740.00119 Council/10–2449
The Chief of the Division of Austrian Affairs (Williamson) to the Minister in Austria (Erhardt)
Dear Jack: I hope that by now you have seen the top secret telecon of October 19 with General Keyes.1 I noted with interest that the political adviser was not present at this telecon although two representatives of the Department participated in it at this end. As a result of General Keyes’ views there was no decision in the National Security Council on Thursday.2 I attended this meeting and saw the way in which General Keyes’ views were used to cast doubts on the entire question of any Austrian treaty. The upshot of the meeting was that Mr. Acheson and Louis Johnson will, respectively, present the State and Defense positions to the President probably tomorrow. The issue will be this: Shall we conclude the Austrian Treaty by accepting the Soviet demands which we consider to be in excess of the Paris agreement? Johnson told the Secretary that he did not wish to embarrass him in any way but that the military consequences of a treaty were so great that the President would have to make up his mind. This puts the President in a rather difficult spot and if he were not an amiable man I believe he would get very mad with his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense for bad staff work, and ask them to go back to the NSC to work out an agreed recommendation.
I might add that there would have been an agreed recommendation had it not been for the telecon. The memorandum prepared for Mr. Johnson’s briefing at the NSC, which had been thoroughly cleared in all parts of the military establishment, was torn up after the telecon and a new memorandum prepared, which states that the National Military Establishment does not concur in the State Department’s view on the Austrian Treaty but does not actively oppose it. General Keyes states that a treaty for Austria is a victory for the Russians, that Austria cannot pay the cost of a treaty, and finally that every concession that we have made on Article 35 provides a basis for Russian infiltration in Austria.
As the matter has developed in the NSC, if the President agrees we will conclude the treaty and then ask the Russians for quadripartite agreement to form an Austrian army. If the Russians refuse to grant this request, the implication of the Defense’s position is that we will have no treaty. The Defense’s position is as follows: “Therefore Russia’s acceptance or rejection of provisions giving time for training [Page 1185] and equipping of the security force may well be the determining test for us as to whether the treaty is desirable.” In government circles this is good procedure, since it means you may enjoy your cake and after having eaten it may still have the cake for future consumption. In the last analysis this leaves the Department of State in a rather bad position. I am sure, however, that it will work out in a satisfactory manner.
I regret very much that we have not been able to keep you informed by official telegram. Any telegram of this nature which goes to Vienna would have to be distributed in the Army and the negotiations with that outfit are so delicate that we do not wish to upset them by making available to you information which is not made available to General Keyes. I shall continue to do my best to keep you informed by delayed letters.
Sincerely yours,