Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington, December 20, 1949.]

I. It is of immediate importance that the United States Government review and decide its position regarding the essentiality and probable use of weapons of mass destruction—particularly atomic weapons—so far as our security is concerned.

Why?

1) Because we are, in effect, deciding now to rely upon and use such weapons.

Why is this so?

a) Because while we had atomic weapons and no other nation had, it came to be regarded as a powerful deterrent to war and guarantee of our security; the Atomic Energy Act authorizes production of weapons upon this theory; they came to play a large part in military planning; and Russian behavior over the past few years overcame popular aversion to the use of the weapon. Thus acceptance of and reliance upon it has grown more subtly than through any articulate major premise.

b) Because, having assumed commitments relating to the defense of Western Europe, as necessary for our own defense, we do not have any other military program which seems to offer over the short run promise of military effectiveness.² Therefore, we are proceeding with the development of atomic weapons and carriers.

(Note: This reasoning does not prove that atomic weapons provide the promise of military success. That will be examined later.)

c) And because also our proposals for international control will not be accepted by the Russians, a situation which produces deadlock and means the inevitable continuation of production and mutual plans for use.

2) It is also necessary to review and decide our position regarding the essentiality of atomic weapons because without it our position on international control (as well as other policy matters noted below) becomes confused and dangerous.

a) We cannot over a period of time carry conviction (and this is of vital importance in the cold war) in advocating and directing the effort for international control and abolition of atomic weapons, if at the same time our military reliance upon them is growing.

b) We cannot consider profitably any proposals which might be acceptable to the Russians and might prohibit for practical purposes in peace time all production of fissionable materials in sufficient quantity to make bombs, unless we know whether we want to do so, or not.

c) If we proceed with further development of atomic weapons, without a clear idea of our attitude toward their use, control or abolition, we will affect the attitude of the Russians—and the chances of avoiding war—, the attitude of our allies—and the course of the cold war—, and the attitude of our own public. In other words, we will affect in various ways the direction of drift.

3) The absence of a clear decision will confuse military planning and this in turn will confuse foreign policy and commitments.

a) Planning for the defense of Western Europe will before long raise in acute form questions of the use of atomic weapons.

i. If plans are based on non-use, or use in retaliation only, serious consequences may follow, unless the full implications of such plans are taken fully into account in other areas of policy and action.

ii. If plans are based upon initial use, and others rely thereon, the United States may have lost the moral right of freedom of action even though, at a later date, our national interest may demand different action.

iii. If alternate plans are made, an impression of indecision is given.

b) Aside from these immediate problems, the task of the planners will be gravely affected by a decision one way or the other on this central question and by the developments which would grow out of either decision.

4) It is important to review and decide our position on the use of these weapons because to do so will enable us to identify and possibly decide some major questions affecting foreign policy. Some of these are:

a) Which are the most immediate dangers to our security? Those involved in the cold war or those involved in military aggression?

b) Will military aggression, if it comes, be directed against us or against our allies?

c) If against us, what are the problems involved and how does use or non-use of atomic weapons affect their solution?

d) If against our allies, the same questions.

e) How does the availability of atomic weapons to both sides now affect the possibility of their use? The possibility of precipitating war? The outcome of the cold war? What will be the trend in this respect in the future?

II. Which danger is most imminent and pressing upon us? That which pertains to the cold war, or the danger of military aggression?

1) Soviet theory warns us that their primary attention is directed toward the former.

a) They believe that the capitalist world is doomed by internal decay.

b) They do believe and advocate active and subversive activities within capitalist societies by the communist parties.

c) They do not believe that the overthrow has to come through communist arms in the first instance, but they believe that the capitalist world will not finally surrender power without a resort to arms and that, therefore, at some time they may be attacked.

d) They would prefer a war between capitalist countries in which they intervene at the decisive moment, but in view of the unlikelihood of that coming about might intervene in confused situations created by satellites or subversive groups.

2) Russian history is divided, but Soviet history seems to be against military adventures which entail any risk.

a) The Crimean war, the Russo-Japanese war and World War I show tendencies toward aggressive adventure. So does the Polish affair of 1921 and 1939 and the Finnish war. But these latter may be said to have involved no great risk and to have lessons that risk is hard to estimate. The great care to escape involvement in the “capitalist” war of 1939 supports the thesis that the lesson was learned.

3) A cold appraisal of the world situation would seem to give the Politburo reason to think that their chances in the cold war are not bad, that their dogmas are being proved true, and that military risks to speed the inevitable are not necessary or desirable. They might well conclude that more effort was needed to grease the wheels of economic and social confusion abroad.

4) This would be a sensible conclusion. Our allies are not strong and have a long way to go to get strong. They are divided on some of the essential steps—Germany, colonialism in Asia and Africa, policy in the Middle East. The American people may tire or become confused. Our problems take perseverance of purpose and use of resources. They take a large degree of unity and persistence of purpose. Democracies are not noted for these qualities.

5) This is important. They need and want the people, industry and resources of Western Europe. They do not want to destroy them. Success in the cold war achieves these. The hot war may lose all this and more too.

6) This is also important. The loss of Western Europe or of important parts of Asia or the Middle East would be a transfer of potential from West to East, which, depending on the area, might have the gravest consequences in the long run.

Conclusion on Point II. The weight of the evidence leads to the belief that the Russians will put their chief reliance on the cold war. It is here that we must meet the most pressing dangers and not from military aggression.

Against this is the danger that—

a) They may think they are going to be attacked and foolishly attack first.

b) That failure in the cold war, the growth of Titoism, and the possible instability of the regime may lead to unpredictable action. This seems unlikely but not impossible.

The point made is not to disregard the dangers of military aggression, but to devise policy to give priority to what comes first.

III. In the case of military aggression by the U.S.S.R. is it likely to be directed first against us or against our allies?

The answer would seem to be, either a simultaneous attack against both, or an attack against some other nation or nations. An attack against the U.S. alone seems too difficult, pointless, and hazardous.

The point which the question and answer, if correct, brings out is this: The function of the atomic weapon in regard to the defense of continental United States is to prevent the attack or to stop it by reason of the general punishment inflicted on the enemy—retaliation. It can hardly have, in this field, a more specific military purpose. In the case of a protracted war, other factors would immediately have important bearing.

These other factors would have to do with the course of the war in other areas. Before coming to this, let us appraise the influence of atomic weapons on preventing or stopping the war.

IV. What can be said about the effect of atomic weapons in preventing or stopping the assumed war against the United States?

Without treading on military ground, consider the problem in two parts: (a) a war started against the United States and others simultaneously; and (b) a war started against our allies only.

1) If there were no atomic weapons, it seems unlikely that an attack would be made against the United States. This leaves out of consideration other weapons of mass destruction. If there were none of these, the conclusion that there would be no attack against us seems highly probable, through sheer difficulty.

2) Would the same be true if it were firmly believed on both sides that such weapons would not be used except in retaliation; but that they would be promptly and vigorously used in retaliation? This involves a calculation as to whether the enemy believed the risks were worth it. In this case it is fair to believe that the risks would not be worth it and there would be no direct attack on the United States, or that the probability of attack would be lessened. This is no inconsiderable consideration to be ignored, if true.

3) Inject a new factor. Suppose a third nation, say Britain, had atomic weapons. Two questions: Would that make use against us more likely? Would Britain use them if others did not, except for retaliation?

A fair answer in both cases is, No.

So, as to an attack on the United States, it would seem much less likely if it were known that we would not precipitate atomic warfare, but would retaliate if such warfare were introduced by others.

4) Insofar as an attack on our allies is concerned, the considerations are different. Suppose both the United States and Russia had stockpiles but that ours was greater, would the known determination on our part to use them in the first instance deter attack? No one can say. It would be a factor. Possibly a great factor. But let us suspend judgment and consider other aspects of the problem.

5) Would it stop an attack once begun by other weapons? Here we are not speaking of technical military use, but of its effect on changing the will of the rulers to press on with the war. We can say with more assurance that it is doubtful whether its use would have such an effect. By hypothesis its use would have been expected and discounted. Aside from its military effect upon troops in motion, the effect would have to be worse than the expectation to break the will of the aggressors.

6) Would it stop the attack by destruction of war industries and supplies? This postulates a fairly long war and a possibility of sustained strategic air penetration of the enemy’s territory. If troops were equipped and in motion fairly close to objectives, and not faced by strong resistance, these factors would not be of great importance.

7) Would it stop the attack by purely military means? This is for the military to answer, but it is hard to see how this could be done.

V. What is the real relation of the atomic weapon to the vulnerability of our western allies to Russian attack?

1) To what degree does our accumulation of atomic weapons act as a defensive shield for our allies? What can be done to substitute for this shield?

2) Does a continued reliance upon the atomic defensive shield prevent progress toward the substitutes therefor?

3) How important would be a further substantial strengthening of the economies of Western Europe?

4) How important would be incorporating western Germany into Western Europe?

5) What contribution would the withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe make?

6) What could be done in the field of conventional armaments either to build up adequate European defensive strength or through international control of conventional armaments to restore a balance in Europe?

VI. The effect of passage of time upon these considerations.

1) Would a continued accumulation of atomic weapons and means of delivery actually stimulate the outbreak of war? It does not appear that this would be likely until such time as the U.S.S.R. considered that its atomic capabilities were sufficient to offset ours and had a clear superiority in other fields.

2) Is it true that within 5–10 years the U.S.S.R. may be expected to have a stockpile of atomic weapons of sufficient size effectively to neutralize the present advantage which we possess and might this time be shortened if the U.S.S.R. developed a thermonuclear reaction?

3) If this is so, would we be better off addressing ourselves now to finding substitutes for the defensive shield our atomic weapons are now giving our allies?

1. The source text is accompanied by the following note by Savage:

   “This memorandum was dictated by Secretary Acheson presumably on December 20, 1949. He handed it to Mr. Nitze on the evening of that day. Mr. Nitze made some changes during the evening just before he left for vacation. On the morning of December 21, Mr. Kennan, Mr. Hooker and Mr. Savage made some further changes. The attached memo contains the changes made by the four of us. It was sent to Mr. Acheson on the morning of December 21 and he used it presumably as a basis for the conversation he had during the afternoon with Secretary of Defense Johnson. It is understood that he did not give a copy to Secretary Johnson. Copies were distributed in the Department to Messrs. Arneson and Fisher.”

   No record of the Acheson–Johnson conversation of December 21 has been found in the files of the Department of State.

   On December 22, the Special Committee of the National Security Council (Acheson, Johnson, and Lilienthal) met in Acheson’s office. Commissioner Smyth, General Bradley, and LeBaron were also present. The discussion, which arrived at no final conclusion, is described in Hewlett and Duncan, p. 398.

2. The question of atomic weapons and the North Atlantic Treaty arose during the development of the “Strategic Concept for the Integrated Defense of the North Atlantic Area.” Point 7a of the report approved at Paris by the North Atlantic Defense Committee on December 1 stated that a basic undertaking of the Treaty was to “Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons without exception. This is primarily a U.S. responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations.” For the full text of the Strategic Concept as approved December 1 by the Defense Committee and related documentation, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.