategic point of view, defense Western Europe is combined problem not related necessarily with Indonesia. Geography does not permit ignoring any one country. If they do not hang together they will be hanged separately. Dutch mission in common defense is vital. If Dutch forces inadequate in numbers or armament to hold north flank on natural barrier, entire defense could be flanked and objectives and expense of MAP negatived. Continental thinking has not forgotten strategic lessons World Wars I and II. This may help explain great concern WU countries about US insistence in declaring possible intent unilaterally to refuse arms assistance to one partner of WU.
Already, under present strategic concept, Dutch would have to concede large part their country to invader in order to make stand on agreed position.
Disheartening effect US action re arms has further shaken Dutch and may jeopardize WU and Atlantic Pact.
Sent Department 1220, repeated Hague 53, Paris 225, Brussels 64.