Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

501.BC/1–1448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin )

confidential

Washington , January 14, 1948—4 p. m.

17. Following views of Dept may be useful to you in SC debate of Kashmir case and in preliminary conversations.¹ Ref is made to memo of conversation between Mr. Lovett and Noel-Baker and other members of UK Del.

1. Leadership in SC. Dept’s views remain as expressed in Deptel 5, Jan 6, which are now fully understood by Noel-Baker in light of conversation with Lovett. Although we wish to cooperate to maximum extent with UK we do not wish to take overt lead in SC consideration.

2. UK plan as outlined by Noel-Baker envisages SC decision to be adopted as soon as possible comprising following points:

(a) Movement of Pakistan troops into tribal areas in northern Kashmir and withdrawal of Indian troops into southern part, Kashmir valley to be occupied by joint GOI and GOP forces.

(b) Appointment by SC of neutral military commander of all Indian and Pakistan troops in Kashmir.

(c) Establishment by SC of UN commission in Srinagar of which military commander might be head to exercise interim governmental administration in Kashmir.

(d) This commission to be composed of individuals from neutral states chosen on basis of competence and to be assisted by Indian and Pakistan officials as well as by a corps of neutral observers.

(e) Use of international police force if possible.

(f) This commission or another commission to be established by SC to make necessary preparation for plebiscite and actual observance thereof.

(g) SC decision to be accompanied or preceded by provisional measure under Art 40 or extension of President’s communication to GOI and GOP.

3. UK are hopeful that agreement can be reached between Indian and Pakistan Delegations in NY on essentials of this plan and that SC can by resolution make decision that it be put into operation.

4. In Dept’s view complexity of UK plan and difficulty of designating military commander, neutral commission, etc. might prolong SC debate and might provide opportunity for obstructionist tactics which would prevent SC decision. However, aside from obvious complications of proposal for use of international troops, some such plan as UK suggests might be feasible if full agreement were reached between India and Pakistan, including agreement on composition of commission, selection of commander, arrangements for observers, and apportionment of costs on satisfactory basis, etc.

5. In event that agreement between parties directly concerned can not be reached, Dept believes that SC action might be achieved by a less complicated plan for settlement containing 3 basic elements:

(a) Calling on parties to desist from military action, to arrange truce and to consult with each other as to effective means of implementing truce.

(b) Establishment of commission to assist parties in implementation of truce and in settlement of their dispute by peaceful means.

(c) Calling upon parties to carry out intention expressed by both that plebiscite be held at early date and expressing Council’s readiness through the commission to assist them to that end.

6. In Dept’s view composition of commission might well be established by SC as in Indonesian case² where each party selects one member and the third to be designated by the two so selected; in this case, however, choice of parties should not be limited to membership of SC. US unwilling to be member of commission selected by a party but could not decline if it were third member selected.

7. Our less complicated suggestion differs from UK plan in one essential point about which Noel-Baker expressed himself strongly; namely, that the process of conciliation should take place in NY and be supported by SC decision rather than left to SC commission in the area.

8. In outlining less complicated suggestion, Dept does not wish it to be advanced in SC debate in competition with UK plan but rather as something to be considered by UK as perhaps more palatable to parties and other SC members and more in harmony with realities of SC capabilities. Nor does Dept wish to eliminate possibility that parties may reach agreement in NY on a more complicated plan which the SC can endorse and implement by appropriate resolution. In this connection US favors and should support British suggestion that, after opportunity has been given to both parties to present their case in SC, President might appoint two members of SC to work with him as a subcommittee in assisting parties in reaching agreement as to most appropriate and effective action which SC could take to effect a peaceful settlement. Dept does not believe that UK, US or USSR should be on this subcommittee but has no objection to France or China. In Dept’s view optimum composition of subcommittee would be Belgium, China and Canada.

9. If provisional measure under Art 40 is proposed and generally favored in SC, US should support it. Any such provisional measure should be without prejudice to rights, claims or position of parties and should not impute blame to either side. As to Belgian draft³ Dept has specific comments which will be telephoned and believes language of any such resolution should be carefully considered.

Marshall

1. The Security Council had placed the Kashmir question on the agenda of its 226th meeting on January 6, when the Representatives of India and Pakistan were invited to participate in the discussion. However, consideration of the matter was postponed at the request of the Pakistani Representative, M. A. Hassan Ispahani, pending arrival in New York of the Pakistan Foreign Minister. The official record of the 226th–240th meetings of the Security Council, January 6–February 4, 1948, is printed in SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 1–15.
2. For documentation on United Nations Security Council consideration of the Indonesian question, see vol. vi, pp. 57 ff.
3. Reference here is to an early draft of a resolution being prepared for presentation in the Security Council following the Pakistani statement scheduled for the next meeting.