Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes on the Fourth Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, August 25, 1949
secret
Representatives:
- Smith1—Canada
- Tsiang—China
- Chauvel—France
- Hickerson—United States
- Cadogan—United Kingdom
- Tsarapkin—USSR
(Prior to the meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, scheduled for 3:00 p. m., the five friendly delegates met at 10:30 in Sir Alexander Cadogan’s Manhattan office. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that after a study of the Soviet amendments, he had been “disappointed” to find [Page 125] that the Soviets had merely reintroduced proposals that had been repeatedly rejected in the past. He emphasized the fact that the crux of the problem was effective control which would make prohibition effective. The important thing to keep in mind was a single integrated solution to the entire problem of control and prohibition. The Soviet amendments were not acceptable to the U.S. Mr. Hickerson stated that we should attempt to obtain Soviet views on the question of control and until we get effective control, the U.S. would not give up its atomic weapons.
Sir Alexander agreed and stated that this was a perfectly respectable position to maintain.
Tsiang pointed out that the Soviet amendments to point 4 really go much beyond the simple question of prohibition and touch on questions of control, stages, and other points of the British document. He would propose, therefore, that at the forthcoming meeting we pass as soon as possible to point 1 of the British paper titled “International System of Control”. As far as the amendments touch on “pure” prohibition, they seem innocuous and unobjectionable.
Mr. Hickerson pointed out that he was in no position to accept the Soviet language even on prohibition and could certainly not accept the time limit on destruction as this was a question of stages which would have to be carefully worked out.
Chauvel expressed approval of Tsiang’s analysis and suggested that it be made at the start of the meeting in order that we might lead naturally to point 1. Wei indicated that his delegation was ready to drop the word “national” in the first sentence of UK Para. 4(a) and to add the word “possession”.
Chase2 pointed out that the word “possession” had been in the first report but had some how not found its way into the British draft. However, since it appeared in Para. 4(c) [4(b)] it was not an important point. Insofar as the word “national” is concerned, the U.S. wished to retain it, because its deletion would not permit the agency itself to carry on research and development of atomic weapons. The arguments for permitting the agency to carry on such work were persuasive, being (1) keeping the agency in the forefront of knowledge which would permit it to recognize research on atomic weapons when they saw it, and (2) giving the agency the power to prove or disprove a possible future claim that some scientist had devised a method for denaturing nuclear fuel in such a way that would make it, in his opinion, unfit for use in weapons.
Mr. Hickerson pointed out that we should stick to the fundamentals at all times in these discussions. When we come to the question of details these can be worked out, but the important point was getting a basis for agreement on fundamentals, not on details. He said that the [Page 126] U.S. was going to restate its position on prohibition. Mr. Hickerson further pointed out that, speaking only for those present, it would not make much difference whether there were one, two, or more conventions or whether the prohibition would be disposed of in a chapter in a single convention, what we had in mind was a complete and integrated solution to the whole problem. He agreed that we should get to point 1 as soon as possible with Tsiang making his analysis as a starter. If Tsarapkin insisted on discussing control under point 4, we should ask him what were his views on the question of control.
Chauvel emphasized that the UK paper was basically a basis for discussion. Our task was to get agreement on principles, not on language. We were not drafting a treaty here, so let us keep to principles. It was generally agreed that there was very little that could be said on prohibition as such and that we should get to the problem of control as soon as possible.)
Meeting of the Sponsors at Lake Success
Tsarapkin (USSR), Chairman, stated that we had before us the UK point 4 and the Soviet amendments thereto. The substance of these had not yet been discussed and he invited discussion of the substance.
Tsiang (China) stated that before taking up point 4 and the Soviet amendments, he wanted to review the situation. The UK had submitted an outline with some elaboration in order to facilitate the discussion of the problem in a coherent and logical fashion. The Soviet representative, without indicating his views on any point, had suggested that we start discussion with point 4. This had been agreed to. Then the Soviet representative had put in amendments to point 4. After studying it, China had found that it went beyond point 4 and touched on most of the other points. The first sentence of the Soviet amendment is almost identical to the UK sentence. The second sentence concerned points 1, 6, and 7. Para. (b) of the Soviet amendments concerned point 1 but was different in substance. Para. (c) was identical in substance to UK Para. (b). Para. (d), with one exception, was identical to UK Para. (c). The time limit on destruction of three months came under point 8, although it was not the same as point 8. He drew two conclusions from this analysis: (1) The Soviet amendments covered other points than 4; (2) insofar as the Soviet amendments were related to point 4, they were substantially in agreement with the principles of UK point 4. Some verbal differences did not seem to be important. We were here to achieve agreement on principles and not to draft a treaty. Therefore, exact wordings were of no great interest. Insofar as the Soviet proposals related to point 4 as such, China could accept the substance of the Soviet language. He then read those sentences or parts thereof that related only to point 4 stating that what he had read his delegation could accept in substance. These [Page 127] were: “An international convention outlawing the production, use and possession of atomic weapons is an essential part of any system of international control of atomic weapons. Atomic weapons should not be used in any circumstances. The production, possession and use of atomic weapons by any state, agency or person whatsoever should be prohibited. All existing stocks of finished and unfinished atomic weapons should be destroyed and the nuclear fuel contained in the said atomic weapons should be used for peaceful purposes.” Since agreement regarding point 4 appeared to be general, he suggested that we take up again the UK outline and start with point 1 referring to a statement Tsarapkin had made at a previous meeting that after we had discussed prohibition we would continue on to control.
Chauvel (France) agreed in general with China. The UK paper was more useful and more analytical. We were dealing here with the substance of the matter, the language here was not so important. He agreed with China that insofar as the Soviet language touched on point 4 we seemed to be in general agreement. The exact text could be worked out later and he suggested that we go to point 1, as effective control was the real issue before us.
Hickerson (U.S.) stated that he had studied with care the Soviet amendments to point 4. He agreed with most of what China had said. The situation confronting us was substantially as follows:
All of us favor prohibition. His government had advocated prohibition from the beginning of the discussions of this problem—effective prohibition made effective by means of effective control. The Soviet amendments were, frankly, obscure to him. They did touch on the control features of the UK draft but they remained obscure. However, they did appear to merely reintroduce Soviet proposals made and rejected in the UNAEC in 1946, 47, 48, and 49. The problem of control and prohibition required a single integrated solution. The Commission plan of control approved by the General Assembly provided such a solution. That is why we supported it and would continue to support it. He realized that human ingenuity was not exhausted and perhaps a better and more workable plan could be devised. He had not been able to find such a plan but he would give sympathetic consideration to any proposal that would lead us out of the impasse. He was sorry to say that the Soviet amendments did not advance us in a search for a way out. Therefore, he repeated his support for the UK draft. He agreed with Franch that the real issue was really effective control. He therefore proposed that we proceed to a discussion of the UK point 1. Although the order of discussion was not of prime importance, we could, and probably would, return to point 4 and to other points in the future. But since the real issue was effective control which would make prohibition effective, he proposed that we start with point 1.
[Page 128]Tsarapkin, speaking as the representative of the USSR, stated that the delegations who had spoken on the Soviet amendments appeared to have agreed on some points. However they attempted to separate some parts of the Soviet amendments and shift them to the discussion of control. The Soviet Union could not agree to this. The U.S. stated that prohibition and control was a single problem. If so, let us try to get agreement on the basic issue—not the details but the basic principle which was prohibition. Control derived from prohibition. Without prohibition there was no need for control. Control without prohibition was hollow talk. There were certain issues of principle raised by the Soviet amendments. Let us agree on these as a basis and then we could go to other questions. Prohibition was the crux of the entire problem. When the Soviet Union submitted its amendments, it did so taking into account certain unacceptable parts of the UK draft. In particular UK Para. 4(a) applies only to nations and does not include the word “possession”. If we consider the word “national” in connection with UK point 6, it acquires great significance. Point 6 gives to the agency production facilities and nuclear fuel. Since the agency was not included in the prohibition provision, this means that the agency would have the right to stockpile bombs. Therefore, it was clear that although states and individuals were included in the terms of prohibition, the agency was not. He could not agree with China and others that the Soviet amendments touched upon other topics. He then reread the Soviet amendments, pointing out that each one incorporated a basic and desirable provision. We must agree upon these now even if we did so in principle only, and therefore did not need to go into details. He pointed out that UK Para. 4(c) did not include semi-finished atomic weapons, which provision must be included. Regarding the three months time limit on destruction he pointed out that if we agreed on prohibition and really meant it, then we could not object to this time limit.
Summing up, he stated that he could not see how the Soviet amendments could be rejected and once we agreed on them we could get on to the basic control point which could be discussed later. He disagreed with statements that we should defer further discussion on prohibition and go to control. If we could not agree on prohibition, there was no need to go on to control. If, on the other hand, we could agree on the Soviet amendments, let us put that in the record and go to the problem of control. That is, control which would ensure the observance of the convention on prohibition.
Smith (Canada) spoke saying that our purpose here is to reach agreement on the entire problem. We were trying to get agreement on principles. If that could be done, then we could get to treaty drafting. He pointed out that without effective control, no prohibition was possible. We all agreed that atomic weapons should be prohibited. The [Page 129] crucial point, however, was effective control. It was this point that we had to resolve. The UK document was a very good one. It covered the entire problem. His government had studied it and found that it fitted the bill. Canada accepted it as a statement of principles covering the problem of control and prohibition. At the previous meeting Canada had suggested that all members submit amendments to all points in order that we might have before us a picture of the problem as a whole. This would be very helpful. Canada had no amendments to make at this time. He hoped that all others would, like Canada, lay their cards on the table with frankness in order that we might have a view of the entire problem. The Soviet Union had indicated in its amendments that prohibition to be effective must be linked to control.
Cadogan (UK) had one or two observations to make. It appeared that there was general agreement on the principle of prohibition. This was one of our purposes. However, no one expected to get this unconditionally. It was dependent on an effective system of control. The Soviet Union said that without prohibition, it was useless to talk of control. We would say that without control, it was useless to talk of prohibition. According to the record, the Soviet Delegate had suggested that we combine points 1 and 4. If so, let us now proceed to point 1.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that it appeared to him that the members present wanted to have a wider frame of discussion. The UK had just suggested that we go back to the Soviet suggestion of combining 4 and 1 into one title and discuss the prohibition of atomic weapons and an international system of control.
Hickerson (US) stated that at the last meeting, he had said that we should have informal conversations to discuss and, if possible, solve the entire problem. The UK paper was a useful frame for discussion. It was not a treaty. Therefore, we should not amend the UK paper as we were not attempting to draft a treaty. The Soviet Union said that without prohibition there was no need for control; others said that without control, there would be no prohibition. It seemed to Mr. Hickerson that both control and prohibition were essential. The Soviet Union emphasized prohibition. That was their point of view. We emphasized control. Let us not amend the UK paper. We have talked about prohibition at length. Now let us discuss control at the next meeting. We could and would go back to prohibition many times. We will discuss both questions from time to time in the future. We were not here in an attempt to make the UK paper a formal document, so let us retain it as a frame of discussion.
Tsiang (China) stated that he appeared to be working at some disadvantage without a verbatim record. He did not understand the Soviet Union and felt that the Soviet Delegate did not understand him. The Soviet Union had said that control without prohibition was [Page 130] meaningless. That made sense, but the converse was also true. Prohibition without control was also meaningless, to which the Soviet Union appeared to have agreed. Furthermore, China had not expressed any opinion on the Soviet amendments; that is, on those which were not within the scope of point 4. China had said merely that they belonged elsewhere, but since we had agreed to a point by point discussion, he had not discussed these other points. Moreover, these points were not very clear in the Soviet draft and China had not taken any position on them. In addition, he had accepted in substance those parts of the Soviet amendments which related to point 4. He had felt that there was so great an area of agreement here that we could now go on to other points. However, without the verbatim record, he could not really be sure. He had not gone fully into verbal differences, but regarding the word “possession”, its omission in para 4(a) appeared inadvertent. It was mentioned in para (c) and perhaps can be re-introduced. Regarding the question of semi-finished weapons, this did not seem at all important in that it was clear that nuclear fuel was to be used for peaceful purposes only and the problem did not arise. Nevertheless, that provision can be accepted. Regarding the three months’ time limit on destruction, China reserved its position, as it related to point 8 and it should be discussed there. He proposed that at the next meeting, we talk of control, since the Soviet Union had some sentences on this subject.
Tsarapkin, speaking as the Soviet representative, stated that it had been emphasized several times that prohibition without control was meaningless. He could not understand where this idea came from. Nobody, including the Soviet Union, had ever stated that they wanted prohibition without control. The Soviet Union had repeatedly stated that a Convention of Prohibition must be complemented by a Convention of Control. Others emphasized that we must have both prohibition and control. He could not understand this emphasis. The need for prohibition was obvious. To say that we would have prohibition without control or that anyone was advocating such a position was pure invention, as no one had put this idea forward. However, the main question remained; namely, the basic question of prohibition. All agreed that we must have prohibition and then we should have control against the non-observance of the Convention on Prohibition. These points were covered in the Soviet amendments. If we could agree on prohibition as indicated in the Soviet amendments, then we could go on to the problem of control. Some delegates had a marked preference for control. It was hard to understand this confusion between cause and effect. The Convention on Control was not the leader. It merely made effective the Convention on Prohibition to ensure compliance with the latter. Moreover, the Soviet Union had agreed that both Conventions should go into effect simultaneously, although it [Page 131] would have been perfectly logical to have one follow the other. However, this did not make control and prohibition identical. Prohibition was the leader; the other was a service instrument, an assistant, so to speak. If we could agree on the Soviet Union amendments (he then read them again), let us say so. Let us state that there was an understanding on the acceptance of the Soviet amendments just read. Then we could go to the following question, an important one, but still a service instrument; namely, the Convention on Control. He did not insist upon formal approval, but just an agreement. Then we could go on to our next problem. There had been no objection in principle to any of the Soviet points. If we could get agreement or an understanding on them, we would be introducing a bit of clarity to the discussion which now appears to be evading us. If we did not wish to bind ourselves formally, to this agreement, we could at least have an understanding in principle.
Hickerson (US) spoke, pointing out that in his opening statement, he had said regretfully, that the Soviet amendments as given were not acceptable to the U.S. Government. We were all agreed that we want agreement on control and prohibition, but we were not in the formal agreement stage now. We were in the stage of informal discussion on all matters before us. After we had thoroughly discussed, not only prohibition, but control and the rest of the items before us, then we would get to the stage of agreement. Since the hour was late, he proposed that we adjourn with the clear understanding that there had been no formal agreements reached to date.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that if he had understood the statement of the U.S. Delegate correctly, to the effect that there was a clear understanding that there had been no agreement reached on prohibition, that did not appear to have reflected what had happened, particularly regarding the statements of China and Canada. He would like an explanation.
Hickerson (US) stated he was happy to clarify his statement. We were in the process of discussing various aspects of various points of a very important problem. We would obtain, of course, many areas of agreement, but, since we were in the discussion stage, and speaking only for himself, he did not think that we were in the position to record these agreements.
Smith (Canada) agreed with the U.S. He stated that we could not record agreements formally now. He wished to inform Tsarapkin that the latter had misunderstood him. Tsarapkin had said that Canada had accepted the second sentence of the Soviet amendment to para. 4(a). What Smith had said was that we were all agreed that there must be prohibition and that prohibition without control is no good. He had merely quoted that part of the Soviet amendment which [Page 132] appeared to make this point. Therefore, it seemed to him that Tsarapkin had agreed with Smith rather than vice versa.
Tsarapkin, Chairman, then read a “hollow” draft press communiqué, but suggested a slight amendment to indicate that the Sponsoring Powers were meeting in pursuance of para. 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of November 4, 1948. No objection seemed worthwhile making, and the amendment was accepted.
Tsarapkin, in consultation with Cadogan, agreed that the next meeting would be held on Thursday, 1 September, at 3 p. m. He attempted to indicate that the agenda would be a joint title combining points 4 and 1, but several delegates speaking more or less simultaneously, indicated that they understood that the subject matter would be point 1, and point 4.
Cadogan (U.K.) prior to adjourning, indicated that he agreed with the U.S. statement that the U.K. paper was not a formal one. However, it did express the views of his Government and he would urge that any delegates who had amendments to any of the points submit them as soon as possible. The meeting adjourned at 5:40 p. m.
(Note: The text of the Soviet amendments as attached by the Secretariat to the record of the Third Meeting3 differs in some respects from the previously circulated text, and is apparently the definitive Soviet text.)