Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

868.00/5–1148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

secret   us urgent

Washington, May 15, 1948—5 p. m.

605. While Tsaldaris must of course be guided by own best judgment, Dept’s suggestion would be to ignore Soviet note (Embtel 811 May 14¹), which itself ignores several public explanations of executions by Grk spokesmen between May 1 and 13. Soviet note merely puts official stamp on current Soviet-inspired propaganda campaign, was presumably intended stimulate this campaign within iron curtain area, and will probably pass unnoticed in free world press like recent Rumanian “protest” which Grks also wisely refused to dignify with a formal answer. Just as they have disregarded public statements, Soviets would certainly disregard any explanatory reply to this note except to cull it for possibly exploitable propaganda material. As for World public, explanations have already been given and publicized, except for details of charges and procedure in selected list of persons executed as suggested Deptel 573 May 11.²

If Soviets publish note, our suggestion is that Tsaldaris might well confine himself to brief statement to press, expressing intention not to reply since explanations already given and since note is obvious propaganda move constituting intolerable interference with and affront to Grk State. He might add such protest comes in singularly poor grace from State where summary punishment without benefit of public procedure is usual fate of persons hostile to or in revolt against authority of State in contrast to democratic Greece where such persons are now being punished, not for their political opposition or opinion but for criminal acts after having been permitted fair public trial in accordance with civilized process of law.

If Ladas assassination was, as seems likely, ordered by Markos on higher Communist directive, it was probably conceived as diabolically clever, double-edged propaganda weapon. Grk Govt would either be intimidated into calling off executions, in which case its “weakness” could be exploited to bolster waning guerrilla morale, or executions would be continued, as has happened, thus permitting their exploitation as “bloody mass reprisals.” While correctly refusing to be intimidated, Grk Govt should, it would seem, avoid adding fuel to propaganda flame by pursuing moderate and cautious policy re executions, preferably selecting for early execution those manifestly guilty of most atrocious crimes and giving full publicity in each case. Grk Govt might also give consideration to possibility that execution after several years incarceration of over 2,000 persons, which is announced backlog of condemned, might create grave political difficulties from viewpoint world opinion regardless of atrocious nature their crimes which would more than offset any advantages from the point of view of maintaining law and order which the carrying out of capital sentences might entail.³

Repeat London as 1773, Paris as 1683, Moscow as 546, Belgrade as 241, Sofia as 311.

Marshall

1. Not printed; it reported that the Soviet note, handed to Mr. Tsaldaris on May 13, called “the attention of the Greek Government to the indignation provoked among the Soviet people by the mass executions of Greek Democrats now taking place in Greece.” (868.00/5–1448)
2. Not printed.
3. Chargé Rankin, on receipt of telegram 605, conveyed its substance to the Greek Foreign Minister. The British Ambassador, however, on instructions from London, advised a formal and detailed reply (telegram 846, May 19, 7 p. m., from Athens, 868.00/5–1948); for text of the Greek reply, see telegram 847, May 19, p. 91.