501.BC/2–2748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Thurston)
Subject: Exchange of Views with British Representatives with Respect to Kashmir
| Participants: | British Delegation |
| Mr. B. R. Curson, Commonwealth Relations Office | |
| Mr. B. Cockram, Commonwealth Relations Office | |
| Sir Cecil Griffin, Commonwealth Relations Office | |
| Mr. M. E. Bathurst, Legal Adviser to UK Delegation to the UN | |
| American Officials | |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, UNA | |
| Mr. Charles Noyes, USUN | |
| Mr. Hare, SOA | |
| Mr. Thurston, SOA | |
| Mr. Sparks, SOA |
It was agreed at the outset that we should begin the discussion by further exchange of views with respect to the use of Pakistan troops during interim period. The US representatives pointed out that they were disturbed by the possibly far-reaching implications of a Security Council resolution recommending the use of foreign troops from one [Page 307] party to a dispute in the territory of another party to the dispute. Reference was made to possible analogous situations in Turkey, Iran, Greece, and China. The British representatives at first attempted to minimize such an analogy by asserting that Kashmir was “territory in dispute.” The US representatives agreed that Kashmir was a state about which a dispute had arisen between India and Pakistan but stated that they found it difficult to deny the legal validity of Kashmir’s accession to India. In the end, the British representatives agreed with the US point of view that we had to proceed on the assumption for the time being at any rate India had legal jurisdiction over Kashmir.
When it was pointed out that a second objection to a SC recommendation that Pakistan troops be used in Kashmir was that it was extremely doubtful that India would permit the implementation of such a recommendation, the British hastened to state that, of course, they had assumed that India would in the last analysis agree to the use of Pakistan troops but only if “morally compelled” to do so by virtue of a UN recommendation. The US representatives said that they wished to make it clear that they agreed with the British that the entry of Pakistan troops into Kashmir would be in itself a desirable thing in that it would no doubt help to bring about a better psychological situation both for the withdrawal of the tribesmen and for the holding of an impartial plebiscite. We felt, however, the furtherest [sic] we could go would be to envisage the use of Pakistan troops as a result of an agreement between the Government of Kashmir and the Governments of India and Pakistan. When the British asked what provision we had in mind for the maintenance of law and order in areas where fighting had taken place (and from which presumably both Indian troops and irregular forces had withdrawn), we stated that it was our thought that local militia could be set up in these areas on a provisional basis.
At the end of the discussion of Pakistan troop question, we referred to several other features of our proposals for an interim regime in Kashmir. The British appeared to be more favorably inclined to the concept of a coalition government than they had previously and they were particularly interested in the proposal for the placing of an outsider in the Kashmir Government with jurisdiction over such functions as the police, courts, etc. There was a brief but inconclusive discussion with respect to the role to be played by the plebiscite marshal and the plebiscite magistrate. With regard to the coalition government proposal, the British seemed very reluctant to agree to any scheme whereby Sheikh Abdullah would remain Prime Minister even if only on a nominal basis. On the other hand, the British commented that if we could get an outsider in the Kashmir Government, he would hold the balance of power in any voting.
[Page 308]At the end of the meeting we turned over to the British several copies of our draft resolution,1 and they said they would transmit it immediately to London. They stated that the Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs2 was returning from Ceylon via New Delhi and Karachi and that he would be in London during the early part of the first week of March with the latest information on Indian and Pakistani thinking. They promised to give us the reaction of their government to the US proposals by March 2nd or 3rd.
In response to an inquiry of the British we told them that we had discussed with the Chinese the principles involved in our proposals and that we did not contemplate further discussions with the Chinese until we heard more from the British. The British seemed particularly anxious to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with us before discussion of detailed plans was undertaken with other delegations. The British made it clear that their own proposals, including those with respect to Pakistan troops, were to be considered as extremely fluid and subject to revision.