740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–548
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)1
Subject: Withdrawal of US Occupation Forces from Korea
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. W. W. Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. J. E. Jacobs, Political Adviser to US Commander, Korea | |
| Mr. Arthur Bunce, Economic Adviser to US Commander, Korea | |
| Mr. J. M. Allison, Chief, NA |
Supplementing the attached memorandum,2 Mr. Butterworth explained to the Secretary that as a result of the action of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly of the UN on February 26, 1948, an election will be held in the American zone of Korea on May 9 in order to choose members of the national assembly which in turn may form a Korean government and thereafter, in consultation with the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, proceed with negotiations for the setting up of a Korean national security force, the taking over of the functions of government from the occupation authorities, and the complete withdrawal from Korea of occupation forces as early as practicable and if possible within 90 days. It was explained that [Page 1140] while a Korean government might be set up by August, 1948, it was probable, in view of the very real concern in the minds of other members of the United Nations as expressed privately during the session of the Interim Committee, that the United States, which is morally committed by the spirit and letter of the UN Resolution, would be able to withdraw only after the creation of reasonably adequate native security forces and under circumstances which would give the newly established government at least an even chance of survival. This would mean that there cannot be established at this time a firm time table for the withdrawal of occupation forces from south Korea and that the timing of such withdrawal may well be determined by the success of US efforts to bring into being an effective native security force as a condition precedent thereto. Concern was expressed at the attitude of the Department of the Army which tended to establish a hard and fast time table for US troop withdrawal which if adhered to might go against US best interests. It was also pointed out that while the Department of the Army was proceeding with plans for increasing the Korean constabularly to a strength of 50,000 men it was placing the equipping of such a force at such a low level of priority there was danger that an adequate force could not be trained and equipped in the time available. It was requested that, if the Secretary agreed with the considerations advanced, the Department of the Army be approached at a high level to insure that it maintain flexibility in its plans for the withdrawal of occupation forces from south Korea pending the outcome of anticipated further developments. It was also requested that the Department of the Army be encouraged to expedite its program for the training and equipping of south Korean security forces.
The Secretary asked specific questions with regard to the present state of Korean armed forces and their equipment. He was told that the constabulary at present consisted of approximately 25,000 men most of whom were armed with either Japanese rifles or American carbines, but that there was little if any heavier equipment such as machine guns, mortars or automatic rifles. In response to the Secretary’s query as to how the Korean forces and equipment are paid for it was pointed out that the Korean troops are paid in local currency taken from the budget of the South Korean Interim Government and that the equipment had been to date furnished from US sources. In view of the fact that the Korean constabulary had not from the beginning been trained under American officers who would have been able to indoctrinate the native soldiers with habits of command and discipline, the Secretary expressed grave doubts as to the feasibility of building up a native Korean force in the south in the time allotted [Page 1141] which would be at all comparable to the force existing north of the 38th parallel. The Secretary then stated that he would like to advance for consideration the possibility of recruiting native Koreans for service directly in the US Army in Korea where they could be under US Army discipline and training under US officers and non-commissioned officers until such time as capable Koreans could be developed to take over command posts. The Secretary asked for opinions as to the general feasibility from a political standpoint of such a project. He explained that this would enable the US Army to meet its manpower shortages in Korea with a minimum of expense and would at the same time train a large number of native Koreans who could be incorporated into a Korean security force upon the final withdrawal from Korea of the US Army. It was generally agreed that this proposal had great merit and deserved serious and immediate exploration as to its practical possibilities. It was further agreed that if this proposed action were undertaken careful consideration would have to be given to methods of approaching the Koreans and to any public announcements of the action being taken in order to provide for the minimum of misunderstanding among Koreans as well as members of the United Nations.
At the close of the meeting the Secretary stated that he agreed whole-heartedly that the Department of the Army should be requested to maintain flexibility in its time table for the withdrawal of troops and that he would look into the problem of expediting equipment as well as have further explored the possibilities of incorporating native Koreans into US Army forces in Korea.