740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2249: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
1154. For Murphy. Following is text referred to in my 1153, March 22.1
“Following is summary of Clay–Schuman interview in Paris March 20, at which Caffery, Riddleberger and Parodi were present.
In welcoming Clay to Paris, Schuman stated he hoped for a frank exchange of views on Germany in endeavor to discover what basic objectives France and US were seeking and how they could best be accomplished. He would, therefore, ask Clay to tell him frankly what his worries were and what difficulties were being encountered in Germany.
General Clay then outlined the principal difficulties which are preventing progress in Germany and which are to be found in the questions of trizonal fusion and its method of application; the French desire to exercise a veto right and appeal to governments; Laender boundaries; PRI; Kehl; the necessity of day to day decisions in governing Germany; and our general dissatisfaction with the course of tripartite meetings which, in his opinion, had now become similar to quadripartite meetings with Soviet obstructionism. Clay then made a strong plea to Schuman that now is the time for a rapprochement with Western Germany and the French should take the lead in this effort. The US is spending vast sums of money in an effort promote European recovery and time had come when France, in his opinion, should take lead in bringing Western Germany into Western European system. Germans should not be kicked in face at very time they were struggling to execute what had been decided in London. He hoped that France would make friendly gesture toward Germans who must be given some encouragement and hope for future. In view of Communist danger, it is tragic that since last June three democratic governments of France, UK and US were exposed to Germans as governments which could not agree upon their German policy. It is essential to agree upon our common objectives and put them into effect rapidly and efficiently.
Schuman replied that he was in accord with this reasoning and that he thought French and American objectives were basically parallel.
With respect to occupation statute, Clay recalled that French in present London negotiations2 seem to be seeking voting procedure [Page 116] that would effectively negate statute operation in Germany in that a wide variety of subjects could be appealed to governments and action thereby suspended. Schuman agreed that occupation statute was too detailed and said he was astonished at its complexity. There were certain subjects, however, on which French Government felt it could not be placed in a position of having decisions taken by majority vote and he asked specifically whether amendments to federal and Land constitutions could be approved only by a unanimous decision. He also thought that certain agreements such as that for Ruhr and PRI were result governmental action and could only be changed by agreement.
Clay agreed that amendments to federal constitution could only be accomplished by unanimity but held that this was not case for Land constitutions which must conform to federal constitution and to basic policy. In US Zone, we have already had two years experience with Land constitutions, but this is not case in British Zone where they are yet to be drafted. Schuman was surprised at this and said he had not realized that so much remained to be done. He said there were certain subjects contained in Land constitutions such as education to which French Government attached greatest importance and he wondered if it would not be possible to prevent constitutional changes in such fields except by unanimous consent. Clay again emphasized that protection in such matters would be found in federal constitution and in power of military governors to disapprove changes that would not conform thereto. Schuman seemed to be impressed by this reasoning. He felt, however, that appeals should be provided for security measures such as Ruhr control. General Clay then stated that in this connection interpretation of what constituted security was most important as otherwise there would be repeated appeals to governments based on security grounds. He further pointed out that in view of reserved powers in security field governments by agreement could have military governments issue corrective legislation if governments became dissatisfied with any measures in field accepted by majority vote of military governors. Schuman agreed this was correct.
Replying to General Clay’s observations on operation controls in Germany, Schuman agreed that restrictions on German industry should be essential ones and should be few in number. He entirely comprehended General Clay’s point about eventual uselessness of large number unessential and irritating restrictions which no one would be willing to enforce in later years. Like General Clay, doubted whether such restrictions such as those on levelled years [bevelled gears?] would hold up over a period of time. Important matter was get agreement between three Western allies on essential restrictions and method of application controls. There might be trouble with UK here but not with France.
In respect of federal constitution, Schuman noted with satisfaction that three military governors had been able to agree on recommendations to guide Germans. He considered this real progress and furthermore that it is now imperative to push ahead rapidly with occupation statute and principles of trizonal fusion. After experience which France had had, French people were understandingly preoccupied with problem of security against Germany and therefore, there were certain restrictions which would be regarded as essential by French Government. Respecting PRI, he thought there were greater differences [Page 117] between US and UK than between US and France, but his latest information from London indicated that progress was being made.3 He therefore hoped for rapid solution of this problem. As to occupation statute he asked Clay if perhaps it would not be better to start all over again in attempt obtain simpler document. General Clay thought not because of difficulties involved but pointed out that revision was contemplated within a year. Schuman then suggested that perhaps at time the occupation statute was promulgated Germans might be told that revision was contemplated. His experience with Germans had led him to believe that while we had to keep ourselves well-armed they would respond to concessions made for good behaviour and we could slowly soften some of clauses of statutes. He therefore agreed with suggestion of Clay’s that military governors should start on revision immediately after promulgation and should so inform Germans.
On principles of trizonal fusion, Schuman agreed to theory very limited appeal rights and also the high desirability being able give decisions promptly to Germans. He believed that we would soon vitiate controls which we regarded as essential unless we were able act promptly and therefore he concurred in General Clay’s analysis of this problem. However, I should point out that Schuman in this conversation was not particularly specific as to what essential controls would be although he agreed that they should be few in number.
Question of Laender boundaries was then discussed at length. Clay explained present position on plebiscite and military reasons why US could not give up North Baden. Schuman at once replied he understood these reasons very well.4 A discussion then took place of tripartite control at Land level as well as at federal level. Clay explained that he had proposed tripartite commissions at federal level with appropriate committees and with integrated coal, steel, and import-export groups; tripartite commissions at Land levels but with certain overt operations such as information services, restitution, et cetera, remaining unilateral with local observers in each occupation area appointed by the occupying powers of the zone. Schuman indicated that this system would be satisfactory to him. Clay then stated that this could be applied to Wuerttemberg-Baden (either in a bipartite or tripartite manner) either under a fusion or under a restoration of the two states. If this type of control were accepted, Clay would have no objection to making this known to the Germans before voting on the fusion of the two states. He thought it wrong to tell the Germans that if they did not accept fusion, the two states would be restored unless we had agreed upon our system of controls in advance. Schuman said he heartily agreed with this reasoning.
[Page 118]With respect to Kehl, Clay contended that the French plan was badly timed particularly now that West boundary changes were about to be announced. He hoped that it was not a matter close to Mr. Schuman’s heart. Schuman said that he came from Lorraine and that Kehl was close to the Alsatian heart but with him it was a matter of the head. He then explained the desire of Strasbourg to prevent competition with Kehl particularly respecting transit traffic to and from Switzerland. Clay proposed that Kehl not be resolved now but that it would be taken up at the time the details of trizonal fusion are negotiated in the form of some type of port authority in which the Germans would participate. Clay said that on this he could not speak for his government but he thought that his proposal would receive sympathetic consideration. Schuman also desired to refer to the French Cabinet but likewise thought it might offer a solution.
The interview lasted some three and one half hours and was conducted in the most cordial manner but with great frankness. Schuman remarked that he had read Clay’s New York speech5 carefully and found nothing in it with which he could not agree. Our impression was that Schuman had a real grasp of all the problems involved and seemed to approach them in a comprehensive and conciliatory spirit. General Clay characterized the conversation as being the most satisfactory which he had ever had on Germany with any French official. In saying farewell, Schuman indicated that he would like to keep in touch with General Clay and he would take steps to have someone designated for this purpose who could convey our ideas to him. Signed Riddleberger”
- Not printed; in it Caffery expressed his own opinion that the Clay–Schuman talk had helped foster mutual understanding of the French and United States positions on Germany (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2249). The meeting had been held on the initiative of Schuman, who at the beginning of March had expressed a desire to meet Clay informally. This idea was supported by the Department of State, and after many false starts it was arranged for Clay to proceed to Paris on March 20. Documentation relating to the arrangements for the talk is in file 740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–849 through 3–2249. For another account of the (conversation, see Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 425–427.↩
- For documentation relating to the London negotiations on the occupation statute, principles of trizonal fusion, and Kehl, see pp. 1 ff.↩
- For documentation relating to the London negotiations on the Humphrey Committee Report, reparations, and prohibited and limited industries, see pp. 546 ff.↩
- Under reference here is the French desire to have North Baden transferred to their control in exchange for South Wuerttemberg. This transfer would have united Baden under French control and Wuerttemberg under United States control. Clay could not accept such a transfer because United States military headquarters and its main communications center were in Heidelberg in North Baden. Connected with the problem of transfer was the request by the Ministers-President to hold a plebiscite in Baden, Hohenzollern, and Wuerttemberg concerning their merger into a single state, a proposal which Clay had supported.↩
- Presumably Schuman was referring to Clay’s speech on October 21, 1948 at the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Fund dinner in which he reported the morale boost given by the air lift and stated that Western Europe was rapidly approaching sufficient stability to defend itself as a result of ERP.↩