Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

711.45/4–248

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)

secret

[Washington,] April 2, 1948.

Participants:	Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, and Commonwealth Relations, GOI
	Mr. Henderson1
	Mr. Hare2
	Mr. Thurston3
	Mr. Mathews

Sir Girja called on Mr. Henderson at 2:30 at the former’s request.

[Omitted here is a paragraph concerned with the feasibility of bringing a collection of Indian art to the United States for exhibition.]

Sir Girja next referred to the possibility of a visit to the United States by Prime Minister Nehru. He said that he personally had urged the Prime Minister to come to this country and that, if the President issued an invitation, Nehru would of course accept. As far as time was concerned, Sir Girja felt that such a trip would not be practicable before next June. Mr. Hare said that we had had word from our Embassy in New Delhi to the effect that Nehru might be able to come to this country this month and after making inquiries of the White House, had informed Ambassador Grady that it would be convenient for the President to receive Nehru between April 19 and 24. Sir Girja expressed surprise at this most recent development and indicated considerable doubt that the Prime Minister would be able to come this month owing to the pressure of affairs. Mr. Henderson pointed out that, if it were impracticable for Nehru to come at present, we could give further thought to working out arrangements for a visit, later this year.

Sir Girija then turned to an exposition of Indian foreign policy which he stated was the real purpose of his visit to the United States and his calls at the State Department. He sketched first of all the present status of India pointing out that the Indian people were now responsible for their own destiny, that British troops had withdrawn from Indian territory, and that practically no British civilians remained in Indian Government positions. He commented with respect to the last point that the situation was quite different in Pakistan. He said, however, that it had been necessary to retain British officers in the Indian Army as there simply were not enough trained Indian personnel available to staff the upper echelons. In short, India is now its own master.

Having expelled the British, India, did not intend to take on any other master in their stead. Sir Girja felt, however, that there was some impression in the United States that India was tending to become a Communist state or at least a “fellow-travelling” state. Mr. Henderson commented that that view was not held in U.S. Government quarters. Although certain actions of individual Indian representatives at international conferences had seemed open to various interpretations, we had been confident all along that the Indian Government itself was fully aware of the basic issues at stake. He went on to say that he wished to make it clear that the issue was not between “American imperialism” and Soviet imperialism; that we had no objection to Russia’s establishing close relations with other nations provided that this were not done by aggression, pressure, and the suppression of freedom; and that the real issue was the maintenance and strengthening of democracy in the face of a totalitarian threat.

Sir Girja said that he appreciated the importance of Mr. Henderson’s remarks and was gratified that the U.S. Government was aware of the basic democratic orientation of the Government of India. He went on to point out that India’s position had been more accurately reflected in the 1947 UNGA than in the 1946 session, citing India’s support of our stand with respect to Korea and other issues. This brought him to the principal point he desired to make. Should the world once again become involved in conflict, India could only associate itself with, those nations holding the same ideals of freedom and democracy. However, his Government is not able to make an open declaration of its position as it could not now withstand the aggression from Russia or the internal difficulties which might ensue.

Mr. Thurston said that some of us had been disturbed by the anti-American tone of portions of the Indian press which had taken the position that the United States wished to assume Britain’s relinquished position in India. Sir Girja replied that he was aware of the type of press comment to which Mr. Thurston referred but that he wished to make a clear distinction between the thinking of responsible Government officials and the irresponsible press. He said that the Indian press was inexperienced in the field of foreign affairs and that it was inclined to treat such matters in emotional rather than rational terms. Furthermore, there was a good bit of popular feeling in India, not shared in Government circles, that the United States was aiding the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indochina. This feeling was reflected in the press treatment of the United States.

Sir Girja then touched briefly on Indo-Pakistan relations emphasizing that India had no desire to eliminate Pakistan as an independent state or to reincorporate into an Indian union the territories now held by Pakistan. Mr. Henderson interjected that the State Department had been aware that such was the Indian position. Sir Girja went on to say that a political reunion of the two Dominions was most unlikely in the foreseeable future, but that he would hope for an understanding which would permit joint defense of the Indian sub-continent whose critical frontier now lay in Pakistan, and possibly a customs union. He did not feel that Indo-Pakistan relations presented any serious or insuperable problems.

Turning next to the question of India’s position in South Asia, Sir Girja said that India had no desire to form or to lead a South Asian bloc. He said in strict confidence that when Thakin Nu⁴ of Burma recently visited India, he brought with him a draft project for a “United Nations of South Asia”. This was studied by Nehru and the Foreign Office, and Thakin Nu was informed that India did not consider it desirable to establish such an organization which would detract from the authority of the global United Nations and introduce into world politics a further racial and regional element. India feels that its first task is to develop itself.

Sir Girja concluded his broad sketch of Indian foreign policy with a discussion of India’s relationship to the British Commonwealth. He pointed out that the draft constitution left open the question of this relationship, but added that it would clearly not be possible for India to recognize the King as titular head of the state. The exact terms of the relationship which might be worked out would depend largely on the attitude of the British but the continuance of imperial preference was definitely out of the question. Certain arrangements with respect to defense might be worked out.

Sir Girja then said that there was somthing of an impression in India that the United States had very little interest in that country and that he would like to know the Department’s views in that respect. Mr. Henderson said that he was very grateful that Sir Girja had been so frank in his comments and that he would be equally frank. It was the considered opinion of the United States Government that in the long term close and friendly relations between India and the United States was the anchor of stability of the whole aim from Africa to South East Asia. Unfortunately, at the moment the United States found it necessary to concentrate its efforts and resources on resisting aggression in certain other parts of the world. We recognized this could be only a short term policy, but we were faced with the problem of meeting an urgent and critical situation. We had every intention of giving proper and essential attention to India just as soon as circumstances permitted.

Sir Girja said that he fully understood the necessity of the United States concentrating its attention at present on certain critical areas and that he had not come to this country with any mendicant ideas. He had, in point of fact, done everything he could to quash the idea of a Marshall Plan for South Asia which had been advocated by the Indian Ambassador in Washington in despatches to New Delhi. However, in order to give immediate evidence of our real interest in India, Sir Girja urged that we urgently and seriously consider two matters in which his country needed our assistance.

He referred to India’s desire to obtain American assistance in carrying out certain hydro-electric developmental projects and said that, although an approach had been made in this connection quite some time ago, no assistance had yet been forthcoming. Mr. Hare said that Ambassador Grady was keenly interested in this problem and that he had pressed it vigorously while in the US on consultation. In view of the Ambassador’s wide experience in economic matters, it would be advisable for the GOI to continue to work with our Embassy in New Delhi on this question. Mr. Henderson added that the Department had been endeavoring to accomplish something along these lines but that the demands upon the American engineering profession were simply in excess of the supply. We would, however, continue our efforts to povide some assistance and it might be that the recent Smith–Mundt Act⁵ would be helpful.

Sir Girja then mentioned that Colonel Kaul, former Indian Military Attaché in Washington, had reported that it was the present policy of the United States to withhold exports of military materiel to India. Mr. Thurston asked whether Kaul had pointed out that this policy applied equally to Pakistan, and Sir Girja replied that Kaul had not mentioned that aspect of our policy. Mr. Hare emphasized that, with respect to the B–25’s which Colonel Kaul had requested, the position was that, quite aside from the policy, that type of plane simply was not available, there being none in this country excess to the needs of our air force. Mr. Henderson pointed out that the decision to withhold exports of military materiel had been taken at a time when relations between India and Pakistan were quite tense and there was a possibility of serious trouble between them. He emphasized that it was not a permanent policy, and Mr. Hare added that we hoped that it would be a policy for a matter of months or preferably weeks. Sir Girja urged that the US not persist in this policy, as it was of urgent necessity that India strengthen its defenses. The Indian air force lacked bombers, and there were many other essential military needs which could be met only by imports. He would like very much to send a military mission to this country to explore the possibilities of procuring essential military equipment. Mr. Henderson said that it would be advisable for us to give some preliminary thought to this proposal before taking any definite action. In view of the indications that our own rearmament would be stepped up, it would be necessary to ascertain from our military people what the possibilities would be for sending military equipment abroad.

Sir Girja returned to Mr. Henderson’s office following his interview with the Acting Secretary.⁶ He said that he had mentioned to Mr. Lovett India’s interest in being considered for the seat on the Security Council now held by Syria which the latter is vacating this coming fall. He pointed out that Asia had only two seats on the Security Council, one held by China, a permanent member, and the other having been passed from one Islamic nation to another. He felt that the time had come for India to be the second Asian member and hoped that the United States would be inclined to support India’s candidacy, particularly in view of our backing of India against the Ukraine last fall. Mr. Henderson said that Sir Girja had presented a good argument and that we would give very serious consideration to India’s claim.

Sir Girja indicated some resentment at the fact that Secretary Royall of the Army Department had not received him despite the prearranged appointment at 4:15. Secretary Royall had been tied up in an urgent press conference. Mr. Henderson expressed his regret to Sir Girja and subsequently called Secretary Royall and suggested that he might wish to have some message sent to Sir Girja at the Indian Embassy.

1. Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
2. Raymond A. Hare, Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs.
3. Ray L. Thurston, Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs.
4. Prime Minister and Minister for National Planning.
5. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. For text, see 62 Stat. 6.
6. Infra.