Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] September 13, 1949.

Subject: Foreign Minister Van Zeeland—Belgian Congo Uranium

Both the First Secretary of the British Embassy at Brussels and our Chargé d’Affaires Millard believe that Van Zeeland could possibly raise the subject of uranium during his forthcoming visits to Washington and Lake Success.¹ In view of this possibility, I think you should be aware of certain recent developments in Brussels:

1. Following the Blair House meeting on July 16th there was a considerable flurry of comment on the uranium question in both the leftist and rightist Belgian newspapers, most of it quite inaccurate as to such details as tonnages exported and duration of the agreement,² which, unfortunately, served to reawaken Belgian sensitivity to the problem of distribution of Congolese uranium.

2. The press furor had about quieted down when, on August 18th, Prime Minister Eyskens in answer to questioning by a Communist senator made the very surprising statement: “No secret treaty exists with any foreign country whatever for the purpose of delivering to it uranium or any other raw material. My declaration is forthright and formal.” Both Sengier³ and Millard believe it inconceivable that Eyskens could be ignorant of the agreement and that he was probably making a play on the word treaty as distinguished from agreement. However, it is most unfortunate that Eyskens did not refer to Spaak’s⁴ carefully worded statement made in reply to questioning by the same Communist senator on July 3, 1947, which was:

“It was necessary, during the war, to provide the Allies with as large a quantity as possible of materials essential to the development of atomic energy. Consequently with the full approval of the Belgian Government, arrangements were concluded for the uranium ore of the Congo to be placed at the disposal of the United States and the United Kingdom.

“By those arrangements, the legitimate interests of Belgium were fully safeguarded. They are still in force, and the Belgian Government hopes that an international agreement concerning the control of atomic energy will be concluded soon, as a consequence of the work of the commission created within the United Nations. As soon as these results are obtained, the Belgian Government will quickly proceed to modify all its legislation on uranium accordingly.”

The press in both this country and Belgium has insinuated that the secret agreement expired July 31, 1949 and that it will now be necessary to negotiate a new one. These reports are patently inaccurate since, as you are aware, the agreement and the contracts provide an exclusive option to the Agency for purchase of all uranium which can be mined at Shinkolobwe in a ten-year period which will expire February 6, 1956.

3. To our present knowledge, neither Sengier nor Millard has had occasion to talk to Eyskens or Van Zeeland regarding uranium.⁵ Millard does not intend to take the initiative in raising the subject. Sengier expects that Van Zeeland will wish to see him, possibly in the company of De Vleeschauwer (Minister of the Interior, who was present at the negotiation of the basic agreement) and Wigny (Minister of Colonies). Sengier has stated on two occasions to Millard that the key to the uranium problem is whether the new government will have confidence in him as Spaak most certainly had. According to Sengier, only Spaak in the former government knew all the details of the secret agreement and even he had not been acquainted with the terms of the contract which Sengier seems to prefer to entrust only to himself. Wigny apparently does not know the full details, although both he and Bruneel, his Chef de Cabinet, must be presumed to have knowledge of the quantities, value, and destination of uranium exported from the Congo. We have requested Millard to ascertain discreetly the extent to which other members of the new cabinet, particularly Eyskens and Van Zeeland, have been briefed on the secret agreement.

4. Sengier recently requested a letter from Carroll Wilson confirming “that the price paid for Belgian uranium is as good as the price paid to any other suppliers.” He wishes such confirmation in writing, and a letter is being prepared by the CDA for this purpose. Meanwhile, in response to Sengier’s request for some immediate ammunition to be used to parry expected inquiries, Wilson cabled Sengier on August 25 as follows:

“Am confirming that principle in negotiations relating to contract has always been that terms must be fully satisfactory to you.”

5. Sengier, accompanied by Robilliart and Leroy, is arriving here October 7 to discuss terms of the contract with the CDA. It is entirely possible that he may request an increase in price, and it would seem that he could very well argue that such an increase would put him in a more defensible position with his government. His presence here will afford an opportunity to secure a reliable evaluation of the Belgian uranium problem.

6. According to Sengier, the main points which will have to be cleared up to the satisfaction of the new Belgian Government are:

a. Is Belgium involved in the alleged “row” between the U.S. and the U.K.?

Comment: The answer is an emphatic “No”. The “row” exists only in the minds of commentators on the Blair House meeting.

b. Is the compensation adequate?

Comment: Sengier thinks the prices paid so far were satisfactory, and the CDA letter will reaffirm that the Congo price is as good as that paid other suppliers, referring of course to profit margins since price paid for Canadian and domestic production is considerably higher to compensate for higher operating costs.

c. Are Belgian interests fully protected in the sense of furnishing uranium for energy, etc., as a possible replacement for Belgium’s diminishing coal supplies?

Comment: Spaak stated unequivocally to the Belgian Senate on July 3, 1947 that the legitimate interests of Belgium were fully safeguarded, basing this of course, on clause 9(a) of the 1944 agreement:

“In the event of the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom deciding to utilize as a source of energy for commercial purposes ores obtained under this agreement, the said Governments will admit the Belgian Government to participation in such utilization on equitable terms.”

R. Gordon Arneson

1. In a conversation with the Secretary of State in Washington on September 16, Paul Van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium, indicated that while he did not wish to take up the question of uranium during his present visit to the United States, he did wish to reserve the right to do so at some later date (memorandum of conversation, by Douglas MacArthur, 2d, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State Atomic Energy Files).
2. Reference is to the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium relating to uranium, September 26, 1944; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, p. 1029.
3. Edgar E. B. Sengier, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga.
4. Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium, 1946–1949.
5. On August 10, following a 6-week cabinet crisis in Belgium, a Christian Socialist-Liberal coalition cabinet headed by Gaston Eyskens had succeeded the Spaak (Socialist) government.