Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Disarmament Files

The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

confidential

New York, February 1, 1949.

Dear Mr. Rusk: On my first reading of Mr. de Rose’s memorandum, “Principles Relative to Control of Atomic Energy which Might Serve as a Base for the Six-Power Consultations”,¹ copy of which is enclosed herewith, I have the following comments:

1. Analyzing his statement of principles, they seem on this reading pretty sound as statements of principle, except for principle No. IV. It seems to me that the way this principle is stated would take us clear back to some of the various debates in the first meetings of the Commission. It could easily be interpreted to mean that a system of national ownership, development and operation would be acceptable for most dangerous operations (de Rose says: “in some cases this (control) can only be arrived at through management”). If we ever appear willing to reopen the question of national ownership and operation versus international ownership, it seems to me we would indefinitely delay the negotiations. Personally, I cannot believe that if governments own and operate any of the steps from the time ore is taken out of the ground until it is actually sold in the form of electrical power, we would ever escape from continuing international rivalries. Any form of agency which had the job of telling governments what to do would, it seems to me, be a constant source of friction and suspicion.

2. While principles I, II, III, V and VI are more clearly and strongly stated, the same general criticism applies to them as well. It took the Commission two years to explain in the clearest form it could just what was meant by the principles laid down in the First Report. To try and state all this over again now in six paragraphs of a few lines each, seems to me to throw away all the clarity which was gained by the Commission in two years of work.

3. Our experience with the Soviet negotiations is that in every case they seem to reach agreement with other nations on principles, and then when the details are left to subordinates to work out, the other nations find that the Soviet interpretation of principles is entirely different from the interpretation of the other nations. The negotiations then break down and the Soviet point to the fact that it was they who made the original agreement and then accuse the other nations of having gone back on it. It seems to me that experience indicates this is what would happen if these “principles” were used as the basis for the consultations. It would be impossible to keep material of this sort from the press in the long run, even if the consultations were held on a closed basis.

4. My own feeling would be that if the consultations are to be based on a discussion of the proposed international agreement for the control of atomic energy, it would be much better to start with the actual plan as approved by the General Assembly and argue out the meaning of the various sections and why they were necessary, and then to clarify the uncompleted portions of the plan in a way which might satisfy the Soviet of the honesty of intent of the others. However, I do not think the Soviet wants to be satisfied of the good intent of other nations.

5. My own feeling has always been that work and discussions on an international treaty should stay in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission, and that the discussion in the consultation should, as suggested in the Third Report, attempt to “find through prior consultation that there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy.” I have always connected this up in my mind with the words in the preceding paragraph of the Third Report, “let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field.” I think that the consultations should be on the question of Soviet participation in the world community and what that would require of them in this field. If the Soviet Union could give some concrete evidence of their desire for such participation, then the Commission could proceed with its discussion in a more realistic way.

6. Mr. de Rose recommends that the consultations be held before the meetings of the Commission. My view agrees with that of General McNaughton that it would be better to hold the Commission meetings first and see how far we can go. It is evident that the question of whether the Commission should hold its meetings first or the consultations should be held first depends a good deal on the decision as to the field which would be covered in the consultations. If the sponsoring powers were to adopt the method proposed by Mr. de Rose it would be reasonable to hold the meetings of the sponsoring powers first. But if the method adopted is to be more along the lines I have suggested, it would be more reasonable to have the meetings of the Commission held first and see how far they can get before calling the consultations.

7. We beg to request the views of the State Department in this matter at the earliest possible date, so that the thinking of the others will not get too far out of line.

Yours sincerely,

Frederick Osborn

1. The memorandum, received from de Rose on January 27, is not printed. An English translation of the six principles contained therein, prepared in the Department of State and transmitted to the United States Mission, read as follows:

   I—Control of atomic energy and prohibition of manufacture, stockpiling and use of atomic weapons are inseparable whether they are established through one or several international instrument[s].

   II—Decisions concerning production and use of atomic energy can not be left to the individual will of nations. Participating countries must agree to a world wide policy and plan of cooperative development and write it down in a treaty. (The plan would include quotas for the allocations of dangerous materials and facilities.)

   III—Control must apply to the entire nuclear industry. It must also apply to raw materials prospections and scientific research.

   IV—Control must be of such nature that it allows at all time to keep track and as accurate accounting as technical developments permits of materials in dangerous quantities or qualities. In some cases this can only be arrived at through management. Control must be exercised by international personnel responsible to an international body.

   V—No security can be achieved if nations can permanently seal off some portion of their territories from international control.

   VI—Each disposition of the treaty which will prohibit a particular activity to nations and persons will come into force as soon as the International organ is discharging the functions which, according to the treaty, are designed to protect the signatory powers against the dangers of violation and evasion in this particular respect. (USUN Files)