711.45/4–248

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)

secret
Participants: Mr. Lovett
Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, GOI
E. G. Mathews, SOA

Sir Girja called at 5:30 at his request. He said that he had come to the US as a member of the Indian Special Delegation to the SC in the Kashmir case. I asked how the Kashmir situation was developing. Sir Girja replied that in Kashmir itself the Indian military position had improved and with the coming spring, Indian troops, totalling only slightly more than a division, would be able to move more vigorously against a few remaining trouble spots. According to latest Indian military reports, tribal invaders still comprised about 60% of the opposing forces, the remaining 40% being indigenous insurgents.

Turning to the SC aspect of the Kashmir situation, Sir Girja said that the fundamental differences between India and Pakistan related to the introduction of Pakistan troops into Kashmir and the composition of the interim government of the State. India could not accede to Pakistan’s demand that the latter’s troops move into Kashmir territory in order to keep the tribal invaders out. The plebiscite when held would result in a very close vote, and if India won, Pakistan forces might not withdraw and would almost certainly not effectively resist the re-entry of tribal elements. With respect to the interim government, Pakistan was insisting that Abdullah1 be removed as Prime Minister and that a coalition government be formed. Sir Girja felt that there was no one to replace Abdullah, and that a coalition of groups whose aims were completely divergent could only result in a paralysis of government and administration in the State.

Sir Girja then said that although he appreciated my interest, he had not intended to trouble me with the Kashmir problem. His real purpose in coming to Washington had been to explain to me and other US officials India’s position vis-à-vis the US and the USSR. He had the impression that there was a feeling in this country that India was [Page 507] somehow “in the Russian camp”. He wished to emphasize that this was not the case, as India had not rid itself of the British in order to accept domination from some other quarter. I commented that although irresponsible newspaper columnists might have speculated on the nature of India’s relations with the USSR, I was sure that there was in the US no informed opinion that India had aligned itself with the Russians. Sir Girja expressed his gratification at my statement and pointed out that two fundamental considerations prevented Indian adherence to the Soviet bloc. First, through its association with the British, unhappy as it had been in some aspects, India had acquired the ideals of democracy and individual liberty which were held by the US and other nations of the west. Second, India can expect no effective assistance from the USSR in its primary objective of developing and strengthening itself economically and militarily. In fact, the US is the only country which is in a position to aid India. I told Sir Girja that we were very grateful to receive his assurances of the friendly disposition of his Government.

Sir Girja stated that his remarks were being made with the full knowledge and authorization of Prime Minister Nehru, and that he hoped that the Prime Minister could himself visit the US in the not too distant future in order further to clarify the Indian position. I said that we would be delighted to receive Prime Minister Nehru, adding, however, that Sir Girja had himself very effectively stated his Government’s views.

Sir Girja then pointed out that although India was maintaining an army of some 360,000 men and had appropriated 121 crores of rupees ($363,000,000) for defense purposes, it was in no position effectively to resist aggression from the north, and that the GOI could not risk an open declaration of its anti-USSR views. The strengthening of India’s military power was of the highest importance, and he would like to send a military mission to the US at an early date to explore the possibilities of obtaining equipment, particularly as the US was about to step up its own armament program. I said that before a mission was sent it would be advisable for us to have some preliminary discussions to clarify India’s wants and to examine the possibilities of supplying them from this country. I added that our production theory and practice involved a sacrifice of immediate small output for a “tooled” longer-term mass output, and cited examples from our experience in World War II. I pointed out that if an Indian military mission came to this country, it should be charged with studying American production techniques in order that some of these might be introduced in Indian ordnance factories. Sir Girja assented, but emphasized that the first objective of the mission would be procurement, and after that objective had been achieved, the mission could [Page 508] turn to the matter of improving Indian techniques. I replied that in view of the importance of repair and maintenance, I would hope that the two matters could be pursued simultaneously. Sir Girja agreed that this would be desirable.

In conclusion, Sir Girja observed that Syria would be leaving the SC next fall and that he hoped India might be considered for this seat. India, the second largest nation in Asia, had not yet been a SC member, and although he appreciated the circumstances which had led the US to support Islamic states for the second Asian place on the SC, China holding the first as a permanent member, he felt that the time might have come when India’s claim could be given serious consideration, particularly in view of our support of India against the Ukraine last fall. I commented that Sir Girja made a strong case for India, and suggested that he discuss this matter with Mr. Henderson. (Sir Girja did subsequently mention India’s desire for a SC seat to Mr. Henderson).

  1. Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.