840.00/3–2649: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
1213. Reference Paragraph 6 Deptel 1017 to London1 not repeated other addresees.
We appreciate difficulties being encountered in resolving problem of relationship between Atlantic Pact and Western Union. Matter discussed with ECC and following are our preliminary views which we will follow up with more considered thoughts soon.
Our feeling is that we must not artificially exaggerate difference in relationship, but all must realize that the Western Union countries comprise the hard core of possible military strength which may be developed in Europe and are strategically most important. Also must bear in mind that Brussels Pact and Western Union covers wider range than just military collaboration among signatories. Nevertheless, Western Union organization in its defense aspect is most important step towards achieving an “army of Europe” instead of nationalistic armed forces loosely coordinated. Under existing and probably continuing difficult economic conditions free Europe, Europe can only afford to support strength to resist threat of aggression by combining its forces in some way to get maximum efficiency through agreed allocations of missions, balancing of force on international scale, combined command, etc.
No matter what mechanics of organization under Atlantic Pact are arrived at, US position vis-à-vis Western Union countries should be one of intimate working relationship and, in fact, one of exercising influence towards unification on Western Union military policies and military aspects of Western Union as a body. Vigorous US action towards Western Union as a body will expedite movement towards integration of armed forces and strategic concepts. Unless there is increasing integration it may not be continuing good risk for US to divert its arms and money to what would remain no more than nationalistic European forces. Value received from dollars and equipment given these non-unified forces might not justify drain on US economy particularly since unintegrated forces and plans would mean diminished US and total Western Powers defense capabilities.
Our national interest demands that we foster the unity and solidarity of Western Union and for that reason we cannot understand apparent Washington emphasis on bilateral relations between US and individual Western Union members excepting, of course, few aspects [Page 251] of reciprocal aid to US, which, because of unavoidable differences in geographical location and extent of individual members must necessarily vary among them.
We have been striving to increase economic integration through ERP, where it is very important, but when dealing with military instead of economic problem, unity in plans and action becomes essential. Although all recognize we will and should have bilateral arrangements on certain matters with individual countries, if US over-emphasizes attitude towards member nations of either Western Union or Atlantic Pact, that it must deal with each primarily on bilateral basis, we can and will be accused of pursuing same tactics as Kremlin vis-à-vis satellites, i.e., those of the great power dictating to smaller powers. This would kill conception individual equality in an association of partners which should be our greatest asset. We would endanger needed European unity and solidarity and weaken Europeans’ confidence in US intentions.
It would seem most unwise to weaken Western Union in the process of absorption into a more diffused Atlantic Pact organization. Also strengthening of Western Union and assistance to Western Union countries must not be delayed by awaiting the organization of Atlantic Pact mechanisms.
Sent Department 1213; repeated Paris 229; Brussels 61; The Hague 50.
- Telegram dated March 24, 1949, not found in Department of State files.↩