840.20/3–1549
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)
| Participants: | Bjarni Benediktsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland |
| Eysteinn Jonsson, Minister of Aviation | |
| Emil Jonsson, Minister of Commerce | |
| Thor Thors, Minister of Iceland | |
| Hans Anderson, Legal Adviser, Icelandic Foreign Office | |
| John D. Hickerson, Director, EUR | |
| Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor | |
| Major General Anderson, Air Force | |
| Admiral Wooldridge | |
| Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE | |
| Mr. Gray Bream, NOE |
In opening the discussion I stated to the Icelandic representatives that we desired to answer honestly and accurately anything which they might wish to ask. Foreign Minister Benediktsson stated that the most important question in their minds is whether it is possible from a military viewpoint to provide Iceland reasonable assurance of [Page 226] security without placing military forces in Iceland in peace time, though with the understanding that some facilities would be provided in event of war I stated that I understood that Iceland has no military forces and only a small police force, and that should Iceland join the Pact there would be no question of stationing troops there in peace time but that certain facilities are and would be in existence for use in war. The mere existence of these facilities might encourage an aggressor to attack Iceland. The queston therefore is how much advance notice might we have of such action and what can we do to prevent it. If we could tell the Icelanders that we have a reasonable hope of preventing it, it would be a comfort to them.
General Anderson explained that it is in our primary interest to prevent the seizure of Iceland by hostile forces. We would hope to have some advance warning. Should an attack be launched by water we would have more time to counter it, but the flight of the jet planes last summer showed the feasibility of using them for quick defensive action. In the plans for US responsibilities in case of aggression high priority would be given to the defense of Iceland. Admiral Wooldridge pointed out that prior to the outbreak of hostilities there is usually a period of strained relations during which forces can be deployed to meet the anticipated situation, and that the case of Iceland is different from that of Pearl Harbor because Iceland is in the strategic path of Russia, whereas we thought Pearl Harbor was not in the strategic path of Japan. In reply to Minister Benediktsson’s query regarding the possible use of submarines Admiral Wooldridge stated that they could carry only small numbers of troops and probably an attack would depend more on the use of an air drop. General Anderson observed that this would require large forces and would appear not to be good tactics. Iceland is strategically located for attack in both directions and both sides would seek to prevent the other from using it. However, the greatest danger is from local action by subversive elements.
Minister Benediktsson asked whether, if Iceland knew the Russians were trying to land there, they could prevent it by demolition, to which General Anderson replied that this would be effective for a time but we also have plans to fly troops in. He added that the Navy has demonstrated the usefulness of carrier planes in that area and that airplane troop transports are sitting ducks for carrier planes. Regarding the distance from Russian bases General Anderson pointed out that it is roughly half as far from Great Britain as from Russian bases near Northern Finland and that in the event of an emergency we would move air units to Goose Bay and Greenland. Minister Benediktsson pointed out that there is a real possibility that the Russians [Page 227] might attempt an attack because they could do much harm with small numbers, but General Anderson explained that the degrees of possibility vary. We worry about a Trojan horse attack by submarines or freighters and about sabotage. There is much less chance of an airborne attack which he said he believed would not seem attractive to the Russians.
I pointed out that yesterday Minister Benediktsson had asked whether, if Iceland joined the Pact, there would be any change in the facilities to be maintained there, without bringing in troops, but for use in the event of war. I said that we had explained that this was to be worked out under Article 9 of the Pact but that we estimate there would be no great material change except for the extension of the runways. General Anderson added that there are plans for a few changes, such as additional housing, the extension of the runways and the construction of a fence, but that the most important addition to the facilities which we have in mind would be the increase of fuel storage capacity by 100,000 barrels.
Minister Benediktsson then inquired whether, if the members of the Pact had control of the airfield in war time, it would be used for launching attacks or for transit. General Anderson explained that it would be used largely for transit and anti-submarine operations and that it would not likely be used as a base for attack on Russia, as long as we had available bases nearer the target. I reiterated that the whole Pact is defensive and Mr. Bohlen pointed out that in war time the question of attack or defense is academic. Minister Benediktsson stated that he understood this but that for purposes of propaganda in Iceland it would help if they could say that other bases are available for attack and that Iceland would be used only for defense.
Minister Benediktsson went on to observe that over half of the Icelandic population lives relatively near Keflavik and that an effort to destroy the field might harm many people. Reykjavik is sufficiently far away that it would probably not accidentally hit by bombs but there is an airfield at Reykjavik and the harbor for Keflavik is also there, so the city may be in direct danger. If Iceland is in the Pact it would want assistance to reduce this danger. He then asked whether we thought it possible that Russia would send parachutists if the field were defended. General Anderson replied that if they made such an attack they would no doubt use paratroops rather than attempt a landing because the latter is very dangerous and slow. He further stated that we would not allow the Russians to hold Iceland regardless of whether they were in the Pact. In reply to Mr. Eysteinn Jonsson’s question as to whether it would be of value for Russia to seize the airport and hold it for a short time, General Anderson replied [Page 228] that a third war would not be simply a Pearl Harbor and then a long period of preparation but that the air activity would be intense during the first few weeks. Russia must consider the airfields which we can use. There are others closer and more dangerous and they could not hit them all. Admiral Wooldridge added that their attempts would be affected by the degree of effort involved and that if Iceland could be taken easily it would move up on their list of priorities. Mr. Jonsson then asked whether, if it is unlikely that Russia could keep Iceland, their interest would not then be to seize and destroy the facilities there. Minister Benediktsson added that it is always more difficult to eject enemy forces once they have gotten in, particularly without harm to the Icelanders, but he said that he understood we thought Iceland to be reasonably defensible without placing forces there in advance and that we have plans for such defense. General Anderson replied that it would be vastly better to have forces there in advance, but that there is a very good chance to defend it anyway and that we can make plans for action on the basis of reasonable warning.
Minister Thors questioned whether, if Iceland signs the Pact, that would make clear to the world that the United States would come to their aid and I replied that it was our hope that this would be unmistakably clear. Admiral Wooldridge observed concerning the danger of bombardment that there is far more damage caused in re-taking a position than in def ending it but that in any case Iceland cannot depend upon neutrality in view of its strategic position.
In reply to Mr. Jonsson’s question as to whether a seaborne invasion would be likely to be observed before reaching Iceland, Admiral Wooldridge reiterated that war might begin with such an attack on Iceland, but that he believed its imminence would be apparent, thus allowing time for deployment of forces to prevent it.
Minister Benediktsson observed that it might be necessary to have a guard at Keflavik to protect the facilities against sabotage and General Anderson replied that this would be most desirable. Minister Benediktsson explained that they have 150 policemen, chiefly unarmed, in Reykjavik and that they desired to strengthen this force but are prevented by the cost. This, however, would be a program which Iceland would have to study. They now need protection against Communist riots. The Communists could take over the whole country at any moment they desire and this is a question which Iceland must solve. General Anderson noted that the Communists are not more numerous than the rest of the population and asked why the population should not be organized. Minister Benediktsson explained that the Icelanders are averse to the use of force and most Icelanders do [Page 229] not believe that the Communists would use it. It is difficult to educate the people and change their habits of mind and this is the greatest obstacle in Iceland, to the development of military forces or joining the Atlantic Pact. I pointed out that Stalin is the actual founder of the Atlantic Pact and that unless they are united the small countries would be picked off one by one. Minister Benediktsson asked whether the Soviets were warned of Hitler’s attack in 1941 and Mr. Jonsson questioned whether Germany had planned to attack Iceland. He further inquired as to whether a Soviet air attack could put the airfield out of use for a long time. General Anderson replied that it could destroy the fuel storage facilities but that the damage to the field itself would be only temporary. Minister Benediktsson pointed out that they could do the same damage with less risk by using fifth columnists. I reiterated that internal sabotage appears to be the greatest danger and is a cause for more worry than a possible attack.
Minister Benediktsson then asked whether the Russians have any bases on Spitsbergen. General Anderson replied that we have no evidence that they do have such bases and that though they would be useful, particularly if Russia had designs, on Iceland, reconnaissance last summer (not made by the United States) showed no indication that such bases had been established. Mr. Jonsson then questioned if Iceland might prepare to place obstacles on the runway to prevent a Russian landing. General Anderson pointed out that a number of relatively simple steps could be taken, such as putting out trucks or using land mines. Minister Benediktsson concluded that there are many possible courses of action but that the best preventive steps lie in common advance planning, to which General Anderson indicated his agreement.