Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The British Ambassador (Franks) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Dear Dean: Here is the British paper I promised to send you when we talked on the telephone yesterday. It represents our attempt to draw up draft proposals based on the last round of discussions.

I have also sent a copy to Hume Wrong.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Franks
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[Enclosure]

British Draft Proposals for Future Tripartite Cooperation

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Anglo-Canadian-United States Tripartite Talks on Atomic Energy

A. General

1. The tripartite discussions held in Washington in September and November have suggested that the following proposals may form the basis of a long-term and binding agreement for co-operation in Atomic Energy between the three countries.

2. There will be complete collaboration in all aspects of atomic energy within the fields within which the three countries are working. This will include research and development; the production of fissile material; the planning, production and trial of atomic weapons; the military aspects of atomic energy; and the development of the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

3. The following are the present stated programmes of the three countries for the large scale production of fissile material.

United States Five Production Piles
Extension to High Separation Diffusion Plant
United Kingdom Two Production Piles
Low Separation Diffusion Plant
Canada

We propose that the above programmes be accepted, but that each country should be free to vary its programme within the raw materials available to it on giving due notice to the Combined Policy Committee.

4. Estimates of uranium ore likely to be available to the three countries are given in Section B,1 together with uranium ore requirements to provide for the needs of the above programmes. It would appear that there is likely to be an adequate supply of uranium for the three programmes, and detailed proposals for allocation between the three countries are made in Section B.

5. Detailed proposals for the integration of the Atomic Weapons programme are made in Section C. The objectives shall be to use the combined scientific and technical manpower and production resources of the three countries to produce the maximum number of atomic weapons of most advanced design during the critical period of the next three years.

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6. There shall be full co-operation in the military aspects of Atomic Energy. This will include—

i.
Operational discussion
ii.
Joint use of bases
iii.
Storage of atomic weapons
iv.
Radiological warfare
v.
Defence against atomic weapons
vi.
Atomic Energy Intelligence
vii.
Use of nuclear reactors for propulsion of naval vessels and (possibly) aircraft.
Detailed proposals are made in Section D.

7. The proposals for technical collaboration in the remainder of the field are described in Section E. These proposals provide for technical co-operation in the design, development and operation of plants for the production of fissile material; for co-operation in development of new types of reactors directed towards power production and increased supplies of fissile material as well as in the more scientific aspects of the field.

8. The principles to be observed in implementing the technical collaboration programme are described in Section F. They provide for common standards of security to be maintained in the three countries.

9. The present arrangement whereby the three countries have agreed not to transmit classified information, materials and equipment to other countries without the agreement of the other two countries should continue. The present arrangements for co-operation between the United Kingdom and other countries are described in Section G, and proposals are made for their regulation in the future.

10. Co-operation shall continue to be regulated by the Combined Policy Committee under the arrangement described in Section H. The agreement should continue until 31st December, 1955.2

  1. Sections B through H are not printed.
  2. Section H consisted of points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the modus vivendi of January 7, 1948; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 679.