501.BC/1–1348: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State
45. Dr. P. P. Pillai brought Dr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who will present India’s case on the Kashmir question before SC, in to call on me this afternoon.
Ayyangar was very moderate in expressing his views. He alluded to the “right end” India would have under international law in crossing Pakistan territory as a measure of self-defense against raiders penetrating Kashmir. However, GOI realized that under present state of affairs, this might precipitate war with Pakistan. In an earlier day there was no international organization, no SC to which matter could be referred. Since we now have SC, the GOI preferred to bring matter to the Council and avoid thereby, if possible, risk of conflict with Pakistan.
Ayyangar said that prompt action by Council was necessary. He said that most important thing was to put a stop to the fighting. He [Page 279] confirmed that a plebiscite or referendum might provide the ultimate solution. Because of weather and other physical conditions, it would probably not be possible to initiate action looking towards a plebiscite until April. Thereafter, electoral rolls would have to be prepared and this would take some time.
He thought that the Prince would soon establish a government with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah as Prime Minister. This government, supported by local forces, would be responsible for maintaining law and order during period of preparation of plebiscite; alternatively Indian forces might be employed.
Abdullah was the head of a national party which cut across religious lines. Only other political party in area is Moslem conference organized on fanatically religious lines. Only 10 or 15 per cent of people had the franchise. Under a plebiscite this would, of course, be extended to cover the entire adult population. Taking account of high degree of illiteracy, methods had been devised which could be applied in Kashmir to guarantee effectiveness of the secret ballot.
Ayyangar was moderate in statements to effect that Pakistan nationals might have joined forces with tribal raiders. In any event, principal question was whether Pakistan Government was willing and able to control these raiders. He implied in his statements that he thought the Pakistan Government was willing. He said that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had indicated to him very recently that his principal difficulty was the adverse public opinion reaction in Pakistan, should Pakistan forces be employed against fellow Moslems. There was a good deal to be said, Ayyangar went on, for the idea of an SC order which would give the Pakistan Government a stronger position vis-à-vis public opinion. If the Pakistan Government wanted help in controlling the raiders, the GOI would be willing to assist.
In conclusion, Ayyangar said that it had been possible for the two governments to arrive at friendly settlements of many of their difficulties and this was only problem of a serious character. He had no doubt that if this problem could be solved amicably, there would be no insuperable difficulties in way of solving other problems between two governments. He gave every indication of intending to follow a moderate course in SC.