711.45/5–1048

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs

secret
Participants: Brigadier General D. Chaudhuri, Military Attaché, Embassy of India
Mr. I. S. Chopra, First Secretary, Embassy of India
Mr. Joseph S. Sparks—SOA

Mr. Chopra initiated the discussion by saying that the Embassy of India would very much appreciate receiving informal information as to whether the U.S. Government felt as did the Indian Government that this would be an appropriate time to initiate a review of the general situation in the relations between the two nations with particular emphasis on the exchange of military information and technical training. He said that in the event such indication should prove favorable a formal approach could be made at the Department’s convenience but that in the event that the United States felt this not to be an appropriate time would it be possible for an assurance informally of maximum cooperation within limitations imposed by the situation to be given by the United States.

In discussing the question of India’s interest in the United States Chopra said that following the “unfortunate affair of the airplanes” in January (at which time a request for military planes and equipment was turned down by the Department because of the Kashmir developments) India had gone to the British with their problem. They [Page 509] had been sympathetically received and certain arrangements had been worked out but the truth of the matter was that the British simply did not possess the facilities for training, information exchange, or equipment supply which the United States has.

Chopra explained that prior to August 15, 1947, and the establishment of separate Dominion status, India had not had any trouble receiving automatically all the information which could be utilized, by the military. The British had received this information from the United States through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it had been automatically passed on to, or available to, the Indian military schools and the Indian Government. Following August 15, however, this source had been completely cut off with the explanation from the British that under their understanding with the United States such information could not be made available by the British to any third country–even a Dominion.

As have various other personal, informal, official representatives of the Indian Government during recent months, Mr. Chopra stated parenthetically that, despite public statements made by Indian Government leaders for domestic consumption, there is no doubt at all as to which side India would take should there be a third world war—the United States could count absolutely on having India at its side in such a conflict.

The specific incident which had caused him to approach the Department on this occasion was explained by Mr. Chopra as being the receipt of a telegram from the Government of India to the effect that Colonel Middleton, American Military Attaché, New Delhi, had asked the Government of India for the following information, all of which is classified as “Top Secret” by India:

  • “1. Mobilization plan of Indian Army
    (a)
    The system and schedule of mobilization of personnel and unit.
    (b)
    The total to be mobilized at the end of the 30 day period, the 60 day period, the 90 day period; the 120 day period and the 180 day period.
    (c)
    A list of divisions and other units to be mobilized in each period.
  • 2. Organization and mobilization of troops of Indian Army reserves.
    (a)
    The number and types of reserve organizations now on active duty.
    (b)
    Planned reserve organizations.
    (c)
    Method of organization.
    (d)
    Method of calling to active duty in the event of emergency.
    (e)
    Number of trained reserves by age groups.
    (f)
    Number of untrained reserves.”

[Page 510]

Mr. Sparks was shown a copy of this telegram which concluded with a paragraph to the effect that Colonel Middleton had been informed that the GOI had no objection to making this information available to the U.S. should it be understood that such release would be made upon a reciprocal basis. The telegram was marked for the attention of Brigadier Chaudhuri and instructed him to approach the India Desk on the subject “with tact”.

In response to a question as to what Brigadier Chaudhuri’s experience so far had been in requesting information which he desired from the U.S. military, Mr. Sparks was informed that (a) few questions had been asked because of the general atmosphere following the January episode involving Colonel Kaul, (b) all questions which had been asked, with the exception of one set referred to the Air Force, had been satisfactorily answered, (c) no questions of the nature of those put by Colonel Middleton had been asked though GOI in view of its problem of reorganizing the armed forces was much interested in them and (d) it appeared that India would lose at least one and possibly both of the two positions it had enjoyed in the past in the Fort Leavenworth training program, apparently through no fault of India’s other than becoming an independent country.

Mr. Chopra reiterated that the GOI had nothing in the way of information which it wished to conceal from the United States with which it desired the closest understanding and cooperation. India was only interested in the exchange of information becoming a two way street.

In subsequent conversation on unrelated matters Mr. Chopra twice referred to a new “era of good feeling and friendly, full, understanding” which he so fervently hopes can now be inaugurated between India and the United States.

Mr. Chopra telephoned later in the afternoon to inform me that the Indian Embassy had just received a second telegram from the Government of India in which it was stated that the American Air Attaché in New Delhi had officially requested the Government of India to supply him with a complete survey of the airfields in India showing their types and classifications with maps, locations, and with detailed analysis of the disposition of facilities and the planned order of battle.