501.BC Atomic/1–3149
Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. G. Hayden Raynor1 and Donald M. Leith2
Subject: Nature of Forthcoming Atomic Energy Consultations
Mr. Denis Allen3 called this afternoon at his request.
1. Mr. Allen said that he had just received a dispatch from the Foreign Office which indicated that the Foreign Office was somewhat concerned over the reports it had received of the conversation among the Delegates of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, held on Monday, January 24, 1949, in New York. The British Representative had reported to his Government that the United States was apparently proposing that the consultations required by paragraph 3 of the GA atomic energy resolution of November 4 be turned into a broad discussion of the major problems involved in the East-West split, and held on a high level. Concern was also expressed about some reference to a “heart-to-heart” talk with Malik, the Soviet Representative; the British feel this would not be the way to handle the Russians. On the other hand, it was the U.K. view (concurred in by Mr. Bevin4) that the consultations should be restricted to atomic energy.
2. Mr. Allen was told that the conversation in New York had been entirely exploratory. The views exchanged were personal views of the representatives of the different Governments describing various alternate courses of procedure in an endeavor to arrive at some consensus as to what should be done next, such views to be relayed to the respective Governments to assist them in making up their minds as to a program for the atomic energy discussions.
4. Mr. Allen was further assured that even the informal views of the U.S. Representative as to the nature of the consultations apparently had been rather exaggerated as they were reported to London. The general line taken by the U.S. Representative had simply been that, while the problems discussed must all be closely related to atomic [Page 26] energy, it might be impossible to “determine whether a basis for agreement exists” unless there were some further exploration of the security problem, at least to the extent of asking the Soviets what were the real reasons they could not accept the majority plan. In other words, we should give them a chance, as perhaps we had never done fully, to state what measures they believed would give them adequate security. At the same time we could make a similar statement as to our general security needs. Such an approach would not involve an across-the-board discussion of all the problems dividing the East and West, nor would it be more than exploratory in nature in preparation for some such high-level consultations as the CFM. Mr. Allen was assured that these thoughts also had been expressed personally and informally in an exploratory way and should not be considered as expressions of U.S. Government positions.
5. With reference to Paragraphs 2 and 4, to underline the point that the views expressed in the New York conversations should not be interpreted as U.S. Government positions, Mr. Allen was informed that no top-level review of U.S. policy in this field had taken place since the passage of the U.N. resolution.
6. Mr. Allen was told that there was considerable support in this Government for the view that the Commission should resume its activities within the next few weeks, and that its initial work should be a survey of its program of work, including an attempt to dispel misconceptions concerning details of the UN control plan remaining in the minds of the Soviets and some other Delegations, as suggested by General McNaugton, the Canadian Representative. Mr. Allen was informed, however, that such a consensus did not yet represent an official Government position.
7. Mr. Allen was assured that we had no intention of taking any action on so important a subject as atomic energy without keeping the British informed and without a full exchange of views as to the desirability of any particular course of action.