740.00119 Council/3–1049: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber)

top secret
us urgent

829. Ausdei 26. Delaus 491 helpful in revealing complexities of present impasse in Aust treaty negotiations. Agree, as matter of immediate tactics, further efforts shld be made to force the issue on frontier [Page 1082] and related questions in attempt to solve problem Yugo claims and to probe Sov intentions.

In event solution proves impossible, decision as to break must be weighed fully from standpoint effect on general internatl situation as well as from narrower aspects of Aust problem alone. We feel in fact Brit anxieties are well based and shld deserve most careful consideration. Wld be extremely loath to insist on course of action that only meets with reluctant acceptance by Brit and Fr and might frighten or confuse other Western countries. In this situation western initiative with view to break, whatever appearances we endeavor to give it, wld probably invite propaganda exploitation by Sovs prejudicial to our interests.

If avoidance breakdown in negotiations desirable at this time in relation to internatl developments, we see no harm in their continuation from point of view Aust problem. Recognize, of course, no indication as yet Sovs intend to conclude treaty and no agreement may be reached in end on any disputed article. Believe however this shld not deter us from renewed discussions other unagreed articles if insurmountable impasse reached on Art 5 and related questions. It shld be possible to keep way open for subsequent return to frontier problems. If Sovs however shld stand on absolute refusal to discuss frontier questions again after deadlocks reached on other articles, such development seems to us capable of exploitation by West in virtually same way as an impasse now on frontier questions.

As situation existed at time treaty negotiations 1948 it was clear frontier and reparations issues afforded most favorable grounds for suspension negotiations in respect to understanding by Aust public of attitude Western powers in seeking to obtain acceptable treaty for Aust people. Consider situation may have so changed now that if adjournment occurs, because of deadlock on other issues, Aust public will appreciate that West is acting in its interest.

It is not understood, however, in event of deadlock on Yugo claims, how agreement to take up other disputed articles could be regarded as evidence West views frontier and related issues of slight importance or serve as pretext to conceal Sov intentions. Nor is it clear to us why we shld not examine any Sov concessions on other disputed articles they may be willing to make and agree to them if they are acceptable on basis of your instrs.2 Because ramifications Yugo situation and Yugo relation to treaty Sovs could hardly be expected, whatever their intentions, to make concessions re Yugo claims in early part negotiations. If they do so at all, wld anticipate such step after initial public attention diverted from this issue. Possibility has existed from [Page 1083] beginning Sovs wld use concessions on their part for propaganda purposes, and it does not appear to us of critical importance if discussion by Deputies possible Sov concessions shld temporarily divert attention from frontier problems.

Internatl opinion will probably question our motives if action taken for adjournment without more than preliminary consideration of other disputed articles. If this shld happen, other countries and Aust itself may hold our impatience responsible for torpedoing this conference not long after its beginning. That appears too serious a risk for us to take until there is some clarification of internatl situation or until thorough demonstration made every negotiating possibility exhausted.

Acheson
  1. Supra.
  2. Ante, p. 1067.