Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes on the Third Meeting of the Sponsoring Powers, Lake Success, New York, August 19, 1949, 10:30 a. m.
secret
Representatives:
- McNaughton—Canada
- Tsiang—China
- Chauvel—France
- Hickerson—United States
- Cadogan—United Kingdom
- Tsarapkin—USSR
Chauvel (France), Chairman, opened the meeting, stating that at the last meeting the question of the order of discussion of the points submitted by the United Kingdom1 had come up. He wished to add that the points submitted by the United Kingdom were not necessarily exhaustive and that the order in which they were discussed carried no other implications. It had been decided to discuss point 4 (Prohibition of atomic weapons) first. He asked whether anyone wished to speak. There was a slight pause.
Hickerson (US) then spoke, stating that the outline and elaboration thereon submitted by the UK was a good one. It was concise but it contained the essential points of a system that was acceptable to the United States, and it conformed to US views on a system of control and prohibition. Of course, further details would be needed, but the US agreed with point 4 and its elaboration as given.
[Page 118]Tsarapkin (USSR) took the floor, stating that the Soviet Delegation had studied the UK document; in particular, point 4 and its elaboration. Before discussing the matter in detail, he wanted to submit a few amendments, of somewhat minor character, perhaps, but nevertheless essential. He then proceeded to read his amendments to the elaboration of point 4, as follows:
- “(a) An international convention outlawing the production, use and possession of atomic weapons is an essential part of any system of international control of atomic weapons. In order to be effective, such a convention should be supplemented by the establishment of a universal system of international control, including inspection to ensure that the provisions of the convention are carried out and ‘to protect States observing the convention from possible violations and evasions’.
- “(b) The Atomic Energy Commission should forthwith proceed to prepare a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention on control of atomic energy, on the understanding that both conventions should be concluded and brought into effect simultaneously.
- “(c) Atomic weapons should not be used in any circumstances. The production, possession and use of atomic weapons by any person whatsoever should be prohibited.
- “(d) All existing stocks of finished and unfinished atomic weapons should be destroyed within three months of the date of entry into force of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Nuclear fuel contained in the said atomic weapons should be used for peaceful purposes.”2
In commenting on his new sub-paragraph (b), he stated that there was an important principle involved here in the introduction of the important idea sponsored by the Soviet Union that two conventions of prohibition and control should be drafted and put into force simultaneously. He repeated that his amendments, though not great, were essential and proposed that they be discussed.
Tsiang, Chairman [China?], stated that in view of the importance of these amendments, we would all like to have the text translated and made available. Nevertheless, some Delegates might want to speak on this or other points, or if no one was prepared, perhaps we might adjourn pending receipt of the translation of the Soviet amendments.
Cadogan (UK) stated that it was difficult to speak about the Soviet amendments immediately; at least he could not do so. However, a question of procedure appears to have been raised. If we were to wait until another meeting prior to discussing anything further, we would be moving very slowly. He suggested that amendments to any or all points, if Delegates had such amendments to make, be submitted as soon as possible. In this way, we would have a clear picture of what [Page 119] the various representatives felt on all points, and might avoid what would otherwise be a repetitive debate over each point.
Tsiang, Chairman [China?], agreed and suggested that all amendments to the UK document be submitted as soon as possible. He strongly recommended such a procedure.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that from the point of view of procedure, it seemed to him better to discuss the various points separately. It would be better to discuss point 4 as we had agreed previously, its elaboration, and the amendments thereto. As regards the remaining points, with the exception of point 3 on the exchange of information, they all relate to the system of control. They are all inter-related and might be discussed together. Since we had agreed to discuss point 4, let us stick to this agreement and discuss the UK point 4, its elaboration, and the amendments thereto. Of course, it is possible for others to submit amendments to this and to other points. But, he repeated, the remaining points and even point 3, are parts of the control system and could be discussed separately after point 4 had been discussed.
Chauvel, Chairman, stated that it did not seem to him that any suggestion had been made by the UK to discuss all topics on the same day, although all the points in the UK paper were, in fact, interrelated. It seemed to him that Sir Alexander had wanted to be in a position to see what the problem as a whole was.
Cadogan (UK) stated that this was a correct interpretation. Even when we were discussing point 4 by itself, he would want to know what was the entire problem facing us. We are here to try to get a basis for agreement. In any good debate, we do restrict ourselves to one topic, but, at the same time, we would need to have a view of the problem as a whole.
Hickerson (US) stated that as he had made clear the previous meeting, he was not particularly concerned with the order of discussion of topics. We are here in response to the GA resolution, which asked the six Sponsors to see whether the existing deadlock could be broken. He repeated that the US supported the Commission plan as approved by the General Assembly and would continue to support this plan as the only feasible, workable and effective one so far advanced until a better plan could be devised. In this plan, control and prohibition are inter-related. They form parts of a single-package solution to the entire problem. The hurdle which we have not been able to surmount and which has led us into the present impasse was this very question of effective control, which would make prohibition itself effective. He wanted to emphasize one fact; namely, the US Government had no intention of giving up the atomic weapons it possesses unless it and the world can be assured that sufficiently effective controls have been established to make it impossible for any nation to make atomic weapons with any degree of impunity. No one could expect us to act otherwise. [Page 120] But we are here to seek a basis for agreement. Perhaps human ingenuity can devise a scheme that is even better than the one approved by the General Assembly. We will give sympathetic consideration to any proposals that might solve this entire problem.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that he had thought that we had agreed to separate the problem into various points and to seek a solution, point by point. We had agreed that we would start with the important item of prohibition and then we would go to the problem of control. Let us suppose that we do agree on this question of prohibition. That would be a great step. Then, we could go to the other problems; problems of control. It is a hopeful path that we have chosen. Now, in view of the US statement, it appeared that the US was not interested in discussing these matters point by point. He had hoped that we could proceed along this path, but the US does not appear willing to do so and in addition it goes back to the majority plan of control. We, therefore, lose the hope that we might have had in following this new path. It seemed to him that we were not far apart on the question of prohibition. If we concentrated all our efforts and strength on getting agreement on prohibition, then we could go to the other points. This would advance us. This was the method we had agreed on and we should not renounce it.
Chauvel, Chairman, stated that it seemed to him that we might nevertheless proceed to a discussion of point 4 and the Soviet amendments thereto.
McNaughton (Canada) stated that seemed appropriate, but, as the US stated, the other points are linked to point 4. Sir Alexander had suggested that amendments to all points would be useful so that we would know in what context we would be discussing point 4. He suggested that any Delegation which had amendments should submit them as soon as possible.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that his view of the problem was diametrically opposed to the Canadian view. Canada wanted to have all amendments submitted as this would be reflected in the various attitudes on point 4. In the view of the Soviet Delegation, the opposite was the case. Agreement on point 4 would be reflected in attitudes on the rest of the points; specifically, on control. The important things must come first. If we agreed on certain conclusions on point 4, this would influence views on control. Prohibition comes first and control is secondary; not, of course, in importance, but in time. Prohibition leads to control and not vice versa. He had hoped to avoid the Atomic Energy Commission’s and Working Committee’s approach and that we could take this new and hopeful path. He suggested that we go back to the procedural proposal of the United Kingdom and take up the points one by one, starting with point 4.
[Page 121]After a period of silence, McNaughton (Canada) stated that he was looking forward to seeing the exact wording of the Soviet amendments. However, he had been able to follow the amendments sufficiently to know that it would be impractical to discuss them without reference to the rest of the UK paper. When we came to discuss point 4 and the amendments, it would be important and vital to know the Soviet attitude on the rest of the document in order to know whether the Soviet amendments were practical or not. He therefore suggested that the amendments to the rest of the document be submitted if at all possible.
Chauvel, Chairman, stated that two Delegations had asked for views or amendments on the entire document as soon as possible so that a general view of the problem as a whole might be before us. The UK has already submitted its views on the entire problem. It was, of course, impossible to force anyone to submit views now or to prevent additional amendments in the future. However, some indication of general views would be useful.
Tsiang (China) stated that as far as our next meeting was concerned, we might discuss point 4 and the Soviet amendments. Taking the long view in regard to subsequent meetings, he stated that the UK paper permitted us to have an understanding and real appreciation of any particular point contained therein. This was a great advantage. As for the Soviet amendments to point 4, it was impossible for him to state what his attitude was, but from what had already been said, he felt that he must reserve any opinion he might have until all amendments to the entire document had been submitted. He would like to have these general views as soon as possible.
Chauvel, Chairman, stated that if the Soviet Delegate were willing to give his views on the whole problem, this would be most helpful. If he was unable or unwilling to do so, then perhaps when point 4 is being discussed, we might ask his attitude on the other points as appropriate.
Frey, Secretariat, stated that the translation of the Soviet amendments would be ready after lunch and would be sent to the Delegations later in the afternoon. If the Soviet Delegation would approve the text of the Secretariat translation, then this could be distributed as an annex to the minutes of the meeting.
Tsarapkin (USSR) stated he would prefer to rely on the Secretariat for the official translation, as his knowledge of English did not permit him to take the responsibility for an accurate translation of his amendments.
Chauvel, Chairman, and Tsarapkin, next Chairman, set next Thursday, August 25 at 3 p. m. for the next meeting.
[Page 122]A “hollow” press communiqué, merely recording the fact that the meeting had taken place and that a new meeting would take place next Thursday, was approved. The meeting adjourned at 1:10 p. m.
(After the meeting the five friendly representatives agreed to meet in Sir Alexander’s Manhattan offices at 10:30 a. m., on August 25 to concert plans and tactics for the afternoon meeting.)