Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of the Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, September 13, 1949

Washington, September 13, 1949

top secret

Present:	The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Webb (in the Chair)
	Mr. George F. Kennan
	Mr. Adrian S. Fisher
	Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, American Executive Secretary Acting Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Pike
	Mr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
	Mr. Joseph Volpe, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
	Major General James H. Burns, Consultant to the Secretary of Defense on Foreign Military Affairs
	Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
	Major General Kenneth D. Nichols, Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
	Dr. Vannevar Bush, President, Carnegie Institution

Before proceeding to the items on the agenda, The Chairman reported to the Committee the recent tripartite developments in connection with the financial talks which had just been completed.¹ While the talks had not produced any startling results of an immediate character, they had been conducted in a friendly and frank atmosphere and had brought about a method of attack on the problems that lay ahead which gave real hope for effective solutions. It had been agreed between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada that their mutual economic and financial problems could be given continuing study and that the three countries should work out together on a closely cooperating basis the solutions that seemed to be feasible. One of the most important conclusions that had grown out of these talks was the mutual conviction that the three countries were partners in the economic crisis that had developed and that they would have to work their way out of it as partners. It seemed probable that the United States, in consultation with the United Kingdom, would have to see how best it could take over British economic commitments in the Far East, particularly India. The United Kingdom, United States and Canada would also have to continue to examine together ways and means of bringing about a healthy economy for Europe.

The Chairman called upon Mr. Kennan to elaborate current Departmental thinking concerning the relationship of the United Kingdom to Western Europe² on the one hand and to the United States and Canada on the other. Mr. Kennan stated that the Policy Planning Staff, with the assistance of a good number of consultants, had been studying over a period of some weeks the problem of how best to link the United Kingdom into regional patterns. This study had come to the conclusion that it would be better if the United Kingdom were not too closely tied politically and economically to Western Europe, but rather that it should be aligned with the United States and Canada. The reasons for this conclusion were several:

(a) The United Kingdom tended to exert a retarding influence on Western European plans for closer political and economic integration. The United Kingdom was most chary of entering into any arrangements which might tend to derogate from her sovereignty and she was continuously preoccupied with her Empire commitments. The net result was that United Kingdom participation tended to place a ceiling on possible Western European attainments toward unification.

(b) We hoped eventually to be able to bring Eastern European countries into the orbit of Western Europe. If and when this might be possible, it was obvious that these countries would not represent truly democratic governments of the sort one would wish to have. Nevertheless, if one could wean the Satellites away from the Soviet Union, it would be worthwhile to do so without worrying too much about their respective forms of government. It seemed evident that the United Kingdom would act as a deterrent to such a development.

(c) It appeared that the future strength of Western Europe would have to rest largely upon a firm Franco-German relationship in which the talents of German youth, presently at loose ends, could be utilized throughout Western Europe to enhance its technical and industrial capabilities. While it appeared possible that such a development could be worked out with the cooperation of the French, it appeared rather unlikely that the British would be willing to go along if they were deeply involved in a program of Western European unification.

(d) In trying to play a role of leadership on the Continent, the United Kingdom was continuously finding itself entering into commitments on which it could not deliver. This usually resulted in having the problem created by such commitments ending up on our doorstep. If the British could be persuaded to take a lesser role in Continental European problems and to cast her fortunes with the United States and Canada, it would appear that a more rational economic, financial and political structure could be built. While the economic difficulties of the Continent were rather similar to those of the British, the British problem was by far the more serious. If it can be handled through tripartite cooperation, it seemed likely that the Continental European problems could be worked out separately and with a considerable amount of initiative on the part of the Europeans involved.

From the foregoing considerations, the conclusion had been reached in the Department that an attempt should be made to link the United Kingdom more closely to the United States and Canada and to get the United Kingdom to disengage itself as much as possible from Continental European problems. While the United Kingdom would continue to be a staunch ally of Western Europe, it should assume more nearly the role of adviser to Western Europe on its problems and less the role of active participant. It was hoped that the United Kingdom could be persuaded to disengage itself quietly from the Council of Europe.

In response to a question from Dr. Bush, Mr. Kennan stated that his group had given very careful study to the question of whether an all-out program for the development of Africa would serve to resuscitate Western Europe. It had been found that the obstacles were many and seemingly insuperable. It was difficult to discover what instrumentality might be used to bring about this program. The colonial powers were most unwilling to allow other nationalities to come into their possessions and there was a serious dearth of capital which would be vital if an African development program were to take hold in any significant and immediate way. For these and other reasons, the African solution had been discarded and the line of approach indicated above had been adopted.

Mr. Kennan pointed out that the problem of atomic energy relationships had not been raised in the course of the study to which he had addressed himself but he thought that it was evident that the pattern which seemed to be emerging concerning relationships between the United States, United Kingdom and Canada in the political, economic and military spheres was parallel with that pattern of relationships which we were considering in the atomic energy field. General Norstad commented that this seemed quite correct to him, and went on to say that as far as military and security relationships were concerned, they should follow the pattern which was emerging in the political and economic spheres. General Nichols expressed the view that if the development Mr. Kennan had outlined did in fact become an actuality, it would be quite inconsistent for us not to have a similar pattern established in the field of atomic weapons.

The Chairman felt that these general considerations which he and Mr. Kennan had developed might serve as a very useful framework in which to consider our further discussions of the atomic energy problem. The Committee then proceeded to the agenda items.

I. Minutes of Last Meeting

In view of the fact that the minutes of the last meeting of the American members of the Combined Policy Committee of July 6, 1948 had been circulated some time ago and the necessary amendations and corrections made, the Committee agreed that these minutes should be considered approved.³

II. Procedures for Tripartite Negotiations

The Committee had before it for approval a paper setting forth the procedures to be followed in the tripartite negotiations (Tab A⁴).

The Chairman asked whether there were any comments or additions which anyone would care to make before the paper was approved. Mr. Pike stated that the Commission would like to suggest under Item 4 “Tactics,” sub-paragraph A–3(f) on page 5, that the word “major” be deleted before the phrase “production effort be located in this country.” It was the Commission’s view that if at all possible, the British should be persuaded to agree that all weapons should be located on this hemisphere and that while the British might insist, for reasons of national prestige, on having some production of fissionable material located on the British Isles, the Commission hoped that the weapons themselves would not be produced there. To this point, Dr. Bush expressed the view that if it would not be possible to persuade the British to stop all production effort, that they should be allowed a token rate but that their efforts should stop short of the weapons themselves. He felt that all weapons should be fabricated and stored on this continent. General Norstad, alluding to his informal discussion with Air Marshal Tedder some months ago, said he was certain that the British could never agree to rule themselves out of the field of atomic weapons. He felt that the British would find it necessary to produce a few, perhaps only a token quantity. Once the British had produced even a single bomb by their own effort, he felt that they probably would be willing to forego any major weapons production program. He thought that whether the British would insist on producing one or several bombs might depend very largely on the economic burden involved. If the cost were not too great, British pride would force them to the production of at least a few bombs. If the economic factor were very burdensome, perhaps they could be persuaded not to go this far.

Mr. Pike raised the question of the attitude of the Canadians on this matter. He noted that Canada seemed anxious to sell us the plutonium they were producing in the Chalk River pile. Mr. Wilson reported that in an encounter with C. D. Howe,⁵ the latter had expressed the view that the British had made a mistake in moving the focus of their activity back to the United Kingdom after the war. There seemed to be a general consensus that as far as Canada was concerned, she would probably favor concentration of effort in this hemisphere. General Nichols commented that when he had talked about this matter with Sir George Thompson, member of the British Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission some time ago, he had gotten the impression that Sir George felt the British would insist on knowing how to make a bomb but not necessarily on actually making it. As to the Canadians, General Nichols had the impression that they did not want to produce weapons nor were they very much in favor of having the British do so. Dr. Bush felt that the nub of the matter lay in coming to agreement that the three countries should produce atomic weapons jointly in this hemisphere and that some arrangement should be made for sharing the product. As long as the British could say that they had weapons for their own use, he doubted whether they would insist on the right actually to make them.

As to the deletion which had been proposed by Mr. Pike in the procedures document, this suggestion was withdrawn when Mr. Arneson pointed out that the language had been taken verbatim in this instance from the March 2 Report to the President on Negotiating Objectives.⁶

The Committee then turned to a discussion of how best to “create the most favorable psychological atmosphere for the negotiations. General Norstad reported his impression from his talk with Tedder, previously referred to, that a great deal of bad feeling had been engendered by our stickiness in the atomic energy field. Tedder felt that the atomic energy problem represented a most serious stumbling block to a fully-effective military collaboration. This problem impinged on many military considerations having to do with over-all strategic planning. Once we could see that we were in a position to have a full partnership with the British in this field, it seemed probable that full military collaboration could be quickly effectuated and that the needs of the British in the field of atomic weapons would be found to be rather minimal. Mr. Kennan commented that any serious rift between ourselves and the British in the field of atomic energy could very well wreck our over-all pattern of cooperation and good-will. Both Mr. Kennan and Dr. Bush pointed out that a favorable atmosphere in the course of the modus vivendi talks in late 1947 had quickly changed from one of uncertainty and fencing as soon as we were able to tell the British that we had in mind a program for renewing interchange of information. As soon as we were able to say this as an earnest of our intent and good-will, it would not prove difficult to arrive at a satisfactory modus vivendi. Mr. Kennan was concerned that we would have real difficulty this time in giving such assurances in view of the negative attitude on the Hill and some uncertainties in Administration quarters as to the best solution. Dr. Bush doubted that we would have very serious difficulties with the Congress and expressed the hope that a reasonable solution along the lines indicated would be found acceptable.

In connection with Item 2 under 4—”Tactics” on page 3 concerning the extension of the allocations and technical cooperation arrangements under the modus vivendi, Mr. Wilson reported on the status of actual requirements and actual supply as contrasted with estimated requirements and estimated supply arrived at in late 1947. On the basis of actual experience under the allocations formula, we had found that our requirements were somewhat greater than had been estimated and also that the supply, particularly from the Congo, in 1949, had been somewhat higher than had been estimated. In discussing the problem of extending the allocations arrangements under the modus vivendi, he proposed that it would be desirable to conduct the explorations on the basis of figures derived from actual experience rather than from estimates made in 1947 and also that as far as supply and requirements for 1950 were concerned, the more recent estimates based on the experience of the last year and a half should be substituted for those tentatively arrived at in 1947. The Committee was in general agreement with this suggestion.

General Nichols asked whether an extension of the modus vivendi arrangements should be considered for less than one year. Mr. Wilson commented that from ah administrative and budgetary planning point of view, one year would be highly desirable. On the other hand, it was recognized that the United Kingdom might prefer that the period be somewhat shorter. Mr. Arneson suggested that we might propose a one-year extension, subject to termination before the end of 1950 provided a new arrangement governing the longer-term could be formalized. It was the consensus of the Committee that this suggestion might turn out to be the more acceptable to the United Kingdom.

General Norstad stressed that the psychological factor was exceedingly important to the extent that we could convince the British that we wanted to make common cause with them. If the British could be sure that we would stay with them in any emergency, he felt that they would probably be willing to settle for only token production. When he had talked with Tedder, he suggested that the chances of moving along expeditiously in tripartite talks would be greatly enhanced if the British negotiators could come over with a minimum position and he hoped that we for our part would do the same. Mr. Kennan added that any attempt on our part to extort a solution from the British would stiffen their backs and we would fail in our negotiations. If, however, we took an open and forthcoming attitude, he was confident that we could get anything we wanted within reasonable limits.

In summing up, Mr. Webb stressed that the United States negotiators should make it clear at the outset that the primary objective in the talks was to work out a rational program for close cooperation across the board in the atomic energy field. He felt that the franker our approach, the greater were our chances of securing a mutually satisfactory arrangement. Above all, it seemed important to avoid leaving the impression that we were fencing with our British and Canadian colleagues.

Subject to the foregoing comments, the Committee expressed general agreement with the procedures outlined in Tab A.

The Committee agreed with General Norstad’s suggestion that the American members of the Subgroup on Strategic and Military Considerations should meet together on Friday, September 16.

R. Gordon Arneson

1. For documentation on the tripartite conversations under reference, see vol. iv, pp. 781 ff.
2. For documentation on European integration, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.
3. For the minutes as approved, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 719.
4. Tab A, “Procedures for Tripartite Negotiations,” a memorandum prepared in the Department of State (presumably by Arneson), September 12, is not printed.
5. Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce; Member of the Combined Policy Committee.
6. Ante, p. 443.