Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–548

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] March 4, 1948.

[Subject:] Withdrawal of U.S. Occupation Forces from Korea.

It will be recalled that on February 26, 1948 the Interim Committee of the General Assembly approved a United States-sponsored Resolution expressing the view that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to which access to Soviet-occupied north Korea had been denied by the “negative attitude” of the Soviet Government, should nevertheless proceed with the implementation of the program set forth in the General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947 in such parts of Korea as may be accessible to the Commission.

It will be further recalled that that program envisages the holding of elections under the observation of the Commission, the creation of a National Assembly by the elected representatives, and the formation by that Assembly of a National Government which will then proceed, in consultation with the Commission, to carry out the following further steps—

a. to constitute its own national security forces and to dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein;

b. to take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea;

c. to arrange with the occupying powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within 90 days.

On the basis of the present intention of the Commission and the U.S. Command in Korea to hold elections on or about May 9 next,¹ it is estimated that the proposed National Assembly (minus representatives from north Korea) may be convened in early June and that a government can be expected to emerge in about July or August.

While the United States may be considered committed under the terms of the Resolutions of November 14, 1947, to withdraw its occupation forces from south Korea as soon as practicable after the formation of a “national” government and if possible within 90 days, it is also morally committed by the spirit as well as the letter of those Resolutions (and this is a very real commitment in the minds of most of the other members of the United Nations) to withdraw only after the creation of reasonably adequate native security forces, and under circumstances which will bequeath to the newly established government at least an even chance of survival. This means primarily two things: first, that we cannot at this time establish a firm time table for the withdrawal of our occupation forces from south Korea, and second, that the timing of such withdrawal will be importantly affected, if not determined, by the success of our efforts to bring into being effective native security forces as a condition precedent to our withdrawal. It also means that, in addition to the latter step, we will be obliged to take measures which will prevent the economic collapse of south Korea which would promptly and inevitably ensue should we make no provision for a continuation of at least a minimum of relief and rehabilitation assistance following our withdrawal.

It is probable almost to the point of certainty that the Korean problem will be brought up for reconsideration by the General Assembly at its next scheduled session in September of this year, and it is reasonable to assume that the authority of any views which we may wish to put forward at that time will bear a direct ratio to the extent to which it is felt that we have carried out our commitments, moral and otherwise, under the terms of the Resolutions of November 14, 1947.

(It is perhaps superfluous to refer here to the obvious implications, in terms of the conflict between United States and Soviet interests in the Far East and the world at large, of a withdrawal by the United States from south Korea on a “scuttle and run” basis.)

Recommendations:

Accordingly it is recommended:

1. That the Department of the Army maintain flexibility in its plans for the withdrawal of occupation forces from south Korea pending the outcome of anticipated further developments in Korea.

2. That the Department of the Army expedite to the fullest extent possible its program for the training and equipping of south Korean security forces with a view to the formation of a well-trained and equipped force of appropriate size. (Present plans call for a force of 50,000, while General Hodge has suggested a figure as high as 100,000 men.) This will require decisive action at a high level in the Department of the Army to ensure that the requisite equipment is forthwith made available.

3. That the necessary legislative steps be taken to assure the continued availability of Army funds for the relief and rehabilitation of south Korea after the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces. (A separate memorandum on this subject is on its way to you.)²

1. For proclamation of March 1 by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge at Seoul and for text of his statement issued on March 4, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1948, pp. 344, 345. These were sent in telegrams 126, March 3, and 127, March 4, from Seoul. (895.00/3–348, 3–448)
2. In a memorandum on March 9, Mr. Butterworth reported to the Secretary of State that the Legal Adviser (Gross) had informed him that “amending language designed to accomplish the purpose envisaged” by this paragraph “has already been embodied in the pending omnibus bill (S. 2085) on relief to occupied areas”, so that a further memorandum on the subject would not be submitted (740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–948).