740.00119 Council/3–1049: Telegram
The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers ( Reber ) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
902. Delau 49. From Reber. Bebler’s statement this morning1 reiterating Yugoslav unwillingness to abandon two principles of frontier rectification and reparations has brought the current meeting to its most critical point.
Following preliminary examination of unagreed articles, discussion has centered on various aspects of Yugoslav claims against Austria by [as] essential element in establishment of any treaty. A procession of Yugoslav memoranda has been submitted which not only concentrates on frontiers and reparations but reiterate demands on many aspects of treaty both in agreed and unagreed articles. Yugoslavs have emphasized the appearance of compromise their proposals give and are obviously building up a case for public record. They have been encouraged by Zarubin to do so in his continuous request for new hearings. It is obvious Soviets have been utilizing this conference and their support of Bebler’s demands to serve their own ends in Yugoslavia and to attempt further to increase breach between Tito and West.2 Bebler, on other hand, has done nothing to ease the Yugoslav position and it is clear as long as discussions are publicized no amount of pressure will induce him to do so.
Bebler’s statement today has, however, brought this phase of the conference to an end. An effort will now be made to require that Soviets accept their share of responsibility for conclusion of Austrian treaty by willingness to modify position and not to hide behind Yugoslav claims. As Gruber pointed out in statement today previously agreed with US, establishment of peace is the duty of four great powers and there can be no justification whatsoever for holding up conference because of Yugoslav objections.
As long as question of Yugoslav claims remains unsolved, however, it is clear no real progress can be achieved toward conclusion of treaty. Western deputies can do little more than maintain fixed positions on remaining unagreed articles. Zarubin’s probable tactics will be either to endeavor to induce the West to break off discussions [Page 1080] over current impasse or to propose further negotiation on other unagreed articles keeping Bebler in reserve for final showdown on frontier issue in which he clearly knows West can accept no frontier rectification. To follow Zarubin in latter course either could be interpreted as an indication that we attach little importance to present issue or would serve as a pretext to Soviets to mask their real intentions.
In discussions with British and French today there appeared to be general agreement we should not be led into obvious trap of agreeing to discussion of other issues certainly at this stage without further efforts to force showdown over frontiers and Yugoslav claims which will constitute only real test of Soviet intentions. French have no definitive instructions and seem to be motivated by general desire to avoid another failure for Austrian treaty. Berthelot hopes to obtain further clarifications Paris views over week-end. I am informed Bevin is anxious keep discussions going as long as possible believing adjournment at this particular stage in general development international situation and in light of uncertainties of Vishinsky’s next move and of possible developments in Germany might be open to adverse construction. In his opinion it would be more serious than last year and might be interpreted as evidence of Western preparation for early showdown with Soviet Union. Before final decision re break, he apparently prefers to see what the results of publication or signature of Atlantic Pact will be in respect of Soviet policy.
On the other hand, in our opinion postponement of decision on Article 5 and renewed negotiations on other articles or even protracted sterile discussions on ethnic questions without meeting issue of basic Yugoslav-Soviet demands would leave West exposed to danger of a later break over other issues which will be less clear to public in general and in Austria in particular. The dangers of adjournment in present circumstances are recognized but from point of view of Austrian treaty and of political situation in Austria the greater danger lies in allowing ourselves to be maneuvered into a weaker position where we may be required by pressure of public opinion to compromise on other issues without any assurance the basic issues of frontiers and reparations will be solved. Also any possible Soviet concession, for example on Article 35, would only serve their propaganda purpose in Austria and divert attention from unsolved basic issues of frontiers. Therefore, judging solely from point of view of Austrian treaty and necessity of continued support of Austrian Government, we should be prepared accept any reasonable grounds for adjournment in near future if continued pressure for solution of problems in connection with Article 5 brings no result. The responsibility for suspension also [Page 1081] then rests in full upon Soviets even though initiative for break might be taken by Western states which in present circumstances would be certain get full support by Austrian Government despite its urgent desire to achieve a treaty. We should of course, endeavor take action to secure fixed adjournment of present talks in such a way as to permit reconvening at a later date to be agreed and without giving appearance of complete rejection of all Yugoslav claims. We have indicated our willingness to discuss possible ethnic arrangements in Carinthia which might serve as a pretext for an adjournment to permit further study these proposals.
Over-all, such a course would be desirable in that it would maintain fiction of continued negotiations. It would permit calling a new conference at time nearer Austrian elections.3 It would also give Gruber opportunity explore possibilities of mitigating Yugoslav claims by direct economic negotiations, as well as providing time for operations under new US economic policy regarding Yugoslavs. Furthermore, opportunity would be provided for further clarification of Yugoslav-Cominform rift with possibility that some understanding might be reached with Bebler without benefit of Zarubin’s watchful eye. As it now stands, Austrian treaty is bearing more of its share of brunt of current conflict over Yugoslavia which unduly complicates treaty negotiations.
Department’s instructions upon foregoing considerations are urgently requested as a decision will undoubtedly have to be taken by Monday at latest. If time does not permit full consideration of this problem prior to then, I should appreciate preliminary indication of Department’s thinking in this respect by telephone not later than Saturday.
Sent Department, repeated Vienna 52, Belgrade 30.
- At the 131st meeting of the Deputies. Reber had given a full report on this meeting in Delaus 48, March 10, from London, not printed. (740.00119 Council/3–1049) The Deputies had been discussing the, Yugoslav claims since the 122nd meeting on February 24.↩
- In telegram 258, March 12, from Belgrade, not printed, Cannon expressed his full agreement with this statement. “As long as Soviets and Yugoslavs continue to be more concerned with tactics of their own dispute than with issues of Austrian settlement no substantial treaty progress can be made on frontier and reparations questions.” (740.00119 Council/3–1249)↩
- For documentation relating to the Austrian national elections, October 9, see pp. 1206 ff.↩