Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes on the Second Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, August 16, 1949, 10:30 a. m.
secret
Representatives:
- McNaughton—Canada
- Tsiang—China
- Chauvel—France
- Hickerson—United States
- Cadogan—United Kingdom
- Tsarapkin—USSR
(Prior to the meeting, the five friendly Delegations met at Sir Terence Shone’s home at 9:30 a. m. and agreed on certain last minute changes in the Statement of Principles previously discussed. It was also agreed that Sir Alexander present at the forthcoming meeting this agreed elaboration of the fundamental points he had circulated in order to get them into the record and make the control of the ensuing discussion easier. This elaboration has already been made available and made part of the record of the meeting held at Lake Success. It will be made available as a Secret UN document.1)
Tsiang (China), Chairman, opened the meeting and requested Cadogan to expand on the list he had circulated so that all might have a better understanding of what the points previously circulated by Cadogan meant.
Cadogan (U.K.) took the floor and suggested that he might elaborate the various points he had previously circulated. These points were, of course, taken from the majority control plan, which is supported by the U.K. These points, moreover, are essential to any effective system of control and might be used as a framework of discussion so that the representatives present might see what the gaps are and perhaps narrow them. In any event, we would have a clear and forthright report to submit to the General Assembly. Cadogan stated he was prepared to put some flesh on the various points and suggested that he read into the record his elaboration thereon. Tsiang agreed that this would be a useful thing to do and since there was no objection, he asked Sir Alexander to proceed. Sir Alexander then read the agreed Statement of Principles and when he had finished, he pointed out that this statement was very much compressed and that he would [Page 114] like the Secretariat to distribute it for study. Since no copies were available for distribution and no Delegate was prepared to speak immediately, it was agreed that the meeting recess while the Secretariat typed out the elaboration, so that all might have it.
When the recess was over, Tsarapkin (USSR) took the floor and pointed out that the list of various points submitted by the UK contained various items such as the international system of control and prohibition of atomic weapons, etc. The order of the listing was of some interest but it did not reflect the substance of the problem, in his opinion. Tsarapkin suggested that points 12 and 43 be combined to read—“The prohibition of atomic weapons and the international system of control”. He pointed out that it is the question of prohibition that gives rise to the problem of control and without prohibition, there would be no need for control. Therefore, he requested that his suggestion be adopted.
Cadogan (UK) pointed out that Tsarapkin’s statement sounded like good logic but that, in fact, his proposal was an old one and had not been at all fruitful in the past. Prohibition is a primordial point but it cannot, in fact, come first in time. We must agree on a plan and an effective one, in order to make prohibition effective. It is, of course, possible to discuss both together, but this would only repeat what we have been doing for these many years. He had hoped to conduct the discussion in the order as it appeared in his list.
Hickerson (US) then stated that, in his opinion, the thing that we must keep foremost in mind is a single package program to solve the entire problem of control and prohibition. If we argue that we should combine points 1 and 4, to be logical, we should combine them all, as this is all one problem of control and prohibition, including the stages of application and implementation. It must be emphasized that prohibition derives from an effective system of control. He would prefer to discuss the points separately.
Tsarapkin (USSR) then stated that he talked only to the point of the order of discussion of the various topics. It seemed to him that Sir Alexander had stated that control must precede prohibition, but the immediate issue was on the order of discussion. He did not agree with the US proposal that we should put all the points together. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the important thing is prohibition and then, of course, control, which must also come. The need for prohibition is the only reason for having control. Perhaps we could discuss these separately; we could first discuss prohibition and then come to the next and necessary step of control, both to go into effect simultaneously. This seemed so logical that it was hard even to argue the point. Tsarapkin repeated his suggestion that we first discuss [Page 115] and discuss separately, if it is so desired, the question of prohibition and then, that of control.
Tsiang, speaking as the representative of China, pointed out that what the Soviet proposal amounted to was the following: He wanted point 4 to become point 1 and also suggested an amalgamation of the two. We should not let the order of discussion prevent our approach to the whole problem, and since the Soviet representative had a decided preference, perhaps we could agree to change the order. It is, of course, true, and on this we are all agreed, that the problem of control and prohibition is one problem and agreement on any one point means nothing unless we have agreement on all. China would be prepared to change the order of discussion and make point 4, point 1.
Cadogan (UK) pointed out that, of course, we can all agree on some statements concerning prohibition, but this was not the crux of the matter; the difficulty has always been agreement on effective control.
Hickerson (US) pointed out that perhaps he had not been understood clearly. What he had meant to say was that there must be a single package solution to the entire problem. He suggested that we keep the list intact and not rewrite it. Of course, it is possible to start with any number in the list, 4 or 6 or any other. Point 4, prohibition of atomic weapons, is part of the control system and appears to have been adequately provided for ever since the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. The order of discussion is really not important. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated that if we do not have prohibition, there is no need to have control. Mr. Hickerson would like to point out that even if there were no atomic weapons in the world, we would still need an effective control system against the possibility that atomic weapons would be made in the future. He repeated that the US supported the Commission plan as approved by the General Assembly because it would be effective both as regards control and prohibition, but that he was willing to listen and to work on any better plan that might be suggested.
Chauvel (France) stated that as the US representative had pointed out, the order of discussion is not of much importance so long as no implications are drawn from any particular order decided upon. The UK list is a very workable one and we could take up topics in any order, or even add new ones, with the understanding that the order of implementation of the various phases of the plan is in no way involved.
McNaughton (Canada) said that the problem seemed to him quite simple. We had a good list before us, the order of discussion was not important so long as all are discussed and agreement on them was reached. He proposed that we could start with point 4 and then go on to point 1 or any other that might be desired.
[Page 116]Tsiang, Chairman, stated that we all seemed to be pretty close in our views; that the list was prepared to facilitate discussion, that it is perhaps not exhaustive and more points may be added. He also pointed out that now that we have put some flesh on the bones in the form of the UK elaboration of the various points, we see that under point 1 occurs the phrase “control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons”. It seems obvious, therefore, that even under point 1, we could discuss both but we are all prepared to start with point 4.
McNaughton (Canada) suggested that since we had acceded to the request of the Soviet Delegate, perhaps he would be prepared to elaborate his views on point 4 at our next meeting. Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that it was not customary in the UN to assign speaking roles to various delegates. Of course, the Soviet Union will participate in the discussion and will make its views known. The Soviet Union may even speak first on this point but did not want to be bound to do so. It would also like to hear the views of other delegates on the substance. McNaughton (Canada) said that it was farthest from his thoughts to bind the Soviet Delegate to speak. On the contrary, he had been impressed by some of the earlier remarks of the Soviet Delegate and had hoped that an elaboration thereon might advance us all. It would be a great advantage to have these earlier remarks elaborated.
Tsiang, Chairman, then read a draft communiqué which included a statement to the effect that the UK had submitted a list of fundamental points with an elaboration thereon, and that the Sponsoring Powers had agreed on the order of discussion of these points. After it was read. Tsarapkin suggested that the communiqué should indicate that it had been agreed that the prohibition of atomic weapons would be the first item for discussion if the Delegates did not consider it appropriate to mention the entire list.
Hickerson (US) took the floor and stated that we were either going to have closed talks or not. He suggested the deletion of that part of the draft communiqué which mentioned the submission of the list and the fact that agreement had been reached on the order of discussion. Such information would only tantalize the press and would make more difficult our attempt to reach agreement. We had a very serious task before us and so long as we were going about the work in a serious way, we should not communicate matters of substance to the press.
McNaughton (Canada) agreed with the US, especially with the use of the word “tantalize”. He wanted to be in a position to talk freely, frankly and confidentially in a sincere effort to break the deadlock. We should not ask for trouble by releasing individual items of substance.
Tsiang, Chairman, stated that it seemed to him that all that the communiqué would amount to would be a statement to the effect that [Page 117] the Sponsoring Powers met, discussed the matter before them, and agreed to meet on__________date.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that he could not agree to the views expressed that no substance should appear in the communiqué. This would deny to the peoples of the world knowledge of what was going on. The communiqué would be a very hollow one; but if all insisted upon it, he would agree to it, even though he wished to emphasize that it was quite hollow.
Hickerson (US) agreed with Tsarapkin that the communiqué was a hollow one. This was exactly what was wanted. Moreover, future communiqués should be equally hollow. These meetings were very important ones, and an anxious world was awaiting their result. He hoped that at some time in the future a really substantive communiqué on these meetings might be given to the world.
After a confused discussion of open dates, it was agreed that the next meeting take place Friday at 10:30 a. m. The meeting adjourned at 1:15 p. m.