895.00/2–1048: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State
confidential
Seoul
, February 10,
1948.
73. Cite Zpol 168. In recent conversation with two persons whom he is believed to trust, Kimm Kiusic has stated his present views as follows:
- 1.
- Rhee and Hankook rightist groups: he expressed considerable resentment against the Rhee and Hankook rightist groups because of their attempt to damage his political standing in the provinces by constantly alleging that he is tool of American military government, while on other hand same groups are telling Americans that he is Communist and pro-Soviet. In support of latter accusation, they cite his statement that both American and Soviet military forces should be withdrawn from Korea. He said these rightist enemies overlooked fact he had also said he did not favor withdrawal of American forces until after establishment of Korean Government with military force of its own reasonably adequate to protect itself. He added Rhee was more likely to sell out to Communists than either he or Kim Koo.
- 2.
- Kim Koo: he admitted he and Kim Koo now held certain common views but he tried to indicate that rapprochement with Kim Koo was not as strong as public believed by stating that he felt Kim Koo’s lieutenant Cho Wan Koo influenced Kim Koo too much in favor of violence. He admitted, however, that he and Kim Koo had conferred before they appeared before UN Commission and that they had coordinated the proposals which they subsequently submitted to that commission. He confirmed reports that there is now definite breach between Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee which he believed would be permanent.
- 3.
- Elections: he stated positively that he opposed UN holding an election in South Korea at present time. He felt that General Assembly [Page 1103] mandate to commission was to bold an election in all Korea for a national government and that, if it were unable to do so because of Soviets, commission should report back to its parent, General Assembly, and get new mandate to go ahead in South Korea. He said that with such new mandate, UN would be more likely to recognize its continuing responsibility to safeguard the new state. From this statement, it might be inferred Kimm Kiusic and Kim Koo would support (rather than boycott as has been suggested) an election in South Korea if UN Commission has new mandate to proceed with such an election.
- 4.
- UN Commission: he believes UN Commission should be kept alive at all costs but it should go slow in reaching major decisions in hope world situation may break in a way favorable to Korea. He says that reference of problem back to General Assembly will take time during which US and USSR may be able to negotiate regarding troop removal (while a South Korean armed force of 100,000 is being organized and trained) and an opportunity present itself for North and South Korean leaders to meet to discuss plans for unifying Korea. He does not have high opinion of members of commission except Jackson who he says is “active and interested” and the Chinese who is “concerned”. He calls French delegate “playboy”; says Salvadorean has no interest; states Syrian considers his country’s problems more important and wants to go home; and the Filipino is concerned solely with home politics. He did not comment on Menon.
Jacobs