840.20/3–1449
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Gross)
| Participants: | Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen |
| Ambassador Henrik de Kauffmann | |
| Mr. Frants Hvass, Danish Foreign Office | |
| Mr. Povl Bang-Jensen, Danish Embassy | |
| Major General C. C. J. Forslev, Military and Air Attaché | |
| Commodore Frits Aage Hammer Kjoelsen, Naval Attaché | |
| Mr. Ernest A. Gross, Assistant Secretary | |
| Mr. Walter Surrey, U/CFA | |
| Mr. Gray Bream, NOE | |
| Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, NME |
In continuation of this morning’s discussion1 with the Danish representatives, I reiterated the idea that it is our hope that military aid legislation may include not only authorization to transfer materiel but also provide funds for cushioning the economies of the participating countries against the impact of rearmament. Thus there would not only be assistance in providing for raw materials in addition to those provided under OEEC but there may also be authority for some dollar financing of a portion of the indirect impact arising from the [Page 207] diversion of manpower from manufacture of export goods or the loss of resources which might otherwise be utilized to earn dollars. I explained that we are trying to stimulate self-help without overloading the economies of the participating countries. In accordance with this we are trying to obtain an estimate of the degree to which arms production could be expanded, utilizing existing facilities, and the costs which such expansion would involve. What we desire is an estimate of what could be produced over and above the OEEC program.…
Mr. Rasmussen observed that the problem of the economic effects of an expanded arms producing program is of far reaching importance for a number of countries but is of rather limited significance in the case of Denmark. Thus, Denmark could produce only small quantities for others. He stated that Denmark might be able to export automatic weapons, as it has done in the past, but that this is the only item which she might be able to provide. Therefore, the problem for Denmark is not of large proportions if consideration is limited to strictly war materials.
I then referred to the third category of procurement as mentioned this morning, i.e., procurement by an Atlantic Pact country in a non-Atlantic Pact country which is not in the OEEC, and explained that it was our thought that as in the case of ERP, military aid legislation would authorize off-shore purchases, as, for example, in Latin America.
Turning to another subject Mr. Rasmussen said that he had lists of their losses of military equipment during the German occupation which he had hesitated to hand over because they might be misleading. He explained that Denmark is not aiming at straight replacement, but he thought that a statement of what had been lost might help to complete the picture. What Denmark has in mind is actually a complete reorganization of its defense forces with modern equipment. At this point he handed over the lists covering the losses by the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
Concerning the relationship between the Atlantic Pact and military assistance Mr. Rasmussen referred to the statement made this morning that the Atlantic Pact does not give an automatic right to arms whereas non-membership in the Pact does not automatically exclude countries from receiving arms. He then asked whether this meant that members of the Atlantic Pact would not be given some sort of preference. In reply, I explained that we have listed from a military strategic viewpoint countries which in the U.S. interests should be given weapons in varying amounts. I pointed out, for example, that we have certain commitments in Greece, Turkey, Iran, [Page 208] Latin America, and the Philippines. The problem is not whether or not to supply arms, but how much and of what types. Thus, in the case of Latin America, it would be politically unwise to cut off supplies even though the amounts involved are limited. In the face of probable shortages there will be a need for priorities. Our interests are to ensure that the Atlantic Pact countries can fulfill the requirements of the situation. But in addition to individual needs there are collective needs and hence from a practical viewpoint it would be important to review the group strategy, which will imply priorities. Implementation of the program will require congressional action on the amount of military assistance. With regard to the specific question of how much Denmark may obtain I pointed out that Congress may hesitate to appropriate the full amount of our estimates which, in turn, would alter the allocations. In the long run the problem of allocations may be decided in light of recommendations by the collective group, on the basis of a collective program similar to OEEC.
Mr. Rasmussen then inquired whether Denmark would be in a better position to obtain equipment if it were a member of the Atlantic Pact than if it were not. I replied that this was a somewhat difficult question since we have consistently sought to avoid applying pressure to join. I explained that in my judgment it will make a difference, however, because of the fact that the Atlantic Pact countries would participate in group planning. The end result is difficult to state but this will probably result in a high priority for the group. However, if Denmark is not in the Pact we would still have to consider whether aid might not be desirable. Nevertheless, it is always easier to justify aid to those who are part of a collective group. Similar considerations have, of course, applied to economic aid.
Ambassador Kauffmann, referring to his previous discussions in the State Department, stated that there had been brought out as important factors not only the attitude of the Administration but also the attitude of Congress. These discussions had indicated that membership in the Pact would make a large difference in the eyes of Congress. As a member, Denmark would be treated, for example, as would Norway. However, if Denmark remained outside the group it could hardly expect the same treatment, that is, arms at the same time and in the same quantities and on the same terms. This factor, said Ambassador Kauffmann, had been brought out in the Department not as pressure but as a simple statement of fact.
In thanking Ambassador Kauffmann for this statement, I pointed out that it would be easy for us to be misunderstood publicly on this point. If we were to say that there would be no aid or less aid to those outside the Pact, that could be construed as a threat. Instead, I said, [Page 209] I preferred to point out that a reciprocal collective program was different from a bilateral program, for which there are different criteria in public and congressional discussions. It is much fairer to answer in terms of underlying considerations rather than to give a positive “yes” or “no”. In this way the Danish Parliament can draw its conclusion on the basis of these factors.
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Returning to the first question regarding Denmark’s plan of defense the Danish representatives brought out that they would concentrate on strategic areas such as the Danish border, harbors and airfields. Commodore Kjoelsen explained that the Navy would be used to combat landings which might be attempted in various places, to protect the Sound against passage of hostile ships, and in mine sweeping which has been and is likely to be a serious problem in Danish waters.
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- The record of this meeting, which covered details of Danish armament, is in Department of State file 840.20/3–1449.↩