Executive Secretariat Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the Army (Voorhees) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)1

top secret

Subject: Austrian Treaty Negotiations—NSC 38, 38/1 and 38/22

1.
On the political and economic questions, I believe that the Department of Defense should recognize that primary responsibility for these aspects of the treaty rests with the State Department. On this account, I recommend that you inform the President through the National Security Council of General Keyes’ views, and that, while not concurring in the State Department’s position, you do not actively oppose it.
2.
General Keyes’ views as restated last night are as follows:

“If we assume that all concessions are acceptable and that the four powers and Austria sign ratify and deposit the treaty it is felt here that Austria cannot withstand Soviet domination any more than her neighbors Czechoslovakia and Hungary were able to ward off communist inroads. Austria cannot pay the cost of the present treaty. Soviet penetration in the economic field is assisted by the concessions agreed in Article 35. Those can and will lead to political crisis and assist in political penetration. The lack of provision for an adequate security force in being at the time of ratification of the treaty will lessen Austrian will to resist the imminent inclusion of Austria in the Soviet sphere of influence. From my local point of view I feel that if the treaty as presently proposed and further modified by the concessions suggested in your DA–1 is concluded it can only be interpreted as a Soviet victory. A victory won by typical methods of stubbornness and intransigency; won by advancing exorbitant demands and gaining their ends through minor and relatively unimportant concessions. Thank you.”3

3.
On the military aspects, two points are presented:

First, the equipment for an Austrian Army. MAP authorities feel that the equipment can be supplied without essential impairment of the plans for other European countries. To prevent loss of time until [Page 1183] Congress can give the legal authorization for MAP assistance to Austria, I believe that you should recommend to the President that the equipment required by Austria be provided under MAP and given sufficiently high priority to insure its delivery in time to provide for an adequate Austrian security force.

The second military objection is that the State Department’s proposed course does not assure an adequately trained Austrian Army in time. Under an Allied Control Council directive, no Army can be formed. Already agreed terms of the treaty authorize an Austrian Army but require Allied troops to leave Austria within ninety days after ratification. Ninety days is entirely insufficient to organize an effective force to maintain internal order. State proposes in spite of the Control Council directive to commence forming a force before ratification. General Keyes believes that this is unsatisfactory. He fears that if this is done another Austrian Army might be formed in the Soviet zone with obvious dangers. Accordingly, I believe that you should recommend to the President that he direct that, at some appropriate point in the treaty negotiations, the U.S. should insist that the Control Council directive be rescinded in time, or that the presently proposed term of the treaty be changed, to allow not less than six months to form an effective Austrian army before Allied troops leave.

4.
Speaking more broadly, I recommend that you inform the President that General Keyes, General Bradley and General Burns4 all are inclined to feel that making a treaty with the concessions at present proposed and without provision for an Austrian security force adequately trained and equipped in time, will create grave danger of entire loss of Austria to the Russians; further, that because Russia probably desires to maintain its troops in their present positions to outflank Yugoslavia while the trouble with Tito continues, there is no motive for the Russians to accept an Austrian treaty unless they get virtually everything they want, or unless they believe that the circumstances will be such that they can probably take over Austria. Therefore, Russia’s acceptance or rejection of provisions giving time for training and equipping of the security force may well be the determining test for us as to whether the treaty is desirable.
5.
Accordingly, I recommend that no treaty be agreed to unless it provides for adequate and timely Austrian security forces.
Tracy S. Voorhees
  1. The source text was transmitted to President Truman as an enclosure to a memorandum from Johnson, through the National Security Council, October 21, not printed. A copy was also sent to the Department of State. (Executive Secretariat Files)
  2. NSC 38 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, p. 1510; regarding NSC 38/1, see the editorial note, p. 1287; NSC 38/2 is not printed.
  3. Apparently this paragraph is an extract from a telecon between the Department of the Army and General Keyes, October 19, with regard to the progress report prepared by the Department of State. DA–1 is the usual indicator for a portion of such a telecon sent from Washington.
  4. Major General James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance.