Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes on the Fifth Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, September 1, 1949
secret
Representatives:
- McNaughton—Canada
- Tsiang—China
- Chauvel—France
- Hickerson—United States
- Cadogan—United Kingdom
- Tsarapkin—USSR
(The five friendly delegates met at Sir Alexander Cadogan’s Manhattan offices at 11 o’clock on September 1. Sir Alexander, who would be in the Chair for the afternoon meeting, stated that the agenda would be Points 4 and 1 of the UK paper.1 Chauvel (France) suggested that he would make the statement he had previously circulated [Page 139] if the other delegates thought the idea was a good one (a French version was previously circulated). In the first section, Chauvel had gone into considerable detail in attempting to give a point by point answer to some of the Soviet amendments and explanations thereon, with a disposition to accept some of the Soviet language when it did not differ in substance from the UK. The latter part of the statement emphasized the need and the reasons for effective control over atomic facilities and materials in order to make prohibition effective.)
Hickerson (US) pointed out that at the previous meeting, Tsarapkin had attempted some fast footwork, but had failed of his purpose because he had overstated the Chinese and Canadian positions. It was obvious that Tsarapkin was using parliamentary devices in order to obscure the differences in fundamentals. He suggested that Mr. Osborn, who had just returned from vacation, might give his opinion as to the status of the consultations. Mr. Osborn pointed out that we had spent considerable time in preparing a statement of principles in order to keep the discussion on things that really mattered. During the consultations, the Soviet Union had put in its own old propaganda proposals and we were beginning to discuss them rather than our statement of principles. He feared that when the secrecy of these talks was compromised, the record would be confusing and could be used to advantage by the Soviet Union. He emphasized the need for keeping the debate on grounds of our own choosing.
Hickerson (US) pointed out that he had continually taken the position that the order of discussion of the various topics was not important so long as all were discussed. He pointed out the need for sticking to fundamentals. In this connection, he referred to the reservations some delegates had on the need for the International Control Agency to carry on research on atomic weapons. Such research appeared to be a good idea, but it was a relatively minor detail and not a fundamental point in our discussions.
There were two main points concerning which we all disagreed with the Soviet Union. The first: We all know that national production will not work; the second: we all know that periodic inspections of declared facilities will not work. Both were inherent in the Soviet proposals on Point 4, and so long as the Soviet Union insisted upon them, we could not reach any basis for agreement. Hickerson stated that he agreed with practically all that Chauvel intended to say, but the details in the early part of his proposed statement should not be gone into, as they tended to accept the Soviet language. He wished to point out that the Soviet insistence on destruction of bombs and particularly on semi-finished bombs made sense only in the light of the Soviet ideas of control. As far as the majority plan was concerned, they made no sense, because the nuclear fuel would be all turned over to the international agency and there would be nothing significant to destroy.
[Page 140]Chauvel (France) agreed that we must stick to principles. He pointed out that Tsarapkin had been drawing erroneous conclusions from the apparent acceptance of some of his wording by other delegates. He pointed out that once we do agree on what the principles must be, then only can we proceed to the drafting stage.
McNaughton (Canada) pointed out that we must always keep in mind that prohibition is associated with and dependent upon control, and that whenever we say that there must be prohibition, we must add these words; otherwise, Tsarapkin will continue to draw these erroneous conclusions.
Tsiang (China) agreed with Mr. Hickerson that we should stick to principles and avoid details. He feared that a break in the secrecy would come about by a Soviet statement that the other five powers do not want prohibition. He suggested that we get to the real meat of the problem under points 6 and 7 of the UK paper and that we should not be finicky about reservations on details.
After considerable discussion, it was agreed that we would attempt to get to points 6 and 7 as soon as possible, since point 1 was so general in character that its language could be agreed to by everyone. Chauvel agreed to make only the second part of his statement on control. McNaughton stated that we would also try to make clear that Tsarapkin says prohibition—period, while we say prohibition that must be effective. We must clearly define what we meant by effective and point out that the Soviet Union did not want any part of it. This was not a question of the number of conventions but what was in them.
There followed an inconclusive discussion on how and when to make public the UK paper on principles. If the Soviet Union broke the secrecy of the meetings, of course there would be no problem. McNaughton wanted to have them part of an interim report that the Sponsors might make during the General Assembly. Cadogan and de Rose supported this point of view, stating that the General Assembly would want some substance in this report; otherwise, there might be a drive for a reconvening of the AEC.
Hickerson (US) argued for a non-substantive report to the effect that the Sponsors had been meeting since August 9, were continuing to meet, and were not yet prepared to make a definitive report.
Hickerson also argued against a de Rose suggestion that the General Assembly endorse the two UNAEC resolutions (fourth report). He suggested that the GA limit its action to noting the resolutions and noting the fact that consultations are still going on. Mr. Osborn believed that we were in an excellent position. The General Assembly had asked the UNAEC and the Sponsors to meet. The AEC had made a finding which is very defensible; the Sponsors are continuing to meet. We do not want any new instructions from the General Assembly. When the Sponsors are ready to make their report, they could emphasize [Page 141] that the three indefensible Soviet points; namely, national ownership, management and operation, periodic inspection of declared facilities, and the control commission’s powers limited only to make recommendations to the Security Council where the veto would apply. This discussion was not pursued further although there was a tacit understanding that we should not ask the GA to endorse the two UNAEC resolutions.
It was agreed by Cadogan, as current Chairman of the Security Council, that he would propose a simple procedural resolution at the Security Council on Tuesday2 to transmit the two UNAEC resolutions to the General Assembly.)
Meeting of the Sponsors at Lake Success
Cadogan (UK) Chairman, stated that at the previous meeting we had decided to take up points 1 and 4. Point 4 had been discussed at some length, and this discussion had revealed a general agreement in principle on the desirability of effective prohibition of atomic weapons. We had not agreed on the details. We have been trying to estimate the measure of agreement among us and were not drafting a treaty at this time. He wished to emphasize that all the points in the UK paper were interrelated and could not be decided upon in isolation. He suggested that we go immediately to point 1 and then to other related points so that we would get a view of the problem as a whole before we tried to record what agreements had been reached.
Chauvel (France) said that he had studied the record of the last meeting and noticed that Tsarapkin had said that there was a large measure of agreement on prohibition. Chauvel repeated that insofar as the Soviet language related to “pure” prohibition, it was not objectionable. If we could get agreement on the remaining points, then the drafting of this agreement would be an easy matter. A more serious matter was the conclusions that Tsarapkin drew from the measure of agreement so far reached. The Soviet amendments went much beyond prohibition. Tsarapkin’s conclusion that agreement on the desirability of prohibition meant that the other delegates were accepting the idea of simultaneous control and prohibition or the three months’ time limit on the destruction of bombs was quite erroneous. The Soviet Union said that without prohibition, there would be no need for control. With equal logic Chauvel said that if there were no atomic weapons, then there would be no need for control. He pointed out that it was true that control was meaningless without prohibition, but, he added, prohibition was not possible without control. Effective control was the real issue before us. We could not get away from the fact that atomic energy was a military matter whether it were used ostensibly for peaceful purposes, or otherwise. If control was necessary, as the [Page 142] Soviet Union contended, only for insuring observance of the convention on prohibition, then it should be logically limited only to installations for bomb assembly and not to production facilities for peaceful purposes. But even the Soviet Union had agreed that these latter must be controlled and that their development must not be unrestricted, when it accepted the idea of quotas. We could not have national rivalries in this field. Therefore, control had other purposes than that of insuring compliance with the convention on prohibition. It was the nuclear fuel that had to be controlled. The assembly of atomic weapons was a complex matter but it will be done quickly and in small installations. In this respect, atomic weapons differed from conventional arms. Conversion of a powerful industry to armaments took time and even Hitler could not hide its existence. It was the speed and the secrecy of military conversion of nuclear fuel that made necessary the control of the whole nuclear industry. The General Assembly recognized this fact in its resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. It did not subordinate control to prohibition or vice versa. He emphasized again three points.
- 1.
- Control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons were both necessary.
- 2.
- Control was not derived from prohibition but must apply to the entire nuclear industry.
- 3.
- Development of peaceful uses of atomic energy was not unrestricted but must be subject to international regulation.
As no one was ready to speak, Cadogan (UK) Chairman, suggested that we go from point 1, which was quite general, to point 6, which defined in detail what was meant by point 1.
Hickerson (US) said that at the second meeting, he had indicated that the order of discussion of the various topics was not important, that our purpose here is to discuss all points and to seek a basis for agreement on the fundamentals. He repeated US support for the Commission Plan as approved by the General Assembly, but also expressed a willingness to listen to and to work on any proposals that might be equally effective or even more so. He agreed that we might go on to point 6 now, as it was the heart of the control system.
Tsiang (China) pointed out that certain parts of the Soviet amendments to point 4, insofar as they related to prohibition, were not objectionable. There were two differences between the Soviet and the UK draft that he wished to point out. The first was the UK mention of one multilateral treaty to cover the problem, and the Soviet suggestion for two conventions. Tsiang wished to point out that the number of conventions was not important; what was important was their content. The second difference was that in the UK draft, control and prohibition were conceived of as one integrated whole, while in the Soviet amendments, prohibition came first with control supplementary. [Page 143] This might be a mere verbal difference; on the other hand, it might be very substantial. We wanted water-tight prohibition, but that was not possible without watertight control. Therefore, effective prohibition and effective control were almost identical in substance, and it was not useful to discuss one without the other. In the Soviet amendments, there was one sentence regarding control that seemed important; namely, “in order to be effective . . . . . including inspection to insure . . . . .”.This sentence bothered Tsiang. He wanted to know what besides inspection was included under control. It was all the more bothersome because the words “including inspection” were not separated by commas. He agreed that we should now go to point 6 in order to get to the meat of the problem.
Tsarapkin (USSR) next spoke, referring to the Chinese question as to what besides inspection is included in control and also the Chinese concern over the lack of commas around “including inspection”. He reminded the delegates that the UK had suggested that we avoid the fruitless discussions of the past and try a new approach. Then the UK had submitted a document which contained the UK ideas on the fundamental points. Canada, China, France and the US had quickly agreed to these points. It was clear that these points were taken from the summary of the United States plan of control as it appeared in Annex 2 of the Third Report. They all stemmed from the United States plan of control, whose main purpose was to put the entire atomic energy field in the world under the United States’ control, perhaps under the United States Atomic Energy Commission or some other agency controlled by the US, so that the US can further its expansionist and imperialist tendencies. Mr. Hickerson continued to insist upon the majority plan, or even a better plan, which can only mean that he wants a better method of controlling the world nuclear industry. Mr. Hickerson’s insistence upon this would not move the Soviet Union or change its attitude. The majority plan was unacceptable and the Soviet Union position on this point had been repeatedly made clear. Moreover, if the US insisted upon the majority plan of control, then it was clear that the United States’ acceptance of prohibition paid only lip service to the idea, and the Soviet Union had no other conclusion to draw than that the US was still against prohibition.
Tsarapkin (USSR) in response to the question of China on what besides inspection was included in the Soviet plan of control, then read out verbatim the Soviet proposals on atomic energy control submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission on 11 June 1947 (see Annex 3(c) of the Third Report or Part IV of the Second Report).
Tsarapkin then stated that now he had answered the Chinese question as to what the Soviet Union meant by control. The Soviet control proposals were designed to insure peaceful uses of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons. In this they differed from the US [Page 144] and UK proposals, which were designed to create a world super-trust placed above nations and government, giving to it exclusive rights of ownership of all atomic resources and installations. This was not control. This is essentially different from the Soviet proposals. The Soviet proposals contained a basis for an effective system of atomic energy control and, on this basis, a satisfactory and effective document could be drafted on the subject of the international control of atomic energy.
Cadogan, Chairman, suggested that at the next meeting, we discuss point 6, to which there was no objection. A “hollow” press communiqué was then approved and in consultation with Hickerson, Cadogan set the next meeting for Thursday, September 8, at 3 p. m. The meeting adjourned at 4:45 p. m.