840.20/3–1449
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)
| Participants: | Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland |
| Mr. Eysteinn Jonsson, Leader, Progressive Party | |
| Mr. Emil Jonsson, Leader, Social Democratic Party | |
| Mr. Hans Anderson, Icelandic Foreign Office | |
| Mr. Thor Thors, Minister of Iceland | |
| Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, Director, EUR | |
| Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE |
The Foreign Minister referred to the phrase “mutual aid and self-help” in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. He wondered what obligations Iceland would assume under this. He understands that the decision would be for Iceland to make but asked what would happen if it said “no” to a suggestion from the other members.
I replied that the members would form a collective defense association in which each would honestly do what it was best equipped to [Page 204] do for the common defense. Matters would be freely discussed in the Defense Committee which might make recommendations to individual governments which would have the final decision as far as their territory is concerned. The Foreign Minister said he wanted to know the juridical aspect of a negative answer by Iceland to suggestions or requests by other states. I said there would be no appeal to any Court of Justice and in that sense each member would have the right to say no.
The Foreign Minister referred to the Keflavik Air Agreement.1 If Iceland wanted to let the Agreement expire and not renew United States rights to facilities there, would the Atlantic Pact make it obligatory on Iceland to renew the Air Agreement? Mr. Hickerson said that Article 9 was pertinent in this connection which envisages that the Defense Committee would recommend measures. When the Treaty comes into effect the Council will first consider what measures should be taken to insure the peace of the area. It is his personal opinion that the Defense Committee might say that there should be certain facilities in Iceland for the general defense, for example the airport. The question would arise as to who would pay for its maintenance and probably the US would have that role. What we have to find is a workable arrangement under which each country will make the contribution for which it is best fitted. It is quite possible that the Committee’s recommendations may result in superseding the present Airport Agreement. I commented that the emphasis was on the fact that this is a collective arrangement and defense measures will not be on a bilateral basis. In an emergency all members of the group would have access to the facilities. The Defense Committee would not itself take over the facilities but Iceland would keep them in condition with appropriate assistance.
The Foreign Minister suggested that Iceland might decide to run the Airport itself with some financial help from the United States. He asked whether we have only Keflavik and Hvalfjordur in mind as defense facilities in Iceland. I said that the Defense Committee would have to answer that and possibly we could throw a little more light on it in our talk tomorrow with the military representatives. The Foreign Minister asked if our interest would be as great if Iceland decided riot to be a party to the Treaty. Mr. Hickerson said we would be even more interested. I commented that the Treaty simply recognizes existing [Page 205] facts and provides a means for advance planning. Mr. Hickerson referred to the Secretary’s comments on responsibilities of members in case of attack on Alaska and that there would be no automatic declaration of war.
Mr. Benediktsson said that in the last war Iceland lent land for bases and permitted the presence of armed forces on its territory. He asked whether Iceland might sign with a proviso that it did so under consideration of its special position as a nation without military forces. He asked if other signatories would understand Iceland’s position. Mr. Hickerson commented that if any country started making provisos too many of them would and this should not be encouraged. He wanted it clear that we have no idea of asking Iceland to build up its armed forces. A possibility existed that some Icelandic trawlers might be wanted for naval service. However, he felt free to give assurance that the United States and British representatives on the Defense Committee would fully understand Icelandic views. The Foreign Minister pointed out that Iceland is and will remain unprotected. Mr. Hickerson commented that Iceland would be safer if there were careful advance planning. To the Foreign Minister’s question as to the status of Greenland in the Pact, I said that through the collective mechanism in the Pact Greenland would be considered from a group viewpoint. Mr. Benediktsson said Iceland would have no objection to forces in Greenland.
Mr. Jonsson said the essence was to have the closest possible collaboration without foreign bases or foreign military forces in Iceland in peacetime.
The Foreign Minister said that many people in Iceland besides the communists were dissatisfied with the present situation under the Airport Agreement. The Progressive Party was asking for a change. If Iceland wanted to change the present situation it would be in trouble with the US, particularly if it tried to deny the US all foothold in Iceland. His people were sensitive about keeping Icelandic sovereignty intact. Mr. Jonsson spoke of “extra-territorial rights” held by the US at the Airport, but I pointed out that our understanding of the phrase implies a situation which does not exist there. If the Airport were made available to the Pact members its facilities would be Icelandic and under Article V Iceland would decide as to their use.
Mr. Jonsson said opponents will say that lengthening the runway increases the danger of attack. I commented that this is a question of weighing up the respective risks.
Mr. Benediktsson asked what advantage there was in the Pact since the US and Britain would help Iceland in any case. In reply I emphasized the advantage of advance planning.
[Page 206]Mr. Jonsson asked whether other members would be annoyed with Iceland for making no greater contribution to the common defense. He asked if there could just be a separate Pact between Iceland and the US. I said I was sure the other members would understand Iceland’s special position and with regard to his second point a separate Pact would be too restricted. The Foreign Minister said he would tell people in Iceland that there would be no military forces in Iceland and the Government would not consent to have any there. I said that this would be correct. Mr. Jonsson said that if the Ministers were asked whether Iceland would have to supply armed trawlers for naval duties they would have to answer no. Mr. Jonsson said that many Icelanders argued it is better to wait for the emergency than to go out and meet it now. I pointed out again the value of advance planning as illustrated in cases in which absence of advance planning contributed to rapid submission to an aggressor.
- Exchanges between the United States and Iceland in 1945, resumed in 1946, resulted in an agreement of October 7, 1946, for the interim use of Keflavik airport by United States forces. For text of this agreement, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1566 or 61 Stat, (p. 2) 2426. Documentation on the exchanges and negotiations eventuating in this agreement is in the files of the Department of State, particularly under file number 859A.20.↩