740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2349
Paper Prepared by the Acting Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs (Murphy)1
US Policy Respecting Germany
basic requirements in germany
- Since the cessation of hostilities in 1945 the US has sought, and will continue to seek, the establishment in Germany of conditions conducive to a peaceful development of that country and its association [Page 119] with the community of free nations. From the US standpoint the basic requirements for the attainment of these conditions remain essentially the same whether the program is susceptible of application of [to?] all of Germany or whether, by reason of forces beyond US control, the program must be restricted to western Germany.
- In summary, these basic requirements are as follows:
- Germany will not be permitted again to become a threat to the peace and security of the world.
- The US will actively oppose the revival in Germany of Nazism, obnoxious German nationalism, and the development of communist totalitarianism. Without according support to any individual party, the US will encourage activity by all political parties subscribing to the principles of political democracy. It will also encourage free trades unions.
- The US will promote the extension throughout as much of Germany as is possible of a governmental system derived from the people and subject to their control, operating in accordance with democratic electoral procedures and dedicated to upholding the basic civil and human rights of the individual. While opposed in principle to an excessively centralized government, the US does not regard as of major importance the degree of centralization or decentralization adopted at the present juncture in the organization of German political life as long as the decision is made freely by the German people in accordance with democratic processes.
- Recognizing that a prosperous Europe requires economic contributions from a productive Germany, the US regards economic recovery in Germany as necessary for recovery throughout all of Europe if a general European community can be created, or, if this cannot be achieved, at least for the recovery of the European nations operating under ERP.
- The US favors speedy termination of reparations from Germany through removal of capital equipment, in order to make possible prompt return to normal economic relations. The US will press for the adoption to the greatest extent possible of a policy to eliminate only industries which constitute a security hazard and in particular will resist prohibitions and restrictions proposed primarily for reasons of economic competition. In the economic field it will approve security guarantees which are simple and workable and at the same time will have a minimum impact on the normal German economy.
- As a general principle, the US has advocated the reconstitution of Germany as a free and independent entity and its eventual participation on an equitable basis in the community of nations. To that end, the US has consistently urged the prompt conclusion of a peace settlement for Germany.
Germany Within Europe
- The US Government recognizes that no approach to the German problem can be adequate which deals only with Germany itself and ignores the question of its relationship to other European nations. In the long run it will not be satisfactory merely to restore Germany as a [Page 120] sovereign entity among similar sovereign entities in Europe, even though Germany may be saddled with special obligations concerning demilitarization. Some new relationship must be found between Germany and her European neighbors other than that which prevailed before the recent war. The US Government therefore considers that any promising approach to the problem of Germany’s future status must address itself not only to the arrangements which are to be made within Germany but also to the conditions which are to govern Germany’s relationship to the remainder of the European community.
- Plainly, Germany cannot be fitted into the European community in a satisfactory manner until there is an adequate framework of general European union into which Germany can be absorbed. The other countries of Europe cannot be expected to cope with the problem of Germany until there is a closer relationship among them than the existing one. If this closer association of the other European countries were not called for by other requirements, it would be called for by their common interests in the handling of the German problem, alone. While the United States considers that the form and pace of the movement toward European union are predominantly matters for the Europeans themselves, it will, as a matter of principle, support and encourage such a movement wherever it can.
- The tempo and method of the relinquishment of present external governmental authority in Germany and the realization of this objective must be geared to the development of such a structure and such integration. It would be against the interest and the policy of the United States, and an obstacle to this objective, to recreate the prewar completely segregated type of political and economic unity of the German people, ready for use—as it was twice used during the brief seventy-five years of existence—in another devastating attempt by itself to dominate Europe and the world, or in an attempt through its central position and potential strength to regain its 1939 frontiers and position of dominance by playing off the East and West against each other.
- The United States recognizes from the experience of the past that once such a segregated political and economic unity were recreated, paper limitations on armaments and industry, no matter how necessary it seems now to adopt them, might well once more prove to be ropes of sand and create merely a delusive sense of security. The only enduring security in the future, so far as the German people are a factor in it, must lie in the renewed vitality of certain of their great cultural traditions of the long period prior to their segregated economic and political unity, together with a radically new reciprocal approach by the German people and the other peoples of Europe on a meeting ground of the mutual benefits of a strong common structure of free Europeanism.
- With regard to the eventual inclusion of Germany into a system
of European states, the United States Government considers that
the terms of such inclusion should not, in the final analysis,
be unequal ones which would impose unilateral handicaps and
restrictions upon Germany. This could easily be reconciled with
the security interests of other European powers if the general
terms of European union are such as would automatically make it
impossible or extremely difficult for any member, not only
Germany, to embark on a path of unilateral aggression. However,
the US Government recognizes that progress toward this end must
be gradual and must be governed both by the degree to which the
German people themselves take a constructive and cooperative
view of their responsibilities as a member of the family of
European nations, and by the framework and conditions of
association offered by the other European governments.
- A most important step in the direction toward European Unionism is the relationship between France and Germany. Stability in Western Europe will be furthered by confident and practical cooperation between Germany, or at least Western Germany if Soviet restraint on Eastern Germany makes this limitation necessary, and France. The efforts to effect Franco-German rapprochement after the First World War failed although sincere elements on both sides made the attempt. Bitterness and chauvinism sabotaged those enlightened efforts. That failure should not deter the United States from fostering in every practicable way the idea of close Franco-German collaboration. Many elements in both countries eagerly desire it and it is often asserted that without it there will be no possibility of peace in Europe.
- Therefore the US should work for reasonable solutions of
problems which if handled on a vindictive basis will only create
a climate where distrust and resentment militate against
friendly Franco-German relations. It should be realized that if
this objective is to be accomplished, it will require an
extended period of time during which the chances of success will
often fluctuate with public reactions to the treatment of
German Recovery and Security
- The United States Government regards the problem of economic recovery in Germany as part arid parcel of the problem of general Western European recovery. It will continue to judge problems of aid to Germany and to other European countries solely from the standpoint of that overall objective. It has no intention of favoring any one country over another or of trying to make recovery more rapid in one country than in another through the allocation of aid. On the other hand, it notes that foreign aid is only a marginal factor in the recovery process, and that the main factor is the will and energy with which the [Page 122] people apply themselves to the task of recovery. The rate of recovery in Germany must therefore rest primarily on the efforts of the Germans themselves. To the extent that they bring about recovery through their own efforts, the United States has no intention of attempting to deny to them the fruits of their effort by attempting to slow down the pace of their recovery. Europe needs production everywhere, and the United States cannot use its influence to delay or hamper the process of recovery.
- On the other hand the United States Government recognizes and is prepared to accept and face the consequences of this attitude upon the security of Germany’s neighboring states. It has no intention of permitting Germany, or any nation, to become again a threat to peace-loving neighbors. Accordingly, it does not propose to accept any arrangement, provisional or permanent, which would permit Germany to become a threat to collective security in violation of the principles enunciated in the United Nations charter. Until the present tense and insecure situation in Europe has been replaced by a satisfactory measure of international confidence and balanced normal relationship, the United States Government does not propose to withdraw from Germany.
- An additional consideration relating to the security of Germany’s neighbors is the possible utilization of Germany by another power for the purposes of aggression. In this respect the United States clearly recognizes the security threat inherent in the industrial potential of an economically recovered Germany. The United States was confronted with a similar consideration, on a much broader scale, when it was in the process of reaching a decision to make the tremendous outlay required from its natural resources to implement the European Recovery Plan. Although the United States recognized at that time that one or more nations affiliated with OEEC were, and for some time to come would continue to be, subject to possible aggression, the United States did not withhold economic aid because of such security consideration. A similar attitude has been adopted by the United States with respect to the possibility that the military potential of the German economy might fall into the hands of an aggressor. From a short-range viewpoint, the vulnerability of Germany to aggression is considered by the United States to be no greater than the vulnerability of the other continental nations of Western Europe. From the long-range viewpoint, the ultimate establishment of a satisfactory military posture by the nations of Western Europe, coupled with economic recovery, will, in the opinion of the United States, diminish materially the possibilities of aggression throughout all Europe, including Germany. Therefore, the United States must adopt the point of view that in general the reestablishment of a viable German economy along [Page 123] the lines previously stated should not be impeded by restrictions in specific fields of industry, which are based primarily upon the thesis that Germany might be used by another power for purposes of aggression.
- It is the considered view of the United States Government,
however, that provision must be made for the external security
of Germany and that the German state, whether unified to include
all zones of occupation or composed of only the Western zones,
must eventually be considered as a part of the general European
security system. The extent of participation in this system
would, of course, be limited to those countries who are free of
foreign domination and who have evidenced a desire to
participate with neighboring states to further the common
interest of the group. It is inherent in any such system that
the members thereof bear a common, joint responsibility for the
security of members within the system. It is not the intention
of the United States Government to force upon the members of the
European defense system, a proposal that Germany should be
permitted to rebuild her war potential or to re-create her armed
forces. Bearing in mind the responsibility of the members of a
European Defense system, it is the view of the United States
Government that a decision on such a proposal must result from
the considered judgment of the group. In general, the United
States would be against forcing or even permitting any
rearmament of Germany unless the principal members of the
Western European Defense system should, under some changed
conditions not now predictable, reach the conclusion that some
degree of rearmament of Germany would promote rather than impede
the security of Western Europe as a whole. However, in making
this determination, the group must bear in mind that the
security interests of the United States are involved. The United
States Government will carefully consider the implications on
the security interests of the United States of the group’s
judgment as to Germany’s participation.
Obstacles to Four-Power Agreement
- In quadripartite negotiations the US has consistently sought to reach agreement for the fulfillment of its basic requirements discussed in the opening sections of this paper. It was believed that the Potsdam Agreement represented a first step in this direction. However, the Soviets quickly proceeded to nullify this program in ACC deliberations and by their unilateral policy in the Soviet zone. They continued with mass reparations removals and the seizure of current output, thus frustrating the attainment of economic unity. They obstructed the adoption for all of Germany of measures necessary to stem economic and financial chaos; they applied ruthlessly communist techniques to their zone ultimately succeeding in establishing a police state and in [Page 124] fundamentally altering the whole pattern of industrial ownership and land tenure. The US sought repeatedly to redress the situation and bring about observance, of the basic principles above through prolonged negotiations at the Council of Foreign Ministers.
- The chief obstacles which led to failure were:
- Soviet insistence on uncontrolled exaction of reparations from the eastern zone both by removals of capital equipment as well as deliveries from current production; Soviet failure to adopt a joint export-import program for all of Germany; thus realization of economic unity in Germany was made impossible.
- Soviet unwillingness to agree to quadripartite supervision of political activities and of elections throughout Germany as a whole and their endeavor to create a highly centralized state susceptible of control by a single party.
- Soviet virtual rejection of the Byrnes treaty2 by insistence on prior agreement on extraneous and controversial issues, such as reparations, denazification, land reform, and four power control of the Ruhr.
- Soviet refusal to examine the question of Germany’s eastern frontiers.
The London Program
- As a result of Soviet obstruction in the ACC and the CFM an intolerable situation developed whereby Germany, lacking unity or a coordinated control, was rapidly being reduced to a state of economic chaos, distress and despair. The US and UK had already taken a first corrective step through the nominal economic fusion of their zones in January 1947, but it was their opinion that a comprehensive constructive program was required in the zones for which the Western nations were responsible in order to commence in the West the fulfillment of the basic principles which could not be applied to all of Germany due to Soviet obstruction. While there were certain differences in French views on methods of proceeding, the French appeared to share the same general objectives as the US and UK. After the breakdown of the London CFM in December 1947 it was decided by the three Foreign Ministers of the Western powers to hold talks in London in order to formulate a constructive and unified program for Western Germany. The talks which were held, with participation of Benelux representatives, from February until June 1948 resulted in six-power agreement on a broad program, the elements of which at present are in various stages of implementation. The major points of the London Agreements are contained in Annex “A.”3
- Having sought to no avail a settlement for all of Germany in accordance with basic US principles, the US, in concert with five Western European nations, has proceeded with a constructive program for the economic and political rehabilitation of Western Germany. This program has met with a substantial measure of success, which has been particularly manifest in increased economic production since currency reform. If not squandered through disagreement among the Western allies, the opportunity exists for the establishment of a stable democratic government in Western Germany. Under such circumstances there would be a real prospect for the successful assimilation of Western Germany into Western Europe, first economically and in due course perhaps politically as well. The resistance of the Western European countries to such a development is in fact likely to be less in the case of a manageable portion of Germany rather than with a united Germany of preponderant magnitude and uncertain orientation. As a result of the London program, Western Germany has already been included in the area benefiting from the European Recovery Program and potentially under the protection of the North Atlantic Pact.
- Because of the split of Germany, for which the Western allies
were in no way responsible, they have been obliged to take and
retain the initiative with respect to by far the larger part of
Germany. Even though the division of Germany may prevent an
all-German settlement, developments in Western Germany will
continue to exercise an influence on Eastern Germany. It may be
expected that the establishment of a stable and orderly
democratic political organization in Western Germany with a
reasonably prosperous economy, will exert an inevitable magnetic
force on Eastern Germany and make even more difficult Soviet
control of that area. Furthermore, the attachment of the Western
German population to a free and orderly system of government is
already causing many Western Germans to question the value of
German unity on uncertain terms. In as much as the Western
German arrangements embody basic principles of US policy toward
Germany, the development of Western Germany does not foreclose
possible agreement on all of Germany which, to be acceptable to
the US, must incorporate the same essential requirements. As
long as the Western German system continues to move forward, the
bargaining position of the Western allies is correspondingly
strengthened in any negotiations with the Soviets. Successful
fruition of our basic principles in Western Germany is the best
guarantee that Germany, if it is to be reunited, will be
restored along lines compatible with US policy. [Page 126]
Execution of Western German Arrangements
- The Western German arrangements which at present are in various stages of implementation are the result of a Six-Power Agreement concluded June 1948. Unless the other parties are convinced that there are cogent reasons for a modification or deferment of the program, the US must regard itself as formally and publicly committed. Although considerable disagreements, particularly with the French, have arisen on matters with respect to the implementation of the London program, there is no indication that the French Government or any of the other parties desire to disassociate themselves from the London Agreement. In the case of the French, the difficulties appear to result primarily from the desire of the French Government to obtain at this stage all possible advantages and benefits prior to the establishment of a Western German government and full entry into effect of the program.
- The main obstacles with respect to the Western German arrangements concern at present the occupation statute, the principles of trizonal fusion, the military government organization, approval of the draft German provisional constitution, Kehl, territorial reorganization of the German states and occupation zones, reparations, and prohibited and limited industries.
- Agreement on the draft occupation statute, with respect to which there are outstanding only a few minor points, has not been reached through failure to agree on collateral issues, e.g., principles of trizonal fusion and Kehl.
- With respect to the trizonal fusion principles, a satisfactory formula has not yet been found to ensure the predominant voice of the US in German foreign trade and related matters affecting US financial aid. Moreover, disagreement has developed with respect to the voting procedure for the exercise of reserved powers under the occupation statute, particularly because of the French desire to maintain unanimity as a prerequisite in certain fields. Also, negotiations on military government organization have been obstructed by French endeavors to obtain a prior decision on the reconstitution of the original states of Baden and Wuerttemberg and alteration of the occupation zones accordingly so that the French would occupy North Baden instead of South Wuerttemberg. This would involve, however, US abandonment of its important military installations in North Baden.
- The draft German provisional constitution has not yet been submitted for formal approval. However, the three Military Governors several weeks ago transmitted a statement to the German Parliamentary Council pointing out deviations in the present draft from the [Page 127] stipulations of the London principles.4 The German reaction has not yet been received.
- With respect to reparations and prohibited and restricted industries, at present there appears to be a good prospect of a satisfactory settlement.
- In view of US support of Western Europe, particularly of the
British and French, through US security commitments and US major
financial contributions, the US should be prepared to use its
negotiating power to seek the resolution of these important
matters of principle which will so greatly affect not only the
establishment, but the effective operation of the Western German
government. It must carefully weigh the undesirability of
forcing an unwilling agreement at this critical period in
European recovery and cooperation against the fact that at
present the French, and to a lesser extent the British, are
endeavoring to pursue courses which may undermine our basic
objectives in Germany. No fixed rules can be established which
can provide a mathematical guide to the degree of pressure that
should be applied at any point in our negotiations on these
subjects, since this must be judged at the time and under the
circumstances. The United States must proceed, however, with
resolution to use the full extent of its influence to ensure
that the London agreements are carried through in such a manner
as to provide a workable and effective organization in Western
Germany and at the same time in a manner which will necessitate
the minimum of US appropriated funds.
The Berlin Situation5
- As was made clear when Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of the Allied Control Council on March 20, 1948 after reading a prepared statement denouncing the tripartite London talks, the ensuing Berlin crisis has arisen as a result of Soviet endeavors to thwart a constructive program for Western Germany. The immediate cause of the Soviet blockade measures against Berlin was the currency reform program instituted in Western Germany on June 18, 1948. By these blockade measures the Soviets have endeavored to exert pressure on the Western allies in Berlin in order to bring about if possible their withdrawal from Berlin and also through intimidation to force a reconsideration of London program. By maintaining their position in Berlin through the airlift the Western allies have greatly enhanced their political position and prestige in Germany and have succeeded in creating tension [Page 128] and pressure in the Soviet zone through their counter-blockade. For the present the airlift continues to be a signal success, since the political, morale of the Berlin population is high and it furthermore places the Soviets in the position of being forced to take overt action to drive the Western allies from Berlin. On the other hand it is an irrational and costly enterprise; it would have to be further expanded to restore the Berlin economy to its previous level; it is certainly doubtful that the high morale of the Berlin populace can be indefinitely maintained in the face of serious privations and unemployment. Whatever means must be employed to remain in Berlin, the allies cannot afford to abandon the city under present conditions. Besides the serious setback to the position of the Western powers in Europe that would result from such an abandonment, the fact cannot be overlooked that the courageous attitude of the Berlin population and its voluntary association with the Western allies has reenforced the moral commitment to protect them against unwanted Soviet domination. The Soviets have made it clear in their attitude respecting currency and by their establishment of a hand-picked communist government in their sector what the fate of the city would be should the allies withdraw.
- There is considerable evidence to support the view that the present situation as regards Berlin is more to the disadvantage of the Soviets than to the US. In addition to the psychological detriment to the Soviet cause throughout Europe, there is no doubt that the Allied counter-blockade is seriously affecting the economic welfare of the Soviet zone and obstructing economic and political absorption of Eastern Germany into the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are now also faced with a humiliating and effective contrast of currency values within Berlin.
- Regardless of these factors, however, the continuation of the blockade with its attendant airlift represents a continued hazard in terms of the risks of serious incidents and possible resulting crises as well as a dangerous over-extension of air force resources susceptible to destruction in event of a surprise Soviet move. The airlift is as well an extremely costly exercise in terms of deterioration of air force material and, of course, in direct financial outlay. In summary, therefore, it may be stated that the lifting of the blockade still represents a major objective of the United States Government.
- Assuming that the motives of the Soviets in imposing the blockade were to force the US out of Berlin and to attempt by duress to force a deferment of the Western German program, the question therefore arises whether the US can pay the price of deferment of that program. Deferment of the Western German government is fraught with dangers as it would be difficult to undertake without the danger that the confusion and surrender of initiative accompanying such a course would in actual practice lead to the abandonment of the establishment [Page 129] of such a government. While the United States could possibly afford to accept a deferment of the Western German government for a short and specific period in exchange for the lifting of the blockade, it should not, due to the dangers involved, sponsor such a course.
- The United States can and should sponsor the position that since the actual establishment of the Western German government is still several months in the future, ample time remains for a CFM meeting on Germany as a whole prior to the establishment of such a government, provided the blockade is lifted. A possible quid pro quo, of greater importance now than formerly would be the lifting of the Western countermeasures.
- If the Soviets are still unwilling to accept the above quid pro quo, the US should be ready to consider abandoning its position of refusal “to negotiate under duress,” at least to the extent of being willing to discuss immediate Berlin problems, although the US could not agree to a Council of Foreign Ministers being held while the blockade continued. This change in position could be justified through utilizing the good offices of the President of the Security Council, since the US has already operated on the principle that discussions through this medium do not violate our principle. The US should also be ready to act in accordance with a Security Council resolution calling upon the Western powers and the Soviet Union to resume direct negotiations, possibly under continuing Security Council auspices. The US could explain publicly, if this was considered desirable, the changed conditions which made entering into such discussions acceptable while the blockade remained. This argument could follow the line that the Soviet blockade had failed in its purpose to drive the Western nations from Berlin due to the success of the airlift, etc., and that their position was such in Berlin that the feeling of duress was no longer upon them.
- The Western Allies have not exhausted the full possibilities
of their efforts to solve the Berlin Crisis in the United
Nations. These possibilities should be fully and resolutely
exploited, but in such a manner as not to give any indication of
undue eagerness for a solution which would only tend to tighten
the Soviet position, which otherwise seems to be one of
increasing eagerness. In event of continued failure to arrive at
a settlement, the United States should consider ways and means
of decreasing the importance of Berlin with a view of possible
withdrawal at some later date under conditions which would
fulfill, to the greatest extent possible, our obligations to the
population of Western Berlin.
Position Regarding Possible Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers
- In their zone the Soviets have kept approximately equal pace with the Western German program by laying the groundwork through [Page 130] a communist-dominated “People’s Council” for the eventual setting up of an Eastern German government claiming to have authority over all of Germany.6 Both the Western nations and the Soviets respectively have declared their programs to be applicable to all of Germany. As is well known, the London agreement envisaged that the Eastern zone states would be free to subscribe to the Western German constitution as soon as circumstances permit it.
- The Western allies are faced with a difficult choice. There is little hope of obtaining Soviet agreement to the type of program which in the US view is the only one that could be safely applied throughout Germany. While the announced Soviet program as contained principally in the Warsaw communiqué of June 19487 is disarmingly innocuous in its advocacy of a “democratic” government, the conclusion of a peace treaty to be followed by the withdrawal of occupation forces, it is patently suspect in its ambiguity. It is difficult to believe, given the differences which have developed between the Eastern and Western zones, that agreement could be reached on such vital specific matters as the following: a unified currency, property relationships including land reform, reparations, Ruhr control, the supply of foreign aid necessary for German’s recovery, etc. Even if compromise solutions were obtained, they would be open to the risk of forcing the Western powers to abandon the initiative they have acquired with respect to by far the larger part of Germany. Furthermore, in view of French views respecting a unified Germany, it is questionable whether the French would agree to according a future all-German government the powers and authority it would have to possess to combat economic deterioration and to resist communist assaults from within and without.
- From the US standpoint the following appears to be the
preferable course of action:
- To proceed with the implementation of the Western German program, recognizing it will not be completed for several months, during which period the Soviets at any time can arrange for a CFM through a lifting of the Berlin blockade;
- To offer in a CFM the appropriate essentials of the Western German program as a pattern for all of Germany;
- In the event of non-agreement, to seek in the CFM a modus vivendi with the Soviets under which the separate parts of Germany can co-exist and profit from mutual exchange, Berlin being included in such an arrangement which would make possible the continued four-power [Page 131] occupation of the city, the reciprocal lifting of transport restrictions, and trade between Berlin and the different parts of Germany.8
- The source text was attached to a memorandum of transmission from Murphy to Acheson and Webb, March 23, not printed, in which he stated that the paper was still under discussion by the Steering Group of the National Security Council (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2349). The first draft of the paper, not printed, was sent to Acheson on March 18 and to Webb on March 19. A copy of it is in file 740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–1949.↩
- Under reference here is the draft German Peace Treaty submitted by Secretary Byrnes to the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 29, 1946. For the text of the draft treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 190 ff.↩
- Not printed; the text of the report of the London Conference on Germany is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, p. 191.↩
- For documentation relating to the deliberations of the Bonn Parliamentary Council, including the text of the Military Governors’ comments on the draft Basic Law, March 2, see pp. 187 ff.↩
- For documentation on the diplomacy of the Berlin crisis, see pp. 643 ff. and Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, pp. 867 ff.↩
- For documentation relating to the establishment of the East German Government, see pp. 505 ff.↩
- For the text of the Warsaw Communiqué of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, June 24, 1948, see Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 300–307.↩
- The comments of three officers of the Department of State on this paper have been found. Jessup and the Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff, George Butler, each submitted memoranda, March 24, neither printed, that suggested minor clarifications and revisions in specific paragraphs. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2349 and 2449) Wayne Jackson submitted his comments to Hickerson, March 25, not printed, stating that the idea of German integration in Europe, presented in the section “Germany Within Europe,” was ignored in the other parts of the paper. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2549)↩
- The source text was not attached to the copy of the policy paper which Murphy sent to Acheson and Webb on March 23, but appeared as Annex B to another copy of that paper among the United States position papers used in preparation for the discussions with Bevin and Schuman.↩