Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Webb), to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] July 7, 1949.

Subject:

A. Position Paper on United States Policy in the UNAEC and the next General Assembly¹

B. Tactics Thereunder

A

u.s. position on atomic energy negotiations

The attached position paper on atomic energy negotiations in the United Nations (Tab A)¹ is submitted for your approval. Departmental responsibility for the formulation of the United States position has been taken over by this office on the recommendation of Mr. Rusk who has informed me that this arrangement is agreeable to you and to Mr. Webb.

Current procedures call for the formalization of U.S. position on atomic energy in the UN through the interdepartmental mechanism of the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments, the top members of which are the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the USAEC. Approval of the paper has now been obtained from the Chairman of the USAEC and the Secretary of Defense, which latter carries with it the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Attached to basic paper as Appendix C.) All requisite Departmental clearances (i.e. SP, G (for UNA as well), ARA, EUR, FE, NEA, and L) have been obtained. The paper has been worked out in the closest collaboration with Mr. Osborn and has his full approval. Ambassador Austin concurs. Upon your approval, it becomes the U.S. position through the next General Assembly.

B

tactics

I. In the UNAEC:

During the gestation period of the position paper, events have moved forward in the UNAEC. The Commission’s Working Committee again rejected the Soviet proposals on June 15. At the same time the Committee also resolved that there was nothing useful that it could do until the Sponsoring Powers found some basis for agreement. In due course the Commission will reach the same conclusions as those of its Working Committee (membership on the Commission and the Committee is identical).

While the attached position envisages that the UNAEC will make a Fourth Report containing the conclusion that no further work is “practicable or useful” in the UNAEC until such time as the Sponsoring Powers find that a basis for agreement exists, the present trend of thinking in New York is that the Commission’s conclusions to this effect may be embodied in a resolution which finds the differences between the majority and the minority to be irreconcilable at the Commission level, reaffirms the analysis of the situation contained in the Commission’s Third Report and concludes that there is nothing practicable or useful that the Commission can do until the Sponsoring Powers find that a basis for agreement exists. A tentative draft of such a resolution is attached (Tab B).² In my view, this form of action by the Commission is fully consonant with the position paper and I have recommended to Osborn that he proceed accordingly.

II. In the Consultations:

The position paper concludes that the consultations among the Sponsoring Powers, which are required by the General Assembly resolution of November 4, 1948, should be held below the level of Foreign Ministers, preferably at the UNAEC level, and that they should center on the question whether the Soviet Union is prepared to accede to the basic elements of the UN plan of control. As to timing, the friendly New York delegations have agreed that the UNAEC should formalize the conclusion that there is nothing practicable and useful, etc., before the Sponsoring Powers begin consultations. The Commission will probably take this action within the next few days. The way will then be clear for consultations.

I am strongly of the view that Mr. Osborn should sit for the United States in these consultations. I would intend to be present to assist him. On the other hand, Mr. Osborn feels that someone else should do it. He has suggested that Mr. Jessup³ would be the logical choice. Mr. Osborn’s view is based primarily on the argument that unless there is a new face at the table, domestic and foreign criticism will contend that the United States is not making a genuine effort to break the deadlock. My view is based on the following:

1. He is thoroughly schooled in the problem and knows intimately the people involved.

2. A new man, however able, would require some period of briefing and careful coaching thereafter.

3. Reasoning from their own practice, the Soviets would in all probability assume, until they were told unequivocally to the contrary, that a new man meant a new policy or a change in line. The net effect of this would be unnecessary alarums and excursions and needless delay in the carrying out of the consultation assignment. (Hickerson, with whom I discussed this problem, places special stress on this last point.)

It seems to me that the decision on this point of representation must rest with you. If you think it would be helpful, I could easily arrange to have Osborn come down so that he and I could talk it over with you.

III. In the General Assembly:

As regards the UNAEC, the attached position does not require the United States to press for formal suspension of that body. It does call for support of the conclusion of the UNAEC that there is nothing practicable and useful that can be done in that body until the Sponsoring Powers find there is a basis for agreement. It requires that the United States should state its unequivocal opposition to carrying on any further work in the UNAEC until such time as a basis for agreement is found by the Sponsoring Powers. It authorizes the United States to support any resolution of the General Assembly which recognizes this reality and to oppose any resolution which does not.

There is reason to expect that the General Assembly will not this time call for a fruitless continuation of UNAEC meetings. The General Assembly may, however, urge that the Sponsoring Powers continue to try to find some basis for agreement. If such is the recommendation of the General Assembly, the United States can hardly oppose it. There is, however, a serious question whether the United States must not now state unequivocally, and if necessary unilaterally, its view that there is no basis for agreement, or hope of agreement, unless the Soviet Union changes radically its point of view on this matter. The time may very well have come when the Soviet Union should be put on notice that the United States refuses to be the subject of propaganda attacks in the UNAEC under the guise of negotiations. While the United States should never explicitly, or by implication, withdraw the offer which it made on the 14th of June 1946, it should speak frankly of its appraisal of the situation and allow no one to be deceived as to the real cause of the impasse, namely Soviet intransigence. It should state its conviction that until the Soviet Union demonstrates a willingness to cooperate in the world community, further negotiations on atomic energy control in the UNAEC or in any other forum can serve no useful purpose.

I would recommend that the United States be prepared at the time of the next General Assembly to state its views along the lines of the foregoing. In order that there may be no doubt about the firmness of this view and its official character, I would further recommend that this view be embodied in your opening speech at the next General Assembly and that it be made utterly clear to all United States participants that this is the firm line to be held. Mr. Osborn and I have discussed this point at some length and we are in full agreement that this is not only wise but necessary. Both he and I have very much in mind the point of view expressed by Mr. Osborn’s consultants early this spring (Conant, Bacher, Oppenheimer, Chester Barnard, John Vance, General Groves, General Farrell, and General Nichols) that the United States should withdraw the offer.⁴ While Osborn and I cannot agree with this view, we do feel that we should come pretty close to it and, in doing so, place the blame for failure to secure international control precisely where it belongs.

C

recommendations

1. That you approve the attached position (Tab A).

2. That you decide whether Mr. Osborn or someone else should be the principal representative of the United States in the consultations.

3. That you approve the idea of a strong statement by the United States in the next General Assembly to the effect that while the United States desires ultimately to achieve effective international control, it is convinced that until the Soviet Union demonstrates a willingness to cooperate in the world community, further negotiations on this problem in the UNAEC or in any other forum can serve no useful purpose.

R. Gordon Arneson

1. RAC D–35b, June 20, p. 70.
1. RAC D–35b, June 20, p. 70.
2. Tab B is not attached to the source text; it is presumably the draft of July 5, not printed. For the draft of July 13, that was actually submitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on July 20, see p. 96.
3. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large.
4. For two memoranda of conversation by Osborn of the March 10 meeting of the consultants to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, see pp. 39 and 41.