895.00/2–1048: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State


72. Cite Zpol 167. In recent conversation with someone whom he is believed to trust, Kim Koo expressed his views as follows:

Attitude toward other parties: Kim Koo came out rather strongly in stating that he would work with Kimm Kiusic and other middle of the road leaders. He said that their ideas for united Korea were basically same as his although in some ways their means of attaining this end might be different. He stated emphatically, however, that he could not cooperate any longer with Hankook Democratic Party as he regarded its members as collaborators and opportunists. With regard to Rhee, he stated he was in disagreement because Rhee advocated separate, sovereign south Korea Govt. Kim Koo’s emphasis on this point lends color to belief that there is definite rift between him and Rhee.
Attitude toward UN commission: Kim Koo stuck to his proposals made before the UN commission. He reiterated that there must be meeting of leaders of both north and south Korea after withdrawal of both US and Soviet troops and that there could be no national election without participation of north Korean people. He feels, at least half seriously, that UN commission should go to Pyongyang in defiance of Soviets since he believes that the enthusiasm with which north Korean population would receive them would prevent the Russians from doing them any harm. This is another example of Kim Koo’s naivete in really believing that Soviets will permit north Korean leaders to confer with southern leaders and that it is simple matter for UN commission to run Soviet gauntlet and actually get to Pyongyang without permission.
Cho Man Sik: Kim Koo stated that the most popular and outstanding Korean political leader was Cho Man Sik now held in custody by Soviets in north Korea. It is true that Cho is highly esteemed by all Koreans but Kim Koo’s support of him is due probably more to fact Cho and Kim Koo are north Koreans by birth.
Manchurian plans: As he does at almost every interview, Kim Koo harped back again to his desire to obtain arms and other support from United States to enable him proceed Manchuria and join together his former followers of whom he says there are many to assist Chinese [Page 1102] in driving Communists out of Manchuria. Kim Koo sincerely believes that he can accomplish this but again in his child-like way he has no real concrete plans as to how he can accomplish his purpose. Whether his former followers would support him, how he is going to get arms and ammunition into Manchuria, the attitude of China, he has never considered.
To another interviewer Kim Koo expressed keen disappointment over developments and seems very pessimistic over possibility for success of any plans for Korea due both to conflicts between Korean leaders and major conflict between US and Soviets.