Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.00/3–1649: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, March 16, 1949—2 a. m.

us urgent

983. Eyes only for Secretary. I met with WU Consultative Committee late this afternoon.¹ Bevin opened our meeting by stating that after two days work, committee had drafted a response to our memorandum² on MAP which he felt covered all matters of principle adequately and represented a remarkable effort of cooperation by Brussels Pact countries. Bevin said committee would meet again immediately to finalize draft and would then adjourn. He and Schuman, who are seeing me tomorrow morning on another matter, would give me the final paper at that time.

Bevin said there was one small question he wished to put to us which we could answer directly to the military committee; will the US require in WU’s formal request for assistance a set of more specific lists of requirements than that already included in Defense Ministers report of January 14?³ (Please answer soonest.)

Bevin next stated there would be certain annexes to the paper, one of which, particularly, he felt he should tell me about. It concerns the principle involved in our warning to the Dutch re Indonesia. Annex enunciates, so Bevin said, that there must be solidarity among any equality of treatment for the Brussels Pact countries—no one should be singled out for special action. Bevin said they all recognized that their relationship is under greater umbrella of Atlantic Pact and UN, but in coming to US in regard to military assistance, the Brussels powers came as one body. The WU organization should “deal with US on a basis of oneness”.

Bevin then invited other members of the committee to make any observations they wished. Schuman, Spaak and Stikker responded with brief acknowledgments that Bevin had stated their position well.

I then told the committee our views as to great importance of WU representatives and ourselves working in collaboration. We could get guidance from WU countries and felt we could help them in resolving some of their problems.

I said I could not answer the question regarding new detailed lists of requirements completely at this time, but we would inform military committee. There might be need for some further amplification or expansion on some items, or alternatively reduction, but matter could easily be handled directly with military committee.

I felt it better to refrain from discussing question of the annex which expresses general principle directed towards possibility of separate treatment of the Dutch because of Indonesian question and therefore did not reply on this matter.

I then reiterated the various matters of principle which I said I assured [assumed?] WU paper on which they had been working covered in full. When we came to question of reciprocal aid, it became apparent that little or no mention of this principle was in draft. I said it was important to have fairly explicit acceptance of principle in draft, and that from standpoint US, principle was not identical with that of mutual aid. Bevin said that they had difficulty on this point because they could not be sure what US means by “reciprocal aid”, and also could not anticipate the signing of Atlantic Pact. It was matter of most extreme political delicacy, and fact that our Congressional time table required acceptance of principle before Atlantic Pact was signed created a cart-before-horse situation. He, for instance, might have to make statement in Parliament on MAP in which he could handle mutual aid easily because it was already specific, but reciprocal aid would be different.

I told committee of our full appreciation of their problem, but reiterated necessity of some explicit mention of reciprocal aid in their document. I suggested they might be able to accept broad principle with understanding that details would be defined and worked out later.

Bevin said acceptance of general principle was not easy. He hoped US realized mutuality involved in MAP; that while we were generously offering considerable quantities of equipment, WU powers were in the front line and were accepting grave risks. The consultative committee had discussed this principle at length during meeting. He begged that US would not overemphasize material aspects of MAP.

I spoke of MAP being partial implementation of Atlantic Pact and said our problem was to reconcile problems raised by public opinion in Europe as against public opinion in US. I said that did not believe, at present stage, we were talking of base rights so much as of other things such as transit rights in time of war, services, etc. I again suggested they attempt to find some language which could show an acceptance of principle of reciprocal aid.

I then asked if it might not be possible for us to see their draft paper before members of committee left London, so that we might offer comments, if any arose, to aid in our common enterprise. Bevin felt that this was not possible since US was asking for European approach to US, the Ministers had met under instructions from their governments, and it would not be compatible with our suggested approach if we were to comment before receiving agreed document. We discussed this point at some length, during which I sensed that perhaps some other members of committee would not have objected. I tried to make plain that my suggestion was solely to aid committee, that they need not, of course, act upon any comments unless they found them acceptable, but that it would seem useful to me for us to cooperate informally to some extent in the work they had done. Bevin gave additional reasons as to why he thought it would not be desirable to let us see draft, and Spaak finally entered conversation with observation that he felt sure draft would be fully acceptable to us and that therefore we were, perhaps, anticipating troubles which might not exist. I then let matter drop.

I asked if I might raise question which I felt our governments would be confronted with sometime in near future. It was the matter of an extension of mutual aid principles to non-WU Atlantic Pact countries. (Reference paragraph 5 Deptel to London 834, repeated Paris 800⁴) Bevin said that this was most difficult question and the others seemed to agree. Bevin hoped we might for moment keep matter secret, but he was sure all would consider it and would let us have their views later.

We briefly discussed question of presentation of MAP to public and there was agreement that we should recognize problem of French elections, but that after that time there should be coordinated presentation in all countries.

Meeting seemed at certain times to be somewhat tense. Bevin, as chairman, did most of talking and showed evidence of the strain involved in two days of continuous session. I was not happy, though perhaps wrongly so, with attitude that we should not really, though informally, be brought into the picture until after committee had formally adjourned.

The above is perhaps somewhat exaggerated reflection of Bevin’s remarks. Since he spoke extemporaneously it may possibly be a misrepresentation of his attitude. I believe, however, that it may not express the attitude of others present. For example I sensed Schuman and Spaak felt that reference to reciprocal assistance to US was not only necessary but right. Moreover after we had risen Schuman, Spaak and Stikker told me privately and separately that we would be completely satisfied with document in its final form.

Later tonight Bevin asked me to call at 9:30 tomorrow to read document before meeting with Schuman and himself at 10 so that I could make comments.⁵

Suggest that no conclusions be drawn from this cable until I have had opportunity to put all pieces together and give you objective assessment.

Will report further after talking with Bevin and Schuman tomorrow morning and after lunching with all other Brussels Foreign Ministers except Schuman and Luxembourger.

Repeated Paris eyes only for Caffery and Harriman, Brussels eyes only for Kirk, The Hague eyes only for Baruch.

Douglas

1. March 15. The Consultative Council met on March 14 and 15, attended by the Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and in some cases, the Finance Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers.
2. Presumably the informal memorandum presented to Bevin on March 1. See telegram 750, p. 136.
3. Not identified in Department of State files.
4. March 12, 1949, p. 195.
5. In his telegram 988 of March 16, 1 p. m., not printed, Douglas informed the Department that the full text of the military request from the Brussels Treaty powers was handed to him by Bevin that morning at 10 a. m. The text, including an appendix on the Belgium–Luxembourg contribution, was quoted in the telegram (840.00/3–1649). For revised text dated April 5, see p. 285.