Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/1601

Summary of Discussions on Agenda Items of the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly Between Members of the United States, British, and Canadian Governments, New York, August 30–31, 1949¹

New York, August 30–31, 1949

secret

Present

United Kingdom

• Sir Terence Shone
• Mr. James E. S. Fawcett
• Mr. David L. Cole

Canada

• General A. G. L. McNaughton
• Mr. John Holmes
• Mr. Leon Mayrand
• Mr. Arnold C. Smith
• Mr. George Grande

United States

• Mr. John Hickerson
• Mr. John C. Ross
• Mr. David Popper
• Mr. Hayden Raynor
• Mr. Thomas F. Power, Jr.

[Here follows discussion of various subjects.]

Procedure on Atomic Energy and Conventional Armament Reports

General McNaughton raised the question of what the Security Council would do with the Atomic Energy Commission’s report.² He had thought that the report should go both to the Assembly and the Security Council, but the Chinese and United Kingdom Representatives had expressed the opinion that there would be particular difficulty with the Russians if the matter were not discussed in the Security Council. Therefore, he had abandoned the attempt to by-pass Council discussion. Mr. Hickerson said he thought this matter had to be taken up in the Council.

Mr. Ross expressed the opinion that it was most important that the Atomic Energy report be considered by the Assembly before Agenda Item 24 which, by its unfortunate title,³ lumped Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments. He recalled that this had been an oversight by the Assembly which had preserved the original Russian title although it was a new resolution. He saw no way to get around that until the Security Council changed the title.

Mr. Hickerson, referring to the procedural manner of handling Atomic Energy in the Council, said two courses had been suggested in the Department of State. First, that it be treated as an annex to its report, and, second, that it be discussed in the Council and sent to the Assembly by a procedural motion. He said he personally inclined toward the second.

General McNaughton pointed out that the first course was not possible since the Atomic Energy debate took place after the Security Council report closed as of July 15. He speculated that the Russians would not oppose a procedural resolution to refer the matter to the Assembly, as was done last year and in which they acquiesced. He thought this procedure could be applied both to the Atomic Energy Commission and Commission for Conventional Armaments reports, but underlined the importance of doing this on two different days to avoid Soviet maneuvers to link them together.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

Atomic Energy

Mr. Hickerson suggested that at the meeting of five of the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission the following day, the mechanics of getting the resolution to the General Assembly be discussed. He said it was his own philosophy that there was nothing the Assembly could do to assist the Atomic Energy Commission to make progress at the present time. He thought the six Permanent-Member talks would continue more or less indefinitely with the Western Powers taking the line that they would be glad to examine any proposals put forward on the assumption that despite all the careful work of the Atomic Energy Commission it might be possible that human ingenuity could suggest a new means of solving the question. He did not anticipate, however, that there would be any such proposal.

He would suggest that the six Permanent Members make an interim report to the General Assembly, saying that they were conducting talks, that they had not yet been able to reach agreement, but would continue their discussions. The General Assembly could then put a blessing on this procedure. General McNaughton concurred. Sir Terence indicated concurrence, but asked about the time-table Mr. Hickerson had in mind. He thought that there would have to be a number of additional talks among the six Permanent Members before any suggestion of this nature were put forward. He suggested that the Russians might say at almost any time that a report should be sent to the Assembly at once. Mr. Ross speculated that the Russians might try to get from the Security Council a report embodying their views which would be discussed early in the General Assembly. He thought that the report from the Atomic Energy Commission should be placed well down on the list and that just before the item were reached for Assembly discussion the six Permanent Members could file their report. Then the Assembly resolution endorsing the continuation of the discussions could be a very simple one which would hope that they would continue discussion and reach some agreement.

Mr. Hickerson noted that François de Rose, of the French Delegation, had suggested that the General Assembly should place its stamp of approval on the Atomic Energy Commission resolution. Mr. Hickerson was of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by opening the whole question to debate and that harm might be done. He would be very unhappy about having a full-dress debate on the question because we could not be sure what the up-shot would be. He thought that we should let well enough alone.

General McNaughton agreed with Mr. Hickerson. He believed that we should concentrate on the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission had passed its explanatory resolution that because there had been no progress in the Atomic Energy Commission, the Six Powers had entered consultations; no conclusion had been yet reached in the consultations, but the consultations were the most promising line to be followed and should be allowed to proceed.

Mr. Ross said he assumed the Security Council would send the Atomic Energy Commission report to the Assembly by a procedural resolution, and noted that it was not presently on the agenda. He expected the General Committee would place it on the agenda under the item dealing with atomic energy so that the ultimate resolution could take note of the Atomic Energy Commission report submitted to the Security Council and of the report from the Six Sponsoring Powers. He suggested that someone should be ready to introduce a resolution along the lines that had been discussed as soon as the item was reached on the Ad Hoc Committee agenda. General McNaughton agreed. Mr. Holmes observed that there was a very good chance that there would be a full debate on the atomic energy question. Mr. Ross hoped that everything possible would be done to keep it under control.

General McNaughton said that, if the Russians again dragged out the charge that the Atomic Energy Plan was nothing except the Baruch report, he thought a very careful explanation should be given along the lines of a paper which he had prepared⁴ to show the developments in the Commission, which made it clear that the Atomic Energy Commission plan was not the so-called Baruch Plan but was actually the product of the Commission. He had already made a draft copy of this available to Mr. Osborn and would furnish a copy to the United Kingdom. He said that he was very anxious that this should be done in the Assembly and the Canadians were ready to make such a presentation. He was most anxious that there should not be a smaller majority on an atomic energy resolution than had been the case in Paris. If the French proposal for a full-scale debate were adopted, he feared very much that it might be difficult to get a two-thirds vote. This would greatly aggravate the situation.

Mr. Hickerson said that it could be anticipated the Russians would make a propaganda speech on the atomic energy item and there would have to be an answer. General McNaughton suggested that the answer should be delivered more in sorrow than in anger. Mr. Holmes pointed out that, if it were necessary to put in a resolution condemning the Soviet view, it might very easily rouse feelings in the Assembly to a widespread attitude of “a plague-on-both-your-houses”. Sir Terence Shone agreed. General McNaughton said this was exactly what had to be faced. He said we did not need positive action at this point, but needed to hold the ground that had been won.

Conventional Armaments

Mr. Hickerson explained that the United States was discussing within the Government its views on the future of conventional armaments discussions. Frankly, he had nothing to contribute at the moment regarding future work but he would welcome an expression of views from other Delegations.

General McNaughton said that Canada would support the French proposal and believed that the work should continue on this basis. He asked about the discussion of safeguards. Sir Terence commented that he thought this would depend on discussions in the Security Council, especially whether the Russians vetoed the French proposal. Mr. Cole commented that if the Russians vetoed the French proposal the necessity of proceeding with a further elaboration of the exchange of information plan next year might be avoided. Frankly, for this reason the United Kingdom rather hoped there would be a veto. Sir Terence commented that if the Commission had to continue work next year the U.K. would probably prefer that it should go on to discuss safeguards. Mr. Cole said that the United Kingdom had considered the idea of suspension of disarmaments talks but would probably wait until Assembly debate began to find out whether there were any sentiment in favor of suspension. If there were no such sentiment, they would probably not put in such a resolution. They would almost certainly not do so unless the Soviets vetoed the French proposal. There might also be a veto on last year’s resolution in which case all work of the Commission would be vetoed and there would be a stronger case for suspension.

Mr. Ross said he doubted very much that a two-thirds vote could be marshalled that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should stop its work. He said that it was a very difficult problem for the public. He thought it would be very hard to support a resolution which would call on the CCA to stop its work.

General McNaughton said that he thought the Western Powers should keep in the position of pushing on disarmament discussions as far as the traffic would bear. They should prepare to do so in good faith, proceeding into discussion of safeguards. He thought it important that there be no retreat in public. In answer to Mr. Hickerson, he said he would advocate this even though a veto were cast but the discussion should be carried forward in good faith. He noted that we had taken the initiative on this and we should not be the ones to say that we did not want to talk about it further.

Mr. Cole said that an open mind should be kept until the debate began. He thought it reasonable to suppose that no proposal would be put forward unless it appeared that it would command a two-thirds majority. Sir Terence commented that as a practical matter, no agreement could be reached on disarmament until agreement had been reached on atomic energy. General McNaughton said that the majority in the Commission should not be the ones to close the door on discussion.

Mr. Hickerson said that he felt very strongly that great care should be taken on any proposal for suspension of discussion. He agreed that no agreement could be reached on disarmament until an atomic energy agreement had been concluded and a rapprochement achieved between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. He saw no chance for this. However, he was worried at a repetition of the kind of debate which had been experienced in Paris. Although it was an emotional approach, nevertheless, the Western Powers would be in trouble if they said they would not talk about disarmament. Mr. Cole wondered whether this might not be deluding public opinion. Mr. Ross thought this would not be the case, provided it were bluntly stated how small the chances of agreement were. General McNaughton concurred. He thought we should go on to express confidence in what the Commission for Conventional Armaments proposed and what had been done, explain the reasonableness of the proposal and address the Soviets more in sorrow than in anger. Mr. Hickerson said he would agree with all except the last statement, and would very much prefer a militant presentation. We should say frankly that we were not deluding ourselves and there was no hope for agreement on disarmament or atomic energy until there was a rapprochement between the Soviets and the rest of the world. The Soviets were now giving no reason for hope for a rapprochement in the near future. He did not think this was misleading public opinion. He said some of the military felt that discussion of disarmament was a waste of time and misleading public opinion. However, he felt that there would be real trouble if we slammed the door on discussion. As a practical matter, he observed that if the Russians proposed disarmament discussions, we would have to sit down and talk with them.

Mr. Cole remarked that if atomic energy discussions were discontinued, there would be a much stronger case for suspending the Commission for Conventional Armaments talks. Sir Terence Shone pointed out that if the C.C.A. was left functioning by itself the Russians would use that Commission all the more for confusing the issues of atomic energy and conventional armaments.

General McNaughton thought that a defense should be made of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, pointing out that what was being done was not entirely without usefulness. Proposals were being put down on paper and were not unuseful for the future. This was not a wasteful program. He recalled that all the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission had been willing to keep on talking in that body. It had been the small powers which had revolted. They might do the same thing in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. However, as long as anyone wanted to keep talking he thought that the talks should be continued.

Mr. Hickerson observed that he did not think there was very much difference between the various points of view. He understood that the United Kingdom would not want a resolution unless there was likely to be a two-thirds majority. Sir Terence confirmed this. Thus, Mr. Hickerson continued, it would be left up to the smaller countries to say that the disarmament discussions should be wound up. The United States, said Mr. Hickerson, would not want to advance the proposal to wind up the discussions but would acquiesce in such a proposal. Mr. Raynor doubted that there would be such a general revolt this year.

Mr. Cole pointed out there was a possibility the Assembly might want the members of the Commission to go on to elaborate further the exchange of information proposals and draft a convention, and even eventually try to get a convention in operation. He thought that the United Kingdom would want to gain its tactical point on the exchange of information plan, and then in the face of the Soviet veto let it die. General McNaughton thought that it could be agreed that safeguards should first be discussed by the Commission, before any attempt was made to put the exchange of information plan into operation. Mr. Cole doubted that this could be done since the French plan was supposed to contain its own safeguards.

It was generally agreed that the Commission for Conventional Armaments and the Atomic Energy Commission matters should come up in the Security Council on separate days, and probably the sooner the better.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

1. This summary was drafted by Thomas F. Power, Jr., Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations; for the section dealing with possible Soviet strategy and tactics in the General Assembly, see vol. ii, p. 72. Additional information on these tripartite discussions is provided in an editorial note in ibid., p. 244.
2. Document S/1377, July 29; for text, see SC, 4th yr., Suppl. for Sept.–Dec., 1949, p. 8.
3. At the 3rd Session of the General Assembly at Paris in 1948, Soviet draft resolution A/658 (for text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 1, p. 431) and subsequent revisions thereof received the following agenda item title: “Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council”. General Assembly resolution 192(111) ( ibid., p. 503), although dealing exclusively with the reduction of conventional weapons and adopted as a substitute for the Soviet proposal, was assigned the title of the agenda item under which it was approved. Consideration of the implementation of resolution GA 192(III) received the same title on the agenda of the 4th Session of the General Assembly, 1949 (Item 24).
4. Not printed.