USUN Files
The Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Alternate British Representative (Shone)
Dear Sir Terence:
1. I have given close attention to your letter of June 23rd1 containing the comments of the Foreign Office on the draft statement of principles, and on the proposals as regards tactics for the Six-Power Consultations.
2. The first change suggested by the Foreign Office, namely, to amend the first sentence of paragraph 5(a) to read “the development and use of atomic energy are not matters exclusively of domestic concern of individual nations,” instead of using the word “essentially.” This seems a good change except that it departs from what General McNaughton calls the approved language, and I think we would all have to consider whether the value of the change outweighs the departure from the approved language.
We note that the Foreign Office would prefer to omit entirely the second sentence of 6(a) “nations cannot have any proprietary rights within their territories.” We feel that this sentence cannot be omitted. It does not attempt to define the term international ownership as used in the Second Report, but it goes right to the heart of the basic fallacy of the whole Soviet position. When the Second Report says that “nations cannot have any proprietary rights or rights of decision arising therefrom over atomic source materials, nuclear fuels or dangerous facilities located within their territories,” the Report is stating a position which it seems to me is basic to the thinking of all members of the majority. It seems very evident that if nations should have proprietary rights or rights of decision over potentially dangerous and explosive materials and facilities for making such materials, there would be a continuance of national rivalries in this field in a most dangerous form. Any nation could then at any time claim that some other nation was exercising its proprietary rights to its own advantage in a manner contrary to the treaty, and such a claim would present a great danger to the peace, even if the claim had no validity whatever. The recent furor in the American newspapers over the suspected loss of a couple of ounces of plutonium is an example of a kind of suspicion that would [Page 80] be aroused, and if such suspicions were put forward in a time of international tension, the tension would be enormously increased.
In three years of discussion in the Commission I think it has become clear to all of us that the Soviet position is very little concerned with simultaneous or not simultaneous, or one treaty or two, but is very much concerned with getting a plan which would give them national ownership and operation of explosive materials and facilities for making them, would bring them up to date on all technical information available anywhere, and would enable them to create an international crisis by making accusations against another nation whenever such a crisis appeared useful to them. The crisis would go to the Security Council where, if there was a veto, the crisis would be unresolved. If the vote was by majority, the Security Council would have to consider the use of force, with the danger of precipitating a war on a secondary issue.
This is only a small part of the story, but enough, I think, to show how strongly we feel about it. We feel sure that if we left out this question of proprietary rights we would fail in one of the important aspects of the consultations, namely, the necessity of having the public understand very clearly and simply the falsity of the Soviet position.
3. I note the suggestions made by François de Rose for changes in the statement of principles. We too have changes to propose at such time as we can meet to consider them.
We are glad that you are ready for a conference of the majority members and hope we may hear from the French in time to have the meeting immediately after the 4th of July.
I enclose a copy of a revised text of the draft resolution2 we would propose to submit to the AEC at its next meeting.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the representatives concerned in the other friendly delegations.
Your sincerely,