Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.00/4–2240

Minutes of the First Meeting of the European Correlation Committee¹

[Extract]

top secret

London, March 25, 1949.

Present:

• Ambassador Douglas, Chairman
• Ambassador Harriman
• Minister Holmes General Huebner²
• Staff and Consultants
• Colonel Bonesteel
• Mr. Bonsal
• Admiral Conolly
• Colonel Hill
• General Kibler
• Mr. Linebaugh
• Colonel Westphalinger

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ambassador Douglas opened the meeting with a few preliminary remarks.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Response to WU Request for Military Assistance

Amb. Douglas: The next point is the question of the U.S. response to the WU Request for Military Assistance. All cables on this subject have been distributed. I don’t know if every member is fully informed as to what happened when the Consultative Council met in London. Col. Bonesteel was here. During the meeting Col. Bonesteel and I met one evening with Messrs. Bevin, Spaak, Stikker, Schuman and the Luxembourg Foreign Minister. We suggested then, in an informal way, that the Foreign Ministers give us an opportunity to examine the tentative draft they were sending us. Mr. Bevin and the others came to the conclusion that they should not follow this suggestion. The draft was delivered to us the following morning. On the whole it was not, bad from our point of view. This Request for Military Assistance was sent to Washington. Washington suggested several substantial changes in the Request.³ We took them up with Bevin. He told us he thought the best way to deal with the matter was for the US Government to submit a reply interpreting the language according to our own lights, and clarifying our position on any points in the Request. He said it would be impossible to reassemble the Consultative Council and have them make the changes we had in mind. Then he elaborated on the difficulties he had had in getting the five Foreign Ministers to agree to the document submitted. Bevin’s view was passed on to Washington.⁴ In the meantime, the British and French notes were delivered to the State Department, covering one or two of the points that were raised with respect to the Request.⁵ Washington, after receiving my comments and Amb. Harriman’s comments, replied⁶ to the suggestion by asking me to go to the Permanent Commission and take up the revisions we desired in the Request, and, through the Permanent Commission, obtain a modification of the draft. This was impossible. In the first place the Permanent Commission had no authority; and in the second place, even if it had had the authority, it probably would not have been able to modify the document to suit the Department. There were four major points in question. First, the document implies membership and participation of the US in WU. However, I think that the Request should not necessarily be so construed. It certainly was not their intention. Anyway, Washington felt it might be taken so. Secondly, it does not make clear that the US has the final determination of the allocation of US assistance. The third point is that this document does not make sufficiently explicit the intention of WU to increase their military production. The fourth point is the expectation that WU will distribute dollar assistance from the US among its members. This point, however, can be taken care of in our reply arid seems identical with the second major point, namely that the US has the ultimate determination of the final allocation of US assistance. Finally, the principle of mutual aid is not spelled out as explicitly as desired.

Furthermore, Washington questions the principle of “equality of treatment.” Washington feels that this principle is designed to prevent us from acting in the event that the Netherlands defies or does not conform to any order of the Security Council. There is no doubt that this language in the Request is associated with the Netherlands-Indonesian situation. Bevin stated that, while this language was intended to cover the Netherlands situation, it could also be applied with respect to the French in Southeast Asia, or with respect to the British in Malaya. However, all members of WU have equal obligations toward UN. Bevin feels that the US should not take unilateral action against any WU country when all of the latter have the same obligations toward UN. That is what that language, according to Bevin, means. I am inclined to think that this matter could be clarified in the US reply.

The issue is whether the Consultative Council should be asked to modify the Request or whether that document will be interpreted by the US according to our lights, and questions we have clarified in our reply. We are interested in retaining spontaneity in the WU approach to us. Can we preserve spontaneity by asking the Consultative Council to change their document to meet our wishes? I am of the opinion, and I think Ambassador Harriman agrees, that the most effective way of preserving spontaneity is to make our comments on the Request in our reply.

Amb. Harriman: I agree.

Amb. Douglas: As to presentation to public opinion at home, we think that the document which the Consultative Council has prepared, plus our written reply, will be adequate. We have communicated our views to Washington. I think you have all received copies of the cable sent out last night.⁷ I know that Pat Carter talked to Paris about it before it went. There was coordination of opinion among us on this matter. We haven’t yet had a reply.

Because it was impossible to resolve this matter through the Permanent Commission, I delivered to Bevin a brief memorandum referring to Washington’s comments on the Request prepared by the Consultative Council. I told Bevin in a letter that I was handing this memorandum to him because I wanted him to be prepared for possible discussions in Washington.⁸

Gen. Huebner: I have been sitting in the WU Chiefs of Staff meetings here the last week and I think we have got to control where our money goes. Either procedure you outline in your telegrams to the State Department would bring about this result. But we must have the final say as to the allocation of our assistance among members of WU.

Amb. Douglas: I agree. However, if we ask WU to rewrite their Request, it seems to me that we really are coercing. We tell them we want them to be spontaneous but we won’t let them be. Either we do or we don’t. If they are in fact spontaneous, we are not barred from stating our opinion.

Amb. Harriman: All of the comments which the Department has on the Request could be covered in the US reply. For example, FASC has raised a question as to the implications in the Request as to US participation in WU. We could clarify our relationship to WU in the reply. The question of whether WU has sufficiently indicated its intention to increase arms production does perhaps pose a problem, but this could be amplified in a subsequent note from WU.

Amb. Douglas: Some of the language in the WU Request to which we now object was actually lifted right out of the Department’s basic telegram, No. 627.⁹ The British do not object to our retaining control over allocations of military aid and I think the WU countries will probably agree to all of Washington’s comments.

Amb. Harriman: Washington seems to feel that we should deal bilaterally with WU countries. Any effort on our part at bilateralism will have most serious political repercussions in France and on the Continent. It is not compatible with the concept of partnership and of equality as between WU and the US. Fears on both sides of the Atlantic are unrealistic and I think it should not be too difficult to resolve this problem.

Amb. Douglas: General bilateral undertakings between the US and WU countries might seriously weaken WU. However, there is no objection on the part of WU to bilateral agreements with the US on technical questions such as transit rights, the granting of services, etc.

Amb. Harriman: I agree that bilateral arrangements of this sort are not objectionable. Further, we must have the final say as to the destination of our aid. However, we want solidarity and unity in Europe and therefore the Europeans must develop a habit of reconciling their differences. We must of course in the last analysis retain the final decision but this should be kept in the background.

Amb. Douglas: Are we then in accord as to the position we should take with respect to the Request from the Consultative Council, namely that the US comments should be made in our reply?

All agreed and also agreed that it would be desirable if the Secretary could discuss the general problem with the WU Foreign Ministers while they are in Washington.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

It was agreed that the next meeting of ECC would be held late in April when General Huebner expects to be in London again.

The meeting adjourned.

1. Held at the U.S. Embassy, London.
2. Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, U.S.A., Deputy Commander in Chief European Command.
3. Telegram 953 to London, March 19, for Douglas from the FACC, not printed.
4. The conversation between Douglas and Bevin on March 21 was described in telegram 1105 from London, March 22, not printed.
5. Notes presented on March 18 by Bonnet and Hoyer Millar in separate conversations with Ernest A. Gross, Coordinator for Foreign Assistance Programs. These notes, not printed, are in Department of State file 840.00/3–1849, together with memoranda by Gross covering the two conversations.
6. Telegram 1004 to London, March 23, not printed.
7. Telegram 1168, March 24, not printed.
8. The letter and memorandum are quoted in telegram 1168.
9. Telegram 627 to London, February 24, not printed, summarized Department of State thinking on the prospective military aid program. These thoughts were incorporated in the memorandum submitted to Schuman on March 3, copy of which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 889 from Paris, March 3, p. 146.