745.45F/2–2848: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State
170. Your 124 February 25. During past few days in addition to Abdullah have talked with Jaya Prakash Narayan,1 Symon acting British High Commissioner, and Kearney Canadian High Commissioner and have several general impressions. First, a feeling which seems to be growing that HMG and USG have taken side of Pakistan. Thursday night Ayyangar publicly accused both governments and the SC of bias and cited statement of Senator Austin with reference to the necessity of satisfying the tribal invaders in connection with any solution of the Kashmir problem.2 He said to his “astonishment” British delegates concurred in statement of Senator Austin. Nehru likewise has bitterly criticized SC without singling out HMG and USG. On other hand, Dawn newspaper frequently indicates belief in successful outcome for Pakistan of Kashmir dispute at UN. Kearney returned on plane recently with Pakistan official who had been at Lake Success and who indicated growing confidence of Pakistan victory before SC.
GOI feel their case badly handled and there is some tendency criticism GOI circles of Ayyangar. Also public criticism GOI for [Page 309] submitting question to SC. Nehru says privately as justification for submission he felt case so strong there could be no doubt of outcome. GOI feel matter a simple one of invasion with the demonstrable assistance of Pakistan and that SC should only have considered evidence this point and enjoined Pakistan to desist its aid to tribesmen and make every effort to get them out of Kashmir. Kearney feels that a defeat for Nehru before SC might well lead to fall his government and I agree. Plebiscite defeat would not have this effect. As indicating-possibility Pakistan being effective in helping keep law and order in Kashmir, Abdullah stated his belief tribesmen would shortly be returning home for the sowing their spring crops. Once they leave, problem of keeping them out, especially if Pakistan made clear to them it would not continue assistance from West Punjab, would be greatly simplified.
Referring your suggestions 1 to 8 inclusive, would stress the importance from standpoint GOI of maintaining strictly constitutional procedure. As you know, GOI case based primarily on legal grounds. I have little doubt GOI can control Maharaja3 and Abdullah and they will accept whatever program GOI agrees to. They would wish the appointment of administrator and his assistants to be formally made by emergency coalition government. I am convinced GOI will continue to insist Abdullah remain head of any coalition government that might be set up. General feeling here is Abdullah has the confidence of people of Kashmir as no other Kashmiri could possibly have. I believe if authority of administrator and staffs is entirely confined to the plebiscite and matters directly connected with the plebiscite and the absolute authority of the emergency coalition government is recognized, that GOI might accept your suggestions.
Drawing analogy Greek situation, I believe coalition government would have every reason to wish to have favorable verdict rendered as to fairness of the elections by the UN Commission and therefore be meticulous in its conduct. This should be reassurance to Pakistan. I believe your plan the basis upon which a solution may be worked out keeping in mind the points I have made in my endeavor to appraise the situation.
Ayyangar leaving for Lake Success end of first week in March. Will cable exact date when definite. Abdullah not returning with him.
Sent Department 170, repeated Karachi 58.4 Department please repeat London 50, and New York.
- Leader of left-wing elements of India’s Congress Party.↩
- Statement by Austin not identified.↩
- H. H. Maharaja Sir Harisingh.↩
- Commenting on this cable, Ambassador Alling in Pakistan informed the Department in telegram No. 128 of March 2, not printed, that he seriously doubted whether India would have the slightest confidence in the fairness of a plebiscite as long as Abdullah remained head of the Kashmir Government (745.45F/3–248).↩