Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph Chase of the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Subject: Atomic Energy Questions Concerning France and the United States
| Participants: | Mr. Francois de Rose—Member of French Delegation to the United Nations |
| Mr. R. Gordon Arneson—U | |
| Mr. Joseph Chase—U |
Mr. de Rose called at his request to discuss a number of matters with Mr. Arneson prior to his departure for France where he will commence a tour of duty in the French Foreign Office. Among other duties, he will be the Foreign Office expert on matters related to atomic energy. He indicated that he would like to get some idea of what United States plans were for the United Nations negotiations because, unlike the situation which prevailed in the past, namely, that the French Delegation to the United Nations would request and usually [Page 618] receive the instructions it desired, from now on, the Foreign Office will forward the necessary instructions in the first instance. These will be originated by de Rose.
Mr. Arneson stated that it was our present intention to continue the consultations in the forum of the permanent members of the UNAEC. We are also preparing to make informal expositions of a number of aspects of the United Nations plan, such as stages and quotas, which are not understood too well. We also have the problem of examining the various proposals submitted during the General Assembly. He expressed the opinion that there was not much to be expected from any of these proposals and suggested that for the next General Assembly, we might all consider the possibility of shifting the emphasis from atomic energy discussions to a broader base.
Perhaps this could best be done by building up the work in the Commission for Conventional Armaments so that we would have demonstrated the validity of our present position; namely, that the solution to the problem of international control of atomic energy and to the problem of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments differ considerably from each other. We must make clear, however, that the implementation of these two solutions should be coordinated. Mr. de Rose thought well of the idea and stated he would keep it in mind.
As regards the work to be done before the next General Assembly on atomic energy, de Rose suggested that we might make clearer our position on such matters as stages and quotas and perhaps even on organization and staffing. The possible possession of atomic weapons by the Soviets has introduced a sense of reality to the question of stages and any clarification of this point and of quotas would be to our advantage. Mr. Arneson believed that we could do something in an informal way on these points.
Mr. de Rose then outlined the situation that faces Western Europe, and France in particular, in the present world situation. As he saw it, immediately after the war, there was considerable hope that the entire world, including the Soviet Union, would cooperate to maintain the peace. The United Nations solution for the control of atomic energy fitted very neatly into such a world framework. For reasons of their own, the Soviet Union refused to play its necessary role. We have all become convinced that the objective of peace in such a cooperative world is at present unattainable. We, therefore, have to pursue a lesser objective, namely, that of increasing our strength, or rather of correcting our weaknesses so that the Soviet Union would not be tempted to aggress in Western Europe. This lesser objective admits the possibility that war may break out at some time. Therefore, we must be prepared for such a war to the extent that we are able to do so. This raises the question of the role of atomic weapons in any such [Page 619] conflict and of the role atomic weapons are to play in the grand strategy of the North Atlantic Pact.
Mr. de Rose stated that the recent public evidences of disagreement on this point in the United States itself was not of great concern to him. On the contrary, he was happy to see that this problem was being very seriously considered. He did not want personally to know what answers the United States might come up with, but he did urge strongly and emphatically that, whenever we do come up with some answer, whatever it may be, some responsible member of the French Government should be informed. Perhaps it might be President Auriol when he arrives on a visit to this country next Spring. It might be a member of the French military, who would be in a position to make certain that French military planning takes into account the decisions reached on this matter. He regretted that General Juin1 refused to leave North Africa for assignment to the Combined Staff under Montgomery.2 In his opinion, General Juin would have been an ideal choice. Mr. de Rose repeated that he would continue to press his immediate superiors, Parodi,3 Schuman and even Auriol until he was certain that somebody would be kept informed and that some responsible member of the French Government would know where France stood.
Mr. de Rose felt that it is certainly in the best interests of France and of Western civilization, in which he included the United States, to preserve Western Europe. He did not believe that Western Europe could survive either an atomic war, which might destroy most of its cities, and certainly would not be able to survive Soviet occupation. He also believed that Western Europe as we know it could not survive if it did not have the possibility of regaining its lost ground in the field of science.
Mr. de Rose next raised the question of the future role of science in France. There was no question in his mind that because of what happened during the war, the United States has now taken a preeminent position, not only in technology, but in basic science, which was formerly held by Western Europe. The internal situation in France was a most unsatisfactory one, with various uncoordinated and hostile schools in many scientific fields. Joliot Curie, for example, has a stranglehold on atomic energy, which situation is further complicated by the fact that Joliot is a Communist. Although he would have to move very slowly, Mr. de Rose planned to do his best to direct and coordinate French scientific activity, perhaps in collaboration with [Page 620] other Western European countries. He believed that it was in the best interests of the United States to promote and to assist the countries of Western Europe in order that they might make their proper contribution to basic science. He pointed out that if it is the U.S. desire to have Western Europe play its role and also to preserve Western Europe, there must be a greater exchange of ideas and students than has been the case in the recent past. He hoped to enlist the aid of perfume companies, etc., for financing scholarships to the United States with their dollar resources. Financial considerations have also assumed a tremendous importance. The time is probably past when a first-rate scientist in a relatively small laboratory can make fundamental discoveries. The basic tools of science, particularly in the field of nuclear energy, require equipment that runs into large sums of money. He hoped that any development in France or in Western Europe along the lines he had briefly sketched would not be misunderstood by the United States, and that requests for assistance in techniques and money for such things as betatrons would not be frowned upon. He felt that the emphasis should be on basic research. There was no point in having first-rate European scientists do the work of laboratory assistants, or duplicating discoveries already made but kept classified in the United States.
Mr. Arneson stated that the matter of classification of both information and equipment was being reviewed in the light of the recent Soviet atomic explosion. This review will probably result in a considerable downgrading of information and equipment now classified. To the extent that this occurred, other countries would find that they could secure certain information and equipment which is not now made available.
Mr. de Rose stated that he must move very slowly and thought that perhaps these latter points could be talked over again at the time of the next General Assembly, which he plans to attend.