Department of State Disarmament Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles H. Russell, Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations
US/AEC/36
| Participants: | General McNaughton, Mr. Ignatieff, Mr. Starnes; Canadian Delegation. |
| Sir Terence Shone, Mr. Laskey; United Kingdom Delegation. | |
| Mr. Chase; Office of the Under Secretary of State. | |
| Mr. Ross, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Russell; United States Mission. |
A meeting was held at the Canadian Delegation on the afternoon of July 6 further to discuss questions relating to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Six Power Consultations. M. de Rose of France will be away until July 15 and in his absence no one seems to be able to speak for the French Delegation. General McNaughton had just returned from three weeks in Canada and this was the first opportunity to get his views.
I. Ownership
Due to the fact that in a recent letter to members of friendly delegations Sir Terence Shone had reaffirmed the desire of the United Kingdom Government to avoid the use of the words “proprietary rights” in the statement of principles (US/AEC/331), a detailed discussion of the issues involved in this position took place.
Mr. Osborn emphasized that ownership was essential to make a watertight treaty. Sir Terence Shone replied that the United Kingdom Government were simply maintaining an existing position, made clear by their previous reservations on “ownership”. The position had not changed. “We don’t like the word ‘ownership’”, he added. Mr. Osborn replied that no one liked the word “ownership”, but that the difficulty which had confronted the Commission throughout had been to find any alternative to ownership. General McNaughton said that the use of the word “ownership” alone did not quite present the true picture; what was clearly meant was “ownership in trust for the world”. He did not see how we could concede ownership resting in a nation. If we made a concession on ownership, nations could step in and operate themselves. We must show what “in trust” really means. He emphasized most strongly, as Mr. Osborn had done, that we could not compromise on our position and that we must keep on the simple, narrow path and support a plan which would work.
Mr. Laskey spoke at length as to the reasons why the United Kingdom Government could not accept ownership by an international agency or a denial of proprietary rights to nations. Among other things he said that if the international agency took over a plant in England employing 10,000 men and then closed the plant, the British Government would be in an impossible position in having these men put out of work. He said that in the long discussions of the Ruhr industries, it was finally decided to give the Germans ownership of the Ruhr industries even though the Allies would make the controlling decisions for a long time to come.
Mr. Osborn said that in view of all that had been said, he would suggest to his Government that the statement of principles include the words “own, operate and manage” instead of leaving it at simply [Page 82] “operate and manage.” The denial of proprietary rights to nations would remain.
General McNaughton strongly urged Sir Terence Shone to clear up the whole matter with his Government. Sir Terence Shone said that he would report fully to his Government on the whole conversation. It was the general understanding that there would be a meeting of the Five to revise the statement of principles early next week if possible.
II. U.N.A.E.C.
General McNaughton said that the first question to consider was whether or not there should be a meeting of the UNAEC before the Six Power Consultations were held. He felt that the Commission had not left its work in tidy shape. Everything had been done in the Working Committee which the General Assembly had told the Commission to do. He thought that the next step should be for the UNAEC to approve the resolutions which had been adopted in the Working Committee.2 In voting these Working Committee resolutions, we could be assured of at least 8 to 2 votes in the Commission itself, since the nations were already committed by their previous vote in the Working Committee. In that case, the debate itself would probably be very short. After a great deal of consideration he had come to the conclusion that this was much better tactics than to try to force through the proposed United States resolution,3 which might lose many important votes, which would in his opinion mean a prolonged debate, and which would appear to put the emphasis on the Commission instead of on the Consultations of the Sponsoring Powers. He himself thoroughly approved of the proposed United States resolution and thought it should be passed some time, preferably in the General Assembly itself. He also wanted an early meeting of the Commission as he wanted to go on the record with a strong statement of the soundness and independence of the Canadian position. He said that from the beginning the Canadian Delegation had been guided solely by the efficacy of the system of control and that he felt that the Commission had built up something which his Delegation believed to be right.
General McNaughton added that neither his Delegation nor the Commission were subscribing to the Baruch report. The majority proposals were fundamentally different. It was important to make this clear to the world too. He felt that the Commission should not undertake to do too much at this time; he thought that there was [Page 83] danger, if too much were attempted, of not getting a vote of 9 to 2. He expressed the view that the Commission should confine itself at its next meeting to giving its approval to the resolutions adopted in the Working Committee.
In regard to the Six Power Consultations, General McNaughton felt that there was no occasion for hysteria. He said that there should be no cause for concern if no decision were reached in the Six Power Consultations before the next meeting of the General Assembly; he thought that in some ways it might be preferable if no decision were reached by then. Mr. Osborn said that he understood that the United States did not see any urgency about reaching a rapid decision in the Six Power Consultations.
In regard to the agenda for the Six Power Consultations, General McNaughton suggested the use of the chapter headings, leaving the statement of principles for later discussion.
Mr. Osborn presented to the meeting a memorandum which he and Dr. Wei, of the Chinese Delegation, had prepared, which recommended that the sequence of discussion in the Consultations should follow the paragraph headings found in the statement of principles.
These are as follows:
- 1.
- International System of Control
- 2.
- International Control Agency
- 3.
- Exchange of Information
- 4.
- Prohibition of Atomic Weapons
- 5.
- Development of Atomic Energy
- 6.
- Atomic Materials and Dangerous Facilities to be Held in Trust
- 7.
- Operation, Management and Licensing
- 8.
- Clandestine Activities
- 9.
- Stages.
The Wei-Osborn recommendation appeared to have general approval. The text is attached.4
There followed a discussion of the “new approach” to which M. de Rose had previously referred. General McNaughton strongly emphasized that the five Sponsoring Powers should not depart from the substance of the Commission’s work or from the Commission’s reports. The use of the words “new approach” in the way they are used in the present draft of the statement of principles might indicate a departure from the approved plan. He did not object to the words “new approach” if it were made very clear that this referred only to shifting from the old approach of detailed proposals to a new approach of general principles, namely, the general principles in the [Page 84] approved recommendations. Mr. Osborn strongly endorsed this point of view.
Mr. Osborn referred to a number of changes which he wished to make in the statement of principles (US/AEC/33). These changes were largely of a minor character, except for the question of ownership.
III. U.S. Draft Resolution
Mr. Osborn referred to a suggestion which he had made some time ago, and which at least did not have an initially unfavorable reception, namely that a resolution be adopted by the UNAEC to take the place of a Fourth Report. He noted that General McNaughton, after much consideration, now suggested a different course. He would like to digest what General McNaughton had said on the course to be followed in the Commission and would not press at this time for a decision as to whether or not to adopt the U.S. draft resolution in the Commission before the opening of the Six Power Consultations. He desired however, that there should be a clear understanding of what the United States had in mind in drafting the resolution.
He read the latest text of the draft resolution, containing contributions made by Ambassador Austin and Mr. Ross, which is attached hereto. He said that he considered it highly desirable that the UNAEC make a clear, concise statement as to why there is an impasse.
Mr. Ross urged prompt action upon the draft resolution, but realized that it might be difficult to obtain a 9 to 2 vote. Sir Terence Shone thought that if the draft resolution were discussed at this time the effect would only be to provoke the Russians. General McNaughton expressed the view that the effect of acting upon the draft resolution before the Six Power Consultations would be to make the UNAEC rather than the Six Power Consultations the forum of debate. (General McNaughton’s further references to the U.S. draft resolution are included under section II of this memorandum.)
It was suggested that Dr. Wei, in view of the fact that China is Chairman this month, be asked to call a meeting of all the majority delegations in New York for the consideration of the matters taken up in sections II and III of this memorandum, if the views of the other powers were not too divergent as to the course to be followed. (Note: The meeting suggested was not called.)